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I. INTRODUCTION
The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law from the year 2006. They are neither
comprehensive in breadth (several cases are omitted) nor in depth (many issues within
individual cases are omitted). Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an
authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to alert the Alaska legal community about
judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission
In Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission,1 the supreme court held
that the Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Commission (“Commission”) applied the proper
standard in denying a petition for a unitization order and that the superior court may deny
a request for a de novo hearing on appeal from the Commission.2 The day before his oil
and gas exploration leases were set to expire, Allen petitioned the Commission for a
unitization order to combine his valueless leases with other highly productive oil fields.3
After the Commission denied the petition, the superior court refused Allen’s request to
hear his appeal de novo and affirmed the Commission’s decision.4 Allen appealed,
arguing that the superior court incorrectly refused his request of a hearing and that the
Commission applied the wrong standard in its denial of his petition.5 The supreme court
held that the statute relied upon by Allen as entitling him to a de novo hearing had been
impliedly repealed by legislative developments, and therefore the decision to hear an
appeal de novo was left to the superior court’s discretion.6 The supreme court further
held that the proper statutory standard for evaluating Allen’s unitization petition was the
standard relating to involuntary unitization, since Allen’s petition was not seeking
voluntary unitization.7 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court,
holding that it was correct to deny Allen’s petition for a de novo hearing and that the
Commission applied the proper statutory standard in rejecting Allen’s petition.8

Brandal v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
In Brandal v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,9 the supreme court
held that the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission’s (the “CFEC”) denial of a limited
entry fishing permit was valid despite a twenty-two year delay.10 Brandal worked as a
crew member on his father’s boat until 1972.11 He was a gear license holder in 1974, and
applied for a limited entry permit in 1977.12 In order to receive a permit, an individual
must accumulate twenty points for certain fishing related activities.13 Brandal’s
application was denied for lack of sufficient points, and he was given an interim permit.14
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Twenty-two years later, the CFEC officially denied his application.15 The superior court
affirmed the CFEC’s decision.16 Brandal appealed, arguing that (1) he should have been
awarded points for special circumstances, (2) CFEC was required to inform applicants
that only partners of gear licensees in 1971-72 would be granted special circumstances
points, and (3) the twenty-two year delay violated his due process.17 The supreme court
held that Brandal’s first argument failed, because the special circumstances provision
applied to former co-owners of boats, not crew members.18 Brandal’s second claim also
failed because at least two individuals who were not partners of gear licensees in 1971-72
did in fact receive permits.19 Finally, Brandal’s third claim failed because there was no
risk of error based on the delay, and there was no evidence of prejudice.20 The supreme
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the CFEC’s denial of
Brandal’s limited entry fishing permit was valid despite a twenty-two year delay.21

Benavides v. State
In Benavides v. State,22 the supreme court held that legislative employees are not
necessarily entitled to the same per diem allowance as legislators.23 Benavides, a
legislative aide required to travel to Juneau for the legislative session, was not granted a
per diem allowance for his time there.24 He filed suit, claiming that he was guaranteed a
per diem equal to that given to legislators under Alaska Statute section 24.10.130(b).25
The supreme court held that the plain language of the statute26 was consistent with the
Alaska Legislative Council’s decision not to give Benavides a per diem allowance.27
Additionally, a look at the legislative history was insufficient to rebut the conclusion that
the plain language allowed the Council’s decision.28 The supreme court affirmed the
decision of the superior court, holding that Benavides and other legislative employees are
not entitled to the same per diem allowance as legislators.29
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Flowline of Alaska v. Brennan
In Flowline of Alaska v. Brennan,30 the supreme court held that an injured
employee who had worked for more than thirteen weeks was an ongoing, hourly worker
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.31 From November 1998 to March 1999,
Brennan worked for Flowline of Alaska (“Flowline”) full-time, with intermittent breaks
due to weather and equipment failure, among other things.32 When Brennan was injured
in early March 1999, he requested workers’ compensation payments as an ongoing,
hourly worker with thirteen consecutive weeks of experience.33 Flowline contested the
classification before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”), arguing first
that Brennan was an “exclusively temporary” worker and, alternatively, that Brennan was
a seasonal hourly worker.34 The Board concluded that Brennan was an ongoing, hourly
worker, and the superior court affirmed.35 The supreme court adopted superior court’s
decision and held that Brennan was an ongoing, hourly worker, not a temporary or
seasonal worker, because of his ongoing relationship with Flowline, the gross number of
hours he worked, and the fact that he worked for more than thirteen weeks.36 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that an injured employee
who had worked for more than thirteen weeks was an ongoing, hourly worker entitled to
workers’ compensation benefits.37

State v. Grunert
In State v. Grunert,38 the supreme court held that the Alaska Board of Fisheries
(“Board”) exceeded its authority in promulgating an emergency regulation to create a
cooperative fishery scheme and in allocating fishery resources within a single fishery.39
Grunert, a non-participating salmon fisher, challenged the Board’s regulation authorizing
a cooperative of salmon purse seine fishers.40 The superior court rejected the challenge
but was reversed by the supreme court.41 The Board then promulgated an emergency
regulation to again authorize a cooperative.42 Grunert challenged and the superior court
entered final judgment for Grunert; the Board appealed.43 The supreme court held that
the Board exceeded its authority in promulgating an emergency regulation to create a
cooperative fishery scheme because the regulation was at odds with the Limited Entry
Act and that the means employed by the regulation, in authorizing different equipment
for the cooperative and open fishers, did not create two distinct fisheries.44 The
30
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regulation was at odds with the Limited Entry Act’s purpose to protect active,
economically dependent fishers, because the emergency regulation required only some
participation by the permit holders in the cooperative,45 allowing fishers who made the
minimum number of deliveries to receive the same profit as those who made more
deliveries.46 Also, the differences in gear authorized under the regulation did not create
two distinct fisheries, and the Board therefore violated its authorizing statute by
allocating fishery resources within a single fishery.47 The supreme court upheld the
superior court’s decision in part and reversed in part, holding that the Board exceeded its
authority by promulgating an emergency regulation to create a cooperative fishery
scheme and that the means employed by the regulation were outside the Board’s
authority to allocate fishery resources within a single fishery.48

J & S Services v. Tomter
In J & S Services v. Tomter,49 the supreme court held that the Alaska State
Procurement Code’s exclusionary provision expressly exempted a government agency
from liability for civil damages, but that damages could be recovered from a government
officer in an individual capacity so long as the officer was acting outside of the scope of
regular duties.50 After losing a bid for leasing an airplane to the Department of Natural
Resources, J & S Services (“J & S”) brought suit in superior court, alleging that Tomter,
who headed the leasing project, and the procurement agency were liable for a number of
torts relating to improper dealing in awarding the contract.51 The superior court
dismissed claims against Tomter and the State, and J & S appealed.52 The supreme court
held that the procurement agency was exempted from liability in a civil damage suit
under the procurement code, but that officials acting outside of the scope of their official
duties were not exempt from individual capacity civil suits.53 No exemption from civil
suit is explicitly provided for individuals in the procurement code, and under traditional
principles of official immunity, officials acting outside of the scope of regular work
duties may be held individually liable in civil damages suits.54 The supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of claims against the State, but reversed the
dismissal of claims against Tomter and remanded the case, holding that the procurement
code expressly exempted a government agency from liability for civil damages, but that
damages could be recovered from a government officer in an individual capacity who
was acting outside of the scope of regular duties.55
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Lewis v. State
In Lewis v. State,56 the supreme court held that the Department of Corrections
(“Department”) did not violate due process of a state prisoner in refusing her request to
be examined by a physician of her choosing in order to prove a medical condition that
would entitle her to be considered for executive clemency.57 Lewis, convicted of seconddegree murder, was not to be eligible for parole until 2011.58 Fearing she would not live
until 2011 because of her poor health, she applied for executive clemency.59 The
Department’s medical staff determined there were no medical grounds to support her
request for clemency.60 Lewis filed a complaint against the State asking for a declaratory
judgment on whether she should be allowed independent medical opinion evidence.61
The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, finding that denial of Lewis’
request to see an independent doctor did not violate her due process.62 The supreme court
applied a three-factor test to determine whether Lewis had a fair opportunity to make a
factual showing to support her clemency application.63 The test balanced (1) the private
interest affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
because of the procedures used and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest.64 Under this test, the Department’s denial of Lewis’ access to an
independent doctor did not violate her due process because Lewis did not demonstrate
there would be any practical value in consulting an independent doctor.65 The supreme
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the Department did not
violate a prisoner’s due process when it denied her access to an independent doctor to
prove a medical condition that would entitle her to be considered for clemency.66

Lakloey, Inc. v. University of Alaska
In Lakloey, Inc. v. University of Alaska,67 the supreme court held that the costs
expended in preparing a bid were not recoverable when irregularities in the bid
solicitation process were not shown to have caused any actual damages.68 In soliciting
bids for improvements to its facilities, the University of Alaska (“University”) issued an
addendum to the bid instructions on the day the bids were scheduled to be opened.69
Lakloey, which had submitted a bid prior to the issuance of the addendum, protested,
arguing that the addendum violated the instructions issued to bidders as well as relevant
statutes.70 After the University rejected the two properly submitted bids, including
56
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Lakloey’s, it denied Lakloey’s bid protest without a hearing.71 On appeal, the superior
court also rejected Lakloey’s arguments.72 The supreme court held that a successful bid
protester must show actual damages in order to recover the costs of bid preparation and
that, while the University violated Alaska law and its own instructions, Lakloey failed to
show that these violations and irregularities caused it any additional expenses.73 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the costs expended in
preparing a bid were not recoverable when irregularities in the bid solicitation process
were not shown to have caused any actual damages.74

City of Saint Paul v. State
In City of Saint Paul v. State,75 the supreme court held that a Department of
Natural Resources ruling that used the statutory definition of a boundary for tidelands did
not address a boundary dispute and, therefore, properly left the issue open for judicial
resolution.76 The City of Saint Paul (“City”) applied to the Department of Natural
Resources (“Department”) for a conveyance of tidelands.77 The Department conveyed
the tidelands in accordance with the current boundary, which was statutorily defined
according to the current mean high water line.78 The City argued that by granting the
tidelands according to the current boundary rather than an earlier line, it was adjudicating
a boundary dispute.79 The supreme court held that the Department was not adjudicating a
boundary dispute by issuing the tidelands, because the Department used the statutory
definition, there were no evidentiary hearings, and the commissioner made it clear that
the conveyance did not establish a fixed boundary.80 The commissioner conveyed the
tidelands under a statute that does not require the commissioner to resolve the boundary
dispute.81 The supreme court affirmed the Department’s conveyance, holding that it did
not adjudicate the boundary dispute.82

Western States Fire Protection Co. of Alaska v. Anchorage
In Western States Fire Protection Co. of Alaska v. Anchorage,83 the supreme
court held that, even under the rational basis standard of review, the decision of the
Anchorage Board of Building Regulation Examiners and Appeals (“Board”) must be
vacated where the Board has not addressed a critical issue in determining the appropriate
outcome of the proceeding.84 Western States Fire Protection Co. appealed a decision of
71
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the Anchorage Fire Department that the sprinkler system in a school was inadequate.85
The Board reversed the decision of the fire department, based on a narrow reading of the
fire code, but without considering the adequacy of water coverage for fire prevention.86
The supreme court held that rational basis review of the Board’s decision was appropriate
and found the decision lacking in proper reference to the overall goal of the fire code: to
ensure the adequacy of water coverage of a potential fire hazard.87 The supreme court
vacated and remanded the decision of the Board, holding that the Board had not
addressed a critical issue in determining the appropriate outcome of the proceeding.88

Wilson v. State, Department of Corrections
In Wilson v. State, Department of Corrections,89 the supreme court held that the
State’s policy of transporting released prisoners to the community nearest the “place of
arrest” satisfies the Alaska administrative code’s requirement90 of a return to the “place
of arrest.”91 Shortly before his release from prison, Wilson requested to be transported by
airplane directly to his home and place of arrest, which was accessible only by footpath
and airplane.92 The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) denied his request,93 and he
filed an administrative grievance and appeal, arguing that the DOC was required by its
regulation to transport him to his “place of arrest.”94 The DOC denied his grievance and
appeal,95 the superior court denied his subsequent suit for declaratory relief and damages,
and Wilson appealed.96 The supreme court held that the DOC could return released
prisoners to the community nearest the “place of arrest” since the phrase “place of arrest”
is ambiguous,97 there is no legislative history which helps define it,98 and the statute’s
purpose to get prisoners home is achieved by the DOC’s interpretation, which was
reasonable and not arbitrary. 99 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior
court, holding that the State’s policy of transporting released prisoners to the community
nearest the “place of arrest” satisfies the Alaskan administrative code’s requirement of a
return to the “place of arrest.”100
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III. BUSINESS LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n v. Alaska
In Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n v. Alaska,101 the Ninth Circuit held that a
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to interpret a settlement agreement in an adversary
proceeding brought between two creditors after the underlying bankruptcy had been
closed.102 Valdez Fisheries Development Association (“VFDA”) and Sea Hawk
Seafoods, Inc. (“Sea Hawk”), its creditor, entered into a settlement agreement in the
course of VFDA’s bankruptcy proceedings.103 The bankruptcy court approved the
agreement and entered a final decree closing the bankruptcy proceedings.104 The
bankruptcy court then claimed jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding between Sea
Hawk and the State of Alaska prompted by the VFDA case.105 The Ninth Circuit held
that the bankruptcy court (1) lacked “related to” jurisdiction over the resultant case, since
the bankruptcy proceeding had been entirely closed prior to the adversary proceeding and
could not, therefore, be impacted or altered by it and (2) lacked ancillary jurisdiction to
“vindicate its authority” or “effectuate its decree” in the previous case, since the
bankruptcy court had not explicitly retained jurisdiction or incorporated the terms of the
settlement agreement as required for ancillary jurisdiction.106 The Ninth Circuit reversed
the order of the district court, holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to
interpret a settlement agreement in an adversary proceeding brought between two
creditors after the underlying bankruptcy had been closed.107

Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska Construction & Engineering, Inc. v. Balzer Pacific Equipment Co.
In Alaska Construction & Engineering, Inc. v. Balzer Pacific Equipment Co.,108
the supreme court held that a lessor who succeeded on the primary issue in the case was
the prevailing party and could therefore recover from a lessee the attorneys’ fees
stipulated in the repossession provision of the lease, but could not recover its trial costs
after repossession nor the higher interest rate printed on its repair invoices.109 Alaska
Construction & Engineering, Inc. (“ACE”) leased rock-crushing equipment with the
option to purchase from Balzer Pacific Equipment Co. (“Balzer”).110 ACE defaulted, and
Balzer repossessed its equipment after posting a bond.111 At trial, the jury found that
101
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ACE breached the contract and awarded $50,500 in damages to Balzer; it also rejected all
of ACE’s affirmative defenses and three out of four counterclaims, awarding ACE
$10,000.112 The judge ruled that Balzer was the prevailing party and was entitled to
attorneys’ fees accrued before it recovered its equipment, but not after, and set the
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate rather than the much higher rate specified on
invoices Balzer sent to ACE.113 ACE appealed the prevailing party decision and Balzer
cross-appealed the attorneys’ fees and interest rate decisions.114 The supreme court held
that the lessor prevailed on the primary issue in the case and, as the prevailing party,
could therefore recover from the lessee the attorneys’ fees provided by the repossession
provision of the lease, but not its trial costs, nor the higher interest rate printed on its
invoices.115 First, Balzer was the prevailing party because it prevailed on the main issue
in the case, had the larger monetary award, and succeeded on greater and more significant
portions of its claims than ACE.116 Further, the supreme court read the lease and option
to purchase as separate agreements.117 Thus, the attorneys’ fees provision of the option to
purchase was inapplicable since the option was never exercised, and the attorneys’ fees
provided by the repossession clause of the lease only applied up to the time that Balzer
obtained possession of its equipment.118 Finally, the court set the interest rate at the
statutory rate rather than the eighteen percent printed on the repair invoices sent to ACE
because Balzer did not show that ACE had knowledge of the eighteen percent provision
or a reasonable opportunity to reject it.119 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s decision, holding that Balzer was the prevailing party because it succeeded on the
main issue and was therefore entitled by the repossession provision of the lease to
attorneys’ fees incurred until repossession of the equipment, but not trial costs nor the
higher interest rate printed on its repair invoices.120

Anchorage Chrysler Center, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
In Anchorage Chrysler Center, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,121 the supreme
court held that a statement can be fraudulent misrepresentation even if technically true
and that a letter of intent is not necessary for fact-finders to determine the existence of an
agreement.122 Anchorage Chrysler Center, Inc. (“ACC”) entered into an agreement with
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. (“DCMC”) that ACC would rearrange its showrooms so as
to sell only Dodge brand cars in one building and Chryslers, Plymouths, and Jeeps in
another building.123 ACC contended that this agreement included a DCMC promise to
allow ACC to build another automobile dealership in the town of Wasilla and to disallow
112
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other new Dodge dealerships in the area.124 DCMC never provided ACC any Jeeps,
arguing that ACC had failed to remodel its buildings per the agreement.125 DCMC also
argued that although it had suggested that there were no plans for another Dodge
dealership when ACC inquired, it did not break any promises when it allowed a new
Dodge dealership to be built in the Anchorage area,126 and that despite talks concerning
an ACC dealership in Wasilla, DCMC never delivered or signed a written letter of intent
giving ACC rights to a new dealership.127 The supreme court held that even though
DCMC’s statements that there were no plans for a new Dodge dealership were
technically true, a true statement can be misleading and, therefore, can still be an
actionable fraudulent misrepresentation if it induced actions that an informed party would
not have undertaken.128 The supreme court also held that ACC did not need a new letter
of intent for the Wasilla dealership to create an agreement and that whether or not there
was an agreement at all is a question for the fact-finder.129 The supreme court vacated
the dismissal of ACC’s contract claims, holding that a statement can be fraudulent
misrepresentation even if technically true and that a letter of intent is not necessary for
fact-finders to determine the existence of an agreement.130
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage
In Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage,131 the Ninth Circuit held that
limited liability companies (“LLCs”) share the citizenship of all of their members for
purposes of invoking the district court’s diversity jurisdiction; thus, the district court
properly exercised jurisdiction over an Alaska state court case removed to federal district
court by the defendant, an LLC whose members were not Alaska citizens.132 Johnson, an
independent crane operator, provided crane services to Columbia Properties Anchorage
(“Columbia”) between September 1998 and February 2000 and sent an invoice in
January, 2002.133 Columbia did not pay134 and, in February 2003, Johnson filed suit in
Alaska state court.135 Columbia removed the case to federal district court based on
diversity of citizenship and moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the claims
were time-barred by Alaska's three-year statute of limitations.136 The district court
granted the defendant's motion.137 Johnson appealed, arguing that the district court
should have remanded to state court based on the citizenship of the LLCs.138 The Ninth
Circuit held that an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its partners are citizens.139
Since none of the partners were Alaska citizens, the district court properly denied the
plaintiff's motion to remove.140 The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court
properly applied Alaska law by tolling the statute of limitations at the conclusion of the
project, not at the submission of the invoice.141 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the district court, holding that LLCs have the citizenship of all of their members; thus,
the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over an Alaska state court case removed
to federal district court by the defendant, an LLC whose members were not Alaska
citizens.142
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Alaska Supreme Court
In re Adoption of Erin G.
In In re Adoption of Erin G.,143 the supreme court held that a father’s petition
under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to invalidate his daughter’s adoption was
time-barred by Alaska’s one-year statute of limitations for challenging adoption
decrees.144 Erin G. was born to an unmarried, terminally ill mother and an incarcerated
father.145 In September, 2002, the superior court entered an adoption decree making the
Grants the legal parents of Erin.146 David L., Erin’s father, spent more than a year
appealing other issues in the case and seeking new counsel, but did not file a petition to
invalidate Erin’s adoption until October, 2004, more than two years after the adoption
order.147 The supreme court held that Alaska’s one-year statute of limitations on
challenging adoptions applied to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, thus barring David
from entering his petition.148 Because Congress did not put a statute of limitations in the
Indian Child Welfare Act, it was appropriate to adopt the local statute of limitations as
long as it did not conflict with federal laws or policies.149 Here, there was no such
conflict, and the one-year statute of limitations on petitioning adoptions provided a good
balance between protecting the rights of Indian parents and protecting the rights of an
adopted child.150 The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, holding
that a father’s petition under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to invalidate his
daughter’s adoption was time-barred by Alaska’s one-year statute of limitations for
challenging adoption decrees.151

Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Insurance, Inc.
In Blood v. Kenneth A. Murray Insurance, Inc.,152 the supreme court held that the
termination-of-coverage notice obligations of the insurer were satisfied by mailing
multiple written notices to the last known address even though the notices were returned
undelivered.153 Blood bought a six month renewable auto insurance policy from Kenneth
A. Murray Insurance, Inc. (“KMI”) but did not pay the renewal premium.154 KMI mailed
termination of coverage notices to Blood’s address which were returned undelivered. 155
Blood was then injured and his claim was denied.156 The superior court found that even
though KMI had satisfied its statutory duty by mailing the notices to the last known
address, KMI had a separate, non-statutory duty of care and due diligence to inform the
143
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insured of terminated coverage, though that failure was not the legal cause of harm to
Blood.157 The supreme court held that KMI fulfilled its statutory duty by mailing notice
of termination of coverage to his last known address and that the returned letters supplied
sufficient proof of mailing.158 The supreme court also held that the superior court erred
in holding KMI to a separate duty of care to inform the insured of termination; the
separate duty of care which may be found in real estate forfeitures is not comparable to
routine termination or non-renewal of automobile policies.159 The supreme court
reversed the superior court’s finding of a non-statutory duty of care for KMI, holding that
KMI satisfied its notice obligations by mailing multiple written notices to the last known
address of the insured.160

Brannon v. Continental Casualty Co.
In Brannon v. Continental Casualty Co.,161 the supreme court held that the statute
of limitations began running on an insured’s claim for breach of duty to defend against
the insurer at the initial refusal to defend, but that the statute of limitations was equitably
tolled until the underlying litigation was complete.162 Terry Pfleiger acted as a real estate
broker for the Brannons in their purchase of franchising assets from investors.163 The
Brannons and Pfleiger were sued by the investors.164 The Brannons, in turn, crossclaimed against Pfleiger for breach of his fiduciary duty as their broker.165 Continental
Casualty Co. (“Continental”), Pfleiger’s professional liability insurance carrier, refused to
defend him in these suits in 1997.166 Pfleiger’s rights to sue Continental for breach of a
duty to defend were later assigned to the Brannons.167 The Brannons asserted these rights
by filing a complaint against Continental in 2002.168 The superior court granted
Continental’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the three-year statute of
limitations had begun running in 1997 and had expired.169 The Brannons appealed.170
The supreme court held that, although the statute of limitations began running when the
contractual duty to defend was breached, it was equitably tolled until the underlying
litigation was resolved, because the duty to defend is ongoing and can be assumed at any
time before final judgment.171 Tolling allows the insured to wait until he has finished
litigating the underlying claim before filing a claim against the insurer.172 The supreme
court vacated the superior court’s dismissal and remanded, holding that the statute of
157
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limitations began running on an insured’s claim for breach of duty to defend against the
insurer at the initial refusal to defend, but that the statute of limitations was equitably
tolled until the underlying litigation was complete.173

Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does
In Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does,174 the supreme court held that
Alaska Statute section 09.10.065, which eliminates any statute of limitations for claims of
sexual abuse, does not apply retroactively, but declined to decide whether the discovery
rule tolled the statutes of limitations for this case because it involved questions of fact.175
Petitioner, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, appealed the superior court’s ruling
against its motion for dismissal in a civil case arising from sexual abuse on the grounds
that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.176 Petitioner argued that section
09.10.065 does not apply retroactively, meaning that the 2001 statute had no application
to allegations of abuse from the 1970s and before.177 The supreme court held that section
09.10.065 does not apply retroactively, because there is a presumption against statutes
applying retroactively and because there was no legislative history indicating
otherwise.178 However, the supreme court declined to dismiss the case, finding that
whether the statute of limitations had tolled was a question of fact, necessitating
discovery and further trial proceedings.179 The supreme court affirmed the decision of
the superior court, holding that section 09.10.065 does not apply retroactively and that the
question of the tolling of the statute of limitations was a factual one, deserving of further
discovery proceedings.180

Domke v. Alyeska Pipeline Co., Inc.
In Domke v. Alyeska Pipeline Co., Inc.,181 the supreme court held that the superior
court erred in a series of procedural decisions in a wrongful termination action.182
Domke sued his employer (“Champion”) for wrongful termination as well as a customer
of his employer (“Alyeska”) and the customer’s employee (“Disbrow”) for tortious
interference with his employment contract.183 Champion counterclaimed for conversion
and unjust enrichment.184 Domke and Champion each prevailed in part, and Domke
appealed.185 The supreme court held that the superior court erred when it denied
Domke’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to hold Alyeska vicariously
liable for Disbrow’s interference, because the record compelled this finding, as the
173

Id. at 282.
141 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2006).
175
Id. at 725.
176
Id. at 722.
177
Id. at 720–21.
178
Id. at 724.
179
Id. at 725.
180
Id.
181
137 P.3d 295 (Alaska 2006).
182
Id. at 308.
183
Id. at 298.
184
Id.
185
Id.
174

15

interference occurred within the scope of Disbrow’s employment.186 The supreme court
also held that the superior court erred when it ruled that Champion’s counterclaims were
compulsory and thus timely, finding that the claims were permissive because they were
not logically related to Domke’s.187 The supreme court further held that the superior
court erred when it entered judgment against Domke based on a jury finding that Domke
had contributed to the interference with his contract, finding that this contravened the
statutory definition of the cause of action.188 The supreme court affirmed the decisions of
the superior court, but remanded for proceedings consistent with the three
aforementioned holdings.189

Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers
Ass’n
In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant &
Retailers Ass’n,190 the supreme court held that it was an abuse of discretion to find that
Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers Ass’n (“ICHRRA”) was a public interest
litigant, because it did not meet its burden of showing that it was not motivated primarily
by economic concerns.191 ICHRRA initially filed suit in an attempt to block a
referendum approving a five-percent retail-sales tax on alcoholic beverages from being
placed on the election ballot, but amended its complaint after the tax proposal was
approved by the voters, claiming that the tax violated another Alaska statute.192 The
supreme court held that a litigant must satisfy four criteria in order to be considered a
public interest litigant: (1) whether the case is designed to effectuate strong public
policies; (2) whether numerous people will receive benefits from the lawsuit if the
plaintiff succeeds; (3) whether only a private party could have been expected to bring the
suit; and (4) whether the litigant would have sufficient economic incentive to bring the
suit forward even if the action only involved narrow issues that lacked general
importance.193 The supreme court held that ICHRRA failed the fourth criteria because its
members had a direct economic incentive to prevent a sales tax on alcohol and that the
potential benefits to winning the lawsuit were not “insubstantial” or “diffuse.”194 The
supreme court reversed and remanded the ruling of the superior court, holding that it was
an abuse of discretion to find that ICHRRA was a public interest litigant, because it did
not meet its burden of showing that it was not motivated primarily by economic
concerns.195
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Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc.
In Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc.,196 the supreme court held that a deferential
standard of review applies to reviewing the superior court’s denial of a motion for a new
trial following a jury verdict.197 Hogg sued Raven Contractors (“Raven”) for negligence
after he suffered injuries from falling into a borough trash disposal unit.198 The jury
decided that though Raven had been negligent, Raven’s negligence was not the legal
cause of Hogg’s injury.199 Hogg moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict did
not follow court instructions on negligence and causation, and the superior court denied
the motion.200 The supreme court held that review of a trial court’s decision to deny a
motion for a new trial following a jury verdict is highly deferential and that the denial
will be reversed only if the verdict was “plainly unreasonable and unjust” because the
verdict was “completely lacking or slight and unconvincing.”201 The supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s denial of a new trial, holding that under this deferential
standard of review, there was an evidentiary basis for the jury’s decision and the verdict
was not “plainly unreasonable and unjust.”202

International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette
In International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. v. Bissonette,203 the supreme court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the plaintiffs as a class, using a
single verdict form, instructing the jury, sanctioning absent class members, and awarding
attorneys’ fees.204 A group of salmon fishers from the Egegik district sued International
Seafoods of Alaska, Inc. (“International Seafoods”) after it failed to match the major
fishing buyers with the higher “bay price,”205 as the fishermen interpreted their contract
to promise.206 At trial, a jury agreed with the fishermen that International Seafoods had
breached its contract as to the class of fishermen, and the court awarded damages and
attorneys’ fees to the class.207 The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying all fishermen who, in the year 2000, took salmon from the Egegik
district and sold them to International Seafoods as a certifiable class, because the class
was sufficiently numerous, shared common issues, and was adequately represented by
counsel.208 Also, the trial court was within its discretion in declining to exclude members
of the class who did not respond to discovery and instead limiting admissible evidence to
that which was gathered from members who responded.209 Further, the trial court was
authorized to use a single verdict form in this class action rather than a verdict form for
196
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each member of the class.210 The jury instructions that assumed a single contract, rather
than separate contracts for each fisherman, were acceptable because both sides argued
and admitted the single-contract theory at trial.211 Finally, International Seafoods
presented no authority for overturning the augmented attorneys’ fees.212 The supreme
court affirmed the jury award, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying the plaintiffs as a class, using a single verdict form, instructing the jury,
sanctioning absent class members, and awarding attorneys’ fees.213

Jarvis v. Ensminger
In Jarvis v. Ensminger,214 the supreme court held that the superior court properly
granted summary judgment on contract claims, but had incorrectly granted summary
judgment sua sponte on the misrepresentation and promissory estoppel claims.215 Jarvis,
a former employee at a car dealership, sued his former employers regarding stock options
provided in his contract of employment but never disbursed to him, claiming breach of
contract, misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel.216 Jarvis’s former employers
moved for summary judgment based only on the breach of contract issue;217 however, the
superior court sua sponte granted summary judgment on the misrepresentation and
promissory estoppel claims as well.218 The supreme court held that since a contractual
condition had not been met, summary judgment was appropriately granted to
Ensminger.219 Summary judgment was rendered in error on the misrepresentation and
promissory estoppel claims, however, because Ensminger never moved for summary
judgment on these issues, and, since the burden of showing any genuine issue of material
fact never shifted to Jarvis, Jarvis’ claims should not have been dismissed for failing to
do so.220 Furthermore, granting summary judgment was not harmless.221 The supreme
court partly affirmed and partly reversed the superior court, holding that the summary
judgment was properly granted on the contract claims, but incorrectly granted sua sponte
on the misrepresentation and promissory estoppel claims.222

210

Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
212
Id. at 573.
213
Id.
214
134 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006).
215
Id. at 355.
216
Id. at 355.
217
Id. at 357.
218
Id. at 361.
219
Id. at 358–59.
220
Id. at 362.
221
Id. at 364.
222
Id.
211

18

Jerry Kinn, Valley Motors, Inc. v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.
In Jerry Kinn, Valley Motors, Inc. v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc.,223 the supreme
court held that an arbitrator who did not have financial ties to a party involved in
arbitration was not evidently biased,224 and that because of the construction of a contract,
the arbitrator had the authority to require the rescission of part of a property contract.225
Kinn sold to Alaska Sales & Service, Inc. an automobile dealership and the property upon
which it was located, in two separate agreements.226 After discovering that the land was
contaminated, Alaska Sales & Service brought an arbitration action against Kinn.227 The
arbitrator ruled in favor of Alaska Sales & Service, requiring Kinn to rescind the property
contract, but not the asset (dealership) contract.228 Upon Kinn’s appeal, the superior
court held that the arbitrator did have the authority to require rescission of the property
contract, and that the arbitrator was not biased.229 Kinn appealed.230 The supreme court
held that the ties between the arbitrator and the attorney for Alaska Sales & Services were
not the kind of financial ties that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
arbitrator would be biased.231 Also, a reasonable person could understand the exchange
to involve two contracts, thus the arbitrator was allowed to require the rescission of one
but not the other.232 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court,
holding that an arbitrator who did not have financial ties to a party in an arbitration was
not evidently biased and that he had the authority to require the partial rescission of the
property contract.233

John’s Heating Service v. Lamb
In John’s Heating Service v. Lamb,234 the supreme court held that the applicable
two-year statute of limitations did not act as a bar to a suit arising from carbon monoxide
poisoning, since the injured party filed suit less than one year after they were put on
inquiry notice of the possible injury.235 On October 15, 1991, the Lambs called John’s
Heating Service to inspect their furnace, which was not functioning properly.236
Although John’s Heating Service did some minor work, the problem was not solved, and
on January 31, 1993 the Lambs learned from another furnace repair service that the
furnace was likely circulating carbon monoxide throughout the home.237 Later that year,
the Lambs hired a lawyer, submitted to neurological tests which showed evidence of
carbon monoxide poisoning, and filed suit against John’s Heating Service on December
223
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23, 1993, more than two years after the initial service call.238 At trial, the jury returned a
verdict for the Lambs, which John’s Heating Service appealed on statute of limitations
grounds.239 The supreme court held that the suit was timely, because although the Lambs
were on inquiry notice of the poor functioning of the furnace on October 15, 1991, the
Lambs were not on notice of the possible health consequences until January 31, 1993.240
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the complaint
arising from carbon monoxide poisoning was timely because plaintiffs were not on notice
until they learned of the possible health consequences.241

Kay v. Danbar, Inc.
In Kay v. Danbar, Inc.242 the supreme court held that a plaintiff who elects to limit
his damage claims under Civil Rule 26(g)243 may subsequently withdraw his request and
that where there is at least minimally sufficient evidence that a Realtor assumed a
responsibility to protect a tenant, a jury must decide whether or not that assumed duty
was breached.244 Kay contacted a RE/MAX agent in an apartment search, moved into a
duplex, and a month later fractured his ankle after slipping on loose carpet in the
garage.245 In the suit that followed, Kay initially invoked Civil Rule 26(g), which caps
damages at $100,000 but also provides for expedited discovery.246 However, after
determining that damages would exceed that amount, he attempted to withdraw his use of
Rule 26(g).247 The court denied his request and, despite a jury verdict of over $400,000,
reduced the amount in accordance with the cap.248 The supreme court held that Kay
could withdraw his use of Rule 26(g), because the rule is comparable to a motion for
leave to amend, and a complaint may be amended if it is in the interest of justice to do
so.249 Here, Kay specifically told the opposing party that he may need to withdraw his
election to use Rule 26(g), and he immediately informed them of his intent to do so once
he found out that the damages would likely exceed $100,000.250 Additionally, RE/MAX
was explicitly designated as the property manager and was specifically mentioned in the
rental agreement as the party which would undertake certain managerial duties.251 As a
result, there was enough evidence that a jury could reasonably find that RE/MAX had a
duty to warn Kay about the hazard which eventually caused his injury.252 The supreme
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the trial holding that a plaintiff who
elects to limit his damage claims under Rule 26(g) may subsequently withdraw his
238
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request for the expedited procedure provided by the rule and that where there is at least
minimally sufficient evidence that a Realtor assumed a responsibility to protect a tenant,
it is a question for the jury whether or not that assumed duty was breached.253

City of Kenai v. Friends of the Recreation Center, Inc.
In City of Kenai v. Friends of the Recreation Center, Inc.,254 the supreme court
held that full attorneys’ fees should be awarded to public interest litigants even though
the case was ultimately dismissed as moot.255 Friends of the Recreation Center, Inc.
(“Friends”) sued the city for entering into a contract for private management of the city’s
recreation center without competitive bidding, as required by city ordinance.256 The
superior court issued a preliminary injunction to stop the city from honoring its
contract.257 The city council then amended the ordinance to exclude recreation center
managers from the competitive bidding requirement, and the case was dismissed as
moot.258 Friends was awarded full attorneys’ fees, and the city appealed.259 The supreme
court held that the attorneys’ fees award was not an abuse of discretion because if a
prevailing party is a public interest litigant, it is normally entitled to the full amount of
reasonable attorneys’ fees.260 The court found that Friends had demonstrated probable
success on the merits, making it the prevailing party despite the case being dismissed for
mootness.261 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that
full attorneys’ fees should be awarded to public interest litigants even though their case
was dismissed as moot.262

Lee v. State
In Lee v. State,263 the supreme court held that facts alleged in a complaint were
properly deemed admitted when an individual willfully failed to follow court orders in
responding to discovery.264 The State filed a complaint against Lee under Alaska’s
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, alleging that he engaged in
consumer fraud in his advertisements and demonstrations for “free electricity.”265 Lee
did not adequately respond to discovery requests, despite repeated orders to do so from
the court.266 In response, the trial court ordered the facts alleged in the complaint to be
deemed admitted.267 The supreme court held that the complaint was properly deemed
253
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admitted, because Lee’s decision not to answer discovery was willful and prejudicial to
the State’s case.268 Also, there did not appear to be any effective alternatives that would
correct the prejudice to the State’s case, other than deeming the facts to be admitted.269
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial judge, holding that the facts in the
complaint were properly deemed admitted when an individual willfully and prejudicially
failed to follow court orders in responding to discovery.270

McLaughlin v. Lougee
In McLaughlin v. Lougee,271 the supreme court held that the repeal of statutory
contribution in Alaska did not preclude a common-law contribution action against
defendants who were not parties to the original action.272 The McLaughlins lost title to a
property due to malpractice by their attorney Robson.273 The McLaughlins allege that
Robson’s law firm conspired with Robson in order to deprive the McLaughlins of their
legal rights to sue Robson for malpractice.274 Because Robson’s liability insurance was
exhausted, the McLaughlins sought contribution for the remainder of their damages from
Robson’s alleged co-conspirator, the law firm.275 The superior court ruled that because
the Uniform Contribution Act was repealed in 1989 by voter initiative, the McLaughlins
could not seek contribution from Hughes Thorsness, a non-party to the original action.276
The supreme court first stated that the ruling on this case applied only to cases between
the 1989 voter initiative and the new contribution law enacted in 1997.277 The supreme
court held that common-law contribution is available against non-parties to the original
action because fairly allocating damages according to the relative fault of all parties, or
non-parties, furthers the objective of Alaska’s comparative-fault-several-liability rule.278
Because Alaska does not reduce damages in an original action for the fault of non-parties,
disallowing contribution in a subsequent action would be unfair to the parties deemed at
fault in the original action.279 The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision
and remanded the case, holding that the repeal of statutory contribution in Alaska did not
preclude a common-law contribution action against defendants who were not parties to
the original action.280
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State, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Miller
In State, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Miller,281 the
supreme court held that the superior court did not err: (1) in denying the State a
continuance where new information came to light two and a half months before trial; (2)
in instructing the jury on negligence; (3) in permitting the jury to consider the lost
earning capacity of the plaintiff; or (4) in failing to grant the State’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.282 Miller was injured in a plane crash at an unmanned
airport in Kipnuk owned and maintained by the State of Alaska.283 He sued the State for
negligence on the grounds that the State failed to maintain functioning windsocks on the
runway and was awarded damages.284 The State appealed.285 The supreme court held
that the superior court’s denial of a continuance for further discovery did not prevent the
State from presenting evidence on four issues which affected the overall trial, because the
State had enough time to present its core case and alert the jury as to the existence of the
four new issues286 and thus was not deprived of a “substantial right.”287 Further,
considering the condition of the airport as a whole, the jury was correctly instructed on
the south windsock’s relevance.288 Also, the superior court did not err in instructing the
jury to consider lost earning capacity when Miller stipulated he was not seeking damages
in relation to his decision to leave his job, because the issue of lost earning capacity was
distinct from the issue of actual lost earnings, and on the facts a reasonable jury could
have found that Miller was entitled to damages for lost earning capacity.289 Finally, the
State was not entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because a reasonable
person could find that the State, having installed but not maintained the windsock, was
aware it had created a dangerous condition and failed to adequately warn about or remedy
the condition.290 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding
that the superior court did not err: (1) in denying the State a continuance where new
information came to light before trial; (2) in instructing the jury on negligence; (3) in
permitting the jury to consider the lost earning capacity of the plaintiff; or (4) in failing to
grant the State’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.291

Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc.
In Milos v. Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc.,292 the supreme court held that the
evidence in a wrongful death suit permitted the inference that an employee killed at his
worksite was off-shift at the time of the accident and that this fact was material to a
281
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determination of whether Alaska’s workers’ compensation statute would apply as an
exclusive remedy.293 Milos was killed after riding, without authorization, an ATV
belonging to his employer, Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. (“Quality”), up a large pile of
gravel and accidentally contacting an overhead power line.294 Milos’s estate sued Quality
for negligence, and Quality moved for summary judgment, arguing that, under Alaska
law, workers’ compensation was the estate’s sole remedy.295 The superior court granted
summary judgment to Quality, holding that Milos’s injuries arose out of and in the course
of his employment.296 The supreme court held that the estate had submitted enough
evidence to create a genuine issue of fact about whether Milos was on the clock at the
time of the accident.297 Further, this issue was material because if Milos’s off-clock
status were proven, it might exclude him from workers’ compensation coverage.298
There was not a sufficient relationship between Milos’s actions and his employment to
allow summary judgment based on the applicability of the workers’ compensation
statute.299 The supreme court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case,
holding that the evidence permitted the inference that Milos was off-shift at the time of
the accident and that this fact was material to a determination of whether Alaska’s
workers’ compensation statute would apply.300

Morgan v. Morgan
In Morgan v. Morgan,301 the supreme court held that a former wife failed to move
for modification of her marriage dissolution decree within a reasonable time after
discovering her former husband’s pension.302 The parties’ 1974 divorce decree dividing
their marital property did not include the husband’s then-unvested pension.303 The
former wife, having learned of the pension’s existence in 2000, moved to modify the
dissolution decree in June, 2003, and the superior court granted the motion.304 The
former husband appealed, claiming the former wife’s motion was not filed within a
reasonable time.305 The supreme court agreed, holding that the former wife’s generalized
fear of the former husband’s anger problem should not have precluded her from seeking
relief sooner.306 The supreme court reversed and remanded the decision of the superior
court, holding that the former wife failed to move within a reasonable time to modify her
marriage dissolution decree after learning of her former husband’s pension.307
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Murray v. Ledbetter
In Murray v. Ledbetter,308 the supreme court held that an attorney’s alleged
misrepresentation in court was not sufficiently egregious to qualify as fraud directed at a
court of law but at most was a wrong committed between the individual parties.309
Rodney and Katherine Ledbetter, while married, came to a debt settlement agreement
with Murray.310 The following year, they filed for divorce, and the decree of divorce
ordered Rodney to assume most of the marriage debt liabilities.311 After moving to
Anchorage, Katherine received notice that Murray was filing suit against Katherine and
Rodney for defaulting on their settlement agreement.312 Katherine responded with a
letter stating that Rodney had assumed all marital debts and eventually dropped off
several legal documents, including the original summons and complaint, at the office of
Rodney’s attorney, Crist.313 Without any consultation with Katherine, Crist represented
her in an Idaho court and agreed on a new settlement with Murray’s attorney.314 The
superior court judge held that the Idaho judgment could not be enforced in Alaska
because it had been obtained fraudulently in the Idaho court.315 The supreme court held
that the degree of misconduct by Crist was not sufficient to find that he had acted
recklessly in representing Katherine in an Idaho court,316 that Katherine failed to prove
that the Idaho court’s determination on her being required to pay back the debt would
have been different had she been represented by her own attorney,317 that as a result of
the misrepresentation one party was not able to take advantage of the other,318 that it
would be inequitable to place the consequences of the superior court’s decision on
Murray, the lender,319 and that Katherine was partly at fault for completely ignoring the
case after depositing documents at Crist’s office.320 If there was a wrong, it was between
Katherine and Crist, not between Crist and the Idaho court.321 The supreme court
reversed the superior court’s ruling, holding that an attorney’s alleged misrepresentation
in court was not sufficiently egregious to qualify as fraud directed at a court of law, but at
most was a wrong committed between the individual parties.322

Perkins v. Doyon Universal Services, LLC
In Perkins v. Doyon Universal Services, LLC,323 the supreme court held that an
employer does not discriminate on the basis of race so long as it is able to provide
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legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring a non-minority rather than a minority
individual.324 Perkins, who identified himself as black, applied for a job at Doyon
Universal Services, LLC (“Doyon”), but the job was given to another individual who was
not a minority.325 As a result, Perkins filed a discrimination suit as a pro se plaintiff.326
The superior court granted summary judgment dismissal to Doyon.327 The supreme court
held that when a plaintiff establishes that he is a member of a recognized class protected
by statute and that he was denied a position for which he was qualified, he establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the defendant.328 Although the
burden shifted, however, Doyon had legitimate reasons for hiring the non-minority
candidate over Perkins.329 The hired individual had worked for eight years in a kennel,
whereas Perkins had only worked in a research lab, which has a more tenuous
relationship to the desired job.330 The supreme court affirmed the dismissal, finding that
an employer does not discriminate on the basis of race so long as it is able to provide
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring a non-minority rather than a minority
individual.331

Price v. Eastham
In Price v. Eastham,332 the supreme court held that the superior court must
include sufficient findings in its decision for meaningful appellate review333 and that even
a pro se litigant must preserve claims for appeal by raising them at the trial level.334 Price
posted “no trespassing” signs on his property to prohibit snowmachiners from crossing
the land.335 A group of snowmachiners sued Price to have the trail declared right-of-way
or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.336 The superior court found that a right-of-way,
or alternatively a prescriptive easement, existed.337 After the supreme court affirmed and
remanded,338 the superior court issued a single sentence order describing the length and
width of the easement, and Price appealed.339 The supreme court held that the superior
court failed to make findings sufficient to clearly and explicitly specify the scope of the
easement, and therefore to allow for meaningful appellate review. 340 Additionally, the
supreme court refused to consider a new argument Price raised on appeal, because he did
not raise that issue at the trial level, even though pro se litigants should be held to less
324
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rigorous standards than attorneys.341 The supreme court remanded the case, holding that
the superior court’s one sentence order describing the prescriptive easement did not
provide enough specificity for meaningful appellate review and that, though a pro se
litigant’s brief should be read generously, the court would not consider on appeal an issue
he or she did not preserve at the trial level.342

Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.
In Smith v. CSK Auto, Inc.,343 the supreme court held that, while the doctrine of
res judicata bars an action when the claims in that action were previously dismissed with
prejudice,344 a new claim in the subsequent action is not barred when it does not stem
from the same transaction.345 Mr. Smith sued his former employer, CSK Auto, for
injuries Smith allegedly received while working at CSK.346 After CSK had the case
removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, and shortly after the court
dismissed Smith’s claims with prejudice, he filed the current action in superior court,
stating claims similar to those of the federal case, in addition to a new wrongful
termination claim.347 The superior court dismissed this second complaint on grounds that
it was barred by either res judicata or collateral estoppel, and Smith appealed.348 After
quickly dispensing with the claims that were identical to those of the previously
dismissed complaint,349 the supreme court held that the wrongful termination claim,
which was new to this action, was not a new legal theory arising from the same facts, but
was rather a claim arising from a different transaction.350 Since the wrongful termination
claim arose from a different harm, and caused a different injury, the claim was not
precluded.351 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court in part and
reversed in part, holding that the claims that were based on the same injury as the
previously dismissed complaint were barred by res judicata, while the new claim of
wrongful termination was not barred since it did not stem from the same transaction.352

Solomon v. Interior Regional Housing Authority
In Solomon v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,353 the supreme court held that
equitable tolling is available in overcoming the statute of limitations in a state law claim
when a litigant is pursuing the claim in federal court in a timely manner.354 Solomon
sued Interior Regional Housing Authority (“IRHA”) in federal court for violating the
341
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Indian employment preference laws, and claimed that he was not hired in retaliation for
his worker’s compensation claims.355 Solomon’s federal claims were dismissed, and
afterward he filed in state court under Alaska state law.356 The IRHA argued that his
claim was barred by the statute of limitations.357 Solomon argued that, because he was
pursuing those claims in federal court, his state claim should be eligible for equitable
tolling to allow him to file his claim in state court.358 The supreme court, applying a
three-part test, held that his claim was eligible for equitable tolling under state law,
because: (1) the IRHA had notice about the alternative remedy; (2) there was no
prejudice to the IRHA; and (3) Solomon acted reasonably and in good faith.359 The
supreme court reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that, because Solomon
was pursuing his claim in federal court, his state court claim was eligible for equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations.360

Stuart v. Whaler’s Cove, Inc.
In Stuart v. Whaler’s Cove, Inc.,361 the supreme court held that the superior court
did not abuse its discretion when refusing to hold a party in contempt after it had made
significant efforts to comply with the court’s prior order.362 The superior court
previously ordered Whaler’s Cove, Inc. (“Whaler’s Cove”) to remove buildings that
obstructed the right-of-way shared by Stuart.363 A majority of the encroaching buildings
were removed, but not all of them.364 Stuart filed a motion requesting that Whaler’s
Cove be held in contempt.365 The superior court found that significant effort had been
exerted and denied the motion.366 The supreme court held that, under a clear error
standard of review and according considerable deference,367 the record documented
significant efforts by Whaler’s Cove, including using heavy equipment, draining the
reservoir, and reinforcing the embankment.368 Furthermore, these efforts improved the
flow through the right-of-way.369 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s
decision, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when refusing to hold
Whaler’s Cove in contempt after it had made significant efforts to comply with the
court’s prior order.370
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Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Brauneis
In Valley Hospital Ass’n v. Brauneis,371 the supreme court held that a motion for
entry of a default judgment could not be denied on grounds that an averment lacks proof
without first providing a plaintiff with notice and opportunity to submit evidence of the
truth of the averment.372 Valley Hospital Association, Inc. (“Valley Hospital”) obtained a
default judgment against Brauneis, but appealed the superior court’s refusal to award
attorneys’ fees and grant the hospital the right to enforce a health care provider lien.373
The supreme court held that a motion for entry of a default judgment could not be denied
on grounds that an averment lacks proof without first providing a plaintiff with notice and
opportunity to submit evidence of the truth of the averment, thus Valley Hospital should
have been given notice and an opportunity to provide evidence that it recorded the lien,
since it was questioned.374 In addition, the supreme court held that the denial of
attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion since Valley Hospital failed to document its
fees and had waived its right to fees when it failed to move for reconsideration.375 The
supreme court remanded the case, holding that a motion for entry of a default judgment
could not be denied on grounds that an averment lacks proof without first providing a
plaintiff with notice and opportunity to submit evidence of the truth of the averment.376

Vazquez v. Campbell
In Vazquez v. Campbell,377 the supreme court held that a losing party who
engages in bad-faith conduct or brings frivolous claims and defenses can be forced to pay
all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party instead of just a partial
payment.378 Campbell sought to enforce a child custody order entered by a court in
Oregon, and the Vazquezes unsuccessfully opposed this order at the superior court
level.379 The superior court ruled that the Vazquezes litigated in bad-faith and thus
awarded full attorneys’ fees and costs to Campbell.380 The supreme court held that
Alaska Civil Rule 82,381 which gives partial attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party as a
standard, allows a court to award full attorneys’ fees if the losing party acted in bad-faith
or pursued frivolous claims or asserted frivolous defenses.382 Furthermore, the supreme
court held that Campbell was entitled to attorneys’ fees despite that fact that she used a
free legal aid service.383 The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court,
holding that a losing party who engages in bad-faith conduct or brings frivolous claims
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and defenses can be forced to pay all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the
prevailing party instead of just a partial payment.384

Williams v. Williams
In Williams v. Williams,385 the supreme court held that neither the doctrine of
equitable estoppel nor Alaska’s statutory fraud tolling provision applied in a suit by an
heir against two of her siblings for fraudulently removing stock from their father’s
estate.386 Pete Williams began a transfer of stock in a family business to two of his four
children, Mike and Connie, who completed the transfer after Pete’s death, removing the
stock from his estate, which was probated nine years later.387 Another child, Christine,
sued Mike and Connie for fraud in connection with the stock transfer eight years after the
probate.388 The superior court dismissed her complaint as untimely.389 Christine
appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel because Mike and Connie concealed the existence of an earlier will and the
stock transfer and misrepresented that she would receive a share in the business.390 She
also argued that her suit was timely under an Alaska statute that tolls the statute of
limitations on claims of fraud in probate proceedings until discovery of the fraud.391 The
supreme court held that, to show equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must show fraudulent
conduct, justifiable reliance, and damage and must exercise due diligence in uncovering
concealed facts, and that neither equitable estoppel nor the statutory fraud tolling
provision applied to Christine’s suit because Mike and Connie did not commit the
fraudulent acts she alleged.392 Even if they did, Christine’s suit would still be untimely
because, with due diligence, she should have discovered the concealed facts at the time of
the probate, ending the toll.393 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior
court, holding that neither the doctrine of equitable estoppel nor Alaska’s statutory fraud
tolling provision applied to Christine’s claims against Mike and Connie for fraudulently
removing stock from their father’s estate.394
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles
In Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles,395 the Ninth Circuit held that certain
challenged provisions of Alaskan campaign finance law did not violate the First
Amendment.396 The Alaska Right to Life Committee (“AKRTL”), a pro-life nonprofit
corporation, sued the director and members of the Alaska Public Offices Commission
(collectively “APOC”) in their official capacities after APOC notified AKRTL that a
proposed AKRTL telemarketing campaign shortly before the 2002 gubernatorial race
would subject AKRTL to selected financial disclosure requirements under state campaign
finance law.397 AKRTL alleged multiple violations of the First Amendment.398 The
district court granted summary judgment to APOC, and AKRTL appealed.399 The Ninth
Circuit held that the challenged provisions did not violate the First Amendment, because:
(1) the definition of “electioneering communication” was neither unconstitutionally
vague nor overbroad on its face or as applied;400 and (2) the three forms of challenged
reporting requirements survived strict scrutiny.401 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, holding that the selected provisions of Alaskan campaign
finance law challenged by AKRTL did not violate the First Amendment.402

Frederick v. Morse
In Frederick v. Morse,403 the Ninth Circuit held that a school principal cannot
restrict political speech contrary to the school’s mission if the speech did not disrupt
school activities404 and was neither plainly offensive nor school-sponsored.405 Joseph
Frederick displayed a banner that read “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” as the Olympic Torch passed
by his school.406 The students had been released from class for the event, and Frederick
was standing off school property as he held the banner.407 The school principal took the
banner, stating that it was offensive material contrary to the school’s drug policy, and
suspended Frederick from school for ten days.408 Frederick sought a declaratory
judgment that his First Amendment rights had been violated, which the district court
refused on summary judgment.409 The Ninth Circuit held that a school may restrict
395
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speech that is neither plainly offensive nor school-sanctioned only if it reasonably will
disrupt school activities410 and, because it was undisputed that Frederick’s speech was not
likely to disrupt school activities, the school violated Frederick’s constitutional rights.411
Additionally, Morse, the school principal, was not entitled to qualified immunity because
she violated Frederick’s established constitutional rights in a way that would clearly be a
violation to a reasonable principal.412 Thus, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s
dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a school principal cannot
restrict disfavored political speech that did not disrupt school activities and was neither
plainly offensive nor school-sponsored.413

Alaska Supreme Court
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State, Department of Environmental Conservation
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. State, Department of Environmental
Conservation,414 the supreme court held that a state entity could bill an appealing permit
holder for the administrative costs of an appeal without violating due process.415 The
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (“Department”) issued several air
quality permits to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. (“Alyeska”), and Alyeska appealed based
on several aspects of the permits.416 The Department billed Alyeska approximately
$8,000 for the administration costs of their appeal.417 Alyeska claims that this was
improper under Alaska Statute section 46.14.240, or alternatively that the statute is a
violation of their due process.418 The supreme court held that the plain language of
section 46.14.240 allows the Department to recover such costs from Alyeska and that
Alyeska failed to meet its burden of showing that the plain language should not
control.419 The supreme court also held that the Department’s interpretation of the statute
did not impede Alyeska’s access to justice because Alyeska failed to identify any specific
harm done to it as a result of the imposition of the fees.420 Also, Alyeska’s argument that
it did not receive proper notice was rejected because it continued to pursue its claim for
almost a year after it received the initial invoice.421 Because Alyeska was unable to
provide evidence that the plain language of the statute was not controlling, and because
there was no evidence of a due process violation, they could be required to pay for the
administrative costs of their own appeal.422 The supreme court affirmed the superior
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court, holding that a state entity could bill an appealing permit holder for the
administrative costs of such an appeal.423

Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage,424 the
supreme court held that a voter initiative requiring the granting of taxi licenses to all
eligible persons did not violate the Alaska constitutional prohibition of voter initiated
appropriation.425 In 2002, Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform (“Citizens”) submitted a
petition for a voter initiative requiring that all eligible persons wishing to obtain a taxi
license must be granted one by Anchorage, but the municipal clerk rejected the
submission.426 The supreme court held that the initiative, if approved, would not
appropriate assets of Anchorage.427 The taxi permits are not public assets, since fares
paid by customers go to the cab drivers, not the state.428 The supreme court demanded
that the initiative be placed on the ballot at the next municipal election.429 The supreme
court reversed the judgment of the superior court, holding that a voter initiative requiring
the granting of taxi licenses to all eligible persons did not violate the constitutional
prohibition of voter initiated appropriation.430

Crawford v. Kemp
In Crawford v. Kemp,431 the supreme court held that an arrestee raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to an arresting
officer supported a reasonable belief that the arrestee’s words created a hazardous
condition constituting disorderly conduct.432 Kemp, a state trooper, asked Crawford his
name while in search of a suspect in a courthouse clerk’s office.433 Crawford repeatedly
refused and, after a further exchange of words, was arrested and searched.434 Crawford
filed a complaint alleging violation of his right to free speech and unreasonable search
and seizure, but the superior court found that Kemp had sufficient probable cause to
arrest Crawford for disorderly conduct and was immune under state and federal law;
Crawford appealed.435 The supreme court held that the arrestee raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer supported a
reasonable belief that the arrestee’s words were unreasonably loud or created a hazardous
condition constituting disorderly conduct.436 The supreme court also held that, because it
423
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was not clear that Kemp arrested Crawford out of a good faith belief that Crawford was
violating the law, Kemp was not immune from the state law tort suit.437 The supreme
court reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that the arrestee raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the facts and circumstances known to the officer
supported a reasonable belief that the arrestee’s words created a hazardous condition
constituting disorderly conduct.438

Green Party of Alaska v. State, Division of Elections
In Green Party of Alaska v. State, Division of Elections,439 the supreme court held
that a statute restricting recognition of political parties by the Alaska Division of
Elections (“Division”) was constitutional because it served the State’s compelling interest
in regulating ballot access in a way that did not overburden the Green Party’s voters or
candidates.440 An Alaska statute441 defined a political party as an organized group whose
number of registered voters was equal to, or whose candidate for governor had received,
at least three percent of the popular vote in the previous gubernatorial election.442 The
Division withdrew official recognition from the Green Party of Alaska, whose registered
voters were equal to only about two percent of the votes cast in the previous
gubernatorial election, and whose candidate received only about one percent of the
popular vote.443 The Green Party challenged the constitutionality of the statute, alleging
that it violated the party’s rights to equal protection, free speech, free political
association, and ballot access.444 The supreme court held that the Green Party had
asserted a constitutionally protected right,445 but that it had overstated the injury to its
rights, because it could still register voters before the next election or add its candidate to
the ballot by petition.446 The State had a compelling interest in preventing confusion,
deception and frustration of the democratic process at the polls, and therefore could
require parties to demonstrate some specific degree of voter support.447 Also, its means
of accomplishing this goal, tying party recognition to the gubernatorial election, was
narrowly tailored, because the gubernatorial election is the only statewide election which
is sufficiently likely to result in a competitive race.448 Finally, the State had satisfied its
burden of determining the existence of less restrictive alternatives by establishing that its
three-percent requirement was well within the mainstream of ballot access laws of other
states.449 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that a
statute restricting recognition of political parties by the Division was constitutional
437

Id. at 1258–59.
Id. at 1254–55.
439
147 P.3d 728 (Alaska 2006).
440
Id. at 729.
441
ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(21) (2002) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 15.60.010(25) (2007)).
442
Green Party, 147 P.3d at 730.
443
Id.
444
Id. at 731.
445
Id. at 733.
446
Id. at 734.
447
Id. at 734–35.
448
Id. at 735.
449
Id. at 735–36.
438

34

because it served the State’s compelling interest in regulating ballot access in a way that
did not overburden the Green Party’s voters or candidates.450

Kohlhaas v. State
In Kohlhaas v. State,451 the supreme court held that secession is unconstitutional
and an improper subject for a ballot initiative.452 Kohlhaas submitted a ballot initiative
with one hundred qualifying signatures calling for Alaska’s secession from the United
States.453 The Lieutenant Governor refused to certify the initiative petition for
circulation.454 The superior court affirmed this refusal, and Kohlhaas appealed.455 The
supreme court held that the petition was correctly rejected because the power of the
people to enact laws through initiative cannot extend beyond the legislature’s power
under the Constitution.456 Although review of an initiative’s constitutionality typically
cannot occur until after its enactment, an initiative petition can be rejected if it is clearly
unconstitutional.457 Secession is clearly unconstitutional under several post-civil war
Supreme Court decisions and is not a power reserved by the states under the Tenth
Amendment.458 The supreme court affirmed the rejection of the initiative, holding that
secession is unconstitutional and an improper subject for a ballot initiative.459

Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute
In Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,460 the supreme court held that in nonemergencies, a non-consenting mental patient cannot be forced by the State to take
psychotropic drugs, unless the court finds that it is in the patient’s best interest and that
the use of such drugs is the least intrusive method of treatment.461 Myers was an
involuntary patient at the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”), and API petitioned the
superior court to authorize the use of psychotropic drugs without her consent.462 The
court found that under Alaska statute, it was not authorized to make an independent
determination of Myers’ best interests, and thus deferred to API’s judgment.463 Myers
appealed, arguing that a court must determine what is in her best interest, that the right to
refuse consent to medication is fundamental, and that API must show both that the State
has a compelling interest and that the medication was the least intrusive method.464 The
supreme court held that because Alaska’s constitution provides a broader right to privacy
450
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than the U.S. Constitution, Myers’ right to refuse medical care is fundamental.465
Further, when a substantial burden is placed on such privacy, the State must show that
there is a compelling interest and that there are no means less restrictive.466 Although
API has a compelling interest in keeping Myers safe,467 a court, rather than API, must
determine whether or not Myers’ constitutional right to privacy has been violated.468 The
supreme court vacated the involuntary treatment order, holding that in non-emergencies,
a non-consenting mental patient cannot be forced by the State to take psychotropic drugs,
unless the court finds that it is in the patient’s best interest and that the use of such drugs
is the least intrusive method of treatment.469

Sengupta v. University of Alaska
In Sengupta v. University of Alaska,470 the supreme court held that a former
tenured state university professor failed to establish a prima facie case of First
Amendment retaliation.471 The University of Alaska Fairbanks (“UAF”) terminated
Sengupta for cause.472 The professor sought reemployment with UAF, but when UAF
refused to rehire him as a matter of policy, Sengupta filed suit, alleging violation of the
First Amendment.473 The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of UAF,
and Sengupta appealed.474 The supreme court held that Sengupta failed to make a prima
facie First Amendment retaliation case because he adduced no evidence that permitted a
reasonable inference that UAF’s refusal to rehire him was motivated by anything other
than its no-rehire policy.475 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior
court, holding that Sengupta did not establish a prima facie case of First Amendment
retaliation.476

Simpson v. Murkowski
In Simpson v. Murkowski,477 the supreme court held that senior Alaskans were not
entitled to longevity bonuses under the doctrine of promissory estoppel or the Contracts
Clause.478 In 1972 the Alaska legislature approved a program giving Alaskans over the
age of sixty-five a monetary bonus as an incentive for them to remain in Alaska.479 In
2003, the Governor used his veto power to eliminate appropriations for the longevity
bonus program, despite the existence of a phase-out program which indicated that seniors
465
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already receiving benefits would continue to receive them.480 In response to the
Governor’s veto, a group of senior citizens sued the State, and the superior court granted
summary judgment in favor of the State.481 The supreme court held that the senior
citizens were not entitled to longevity bonuses under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.482 In order to show promissory estoppel, a party must show: (1) the action
induced a change of position, (2) the promisor should have foreseen the reliance, (3) there
was an actual promise, and (4) justice calls for enforcement.483 The senior citizens failed
to establish (3), because the prior Governor’s letter suggesting the gradual phase-out of
the program was a proposal, not an enforceable promise.484 Also, the discontinuation of
the longevity bonus program did not violate the Contract Clause of the Alaska
Constitution, since the language of the statute did not clearly show that the legislature
intended to create a contract with the citizens when the statute was enacted.485 Further,
the Governor was well within his authority to veto the appropriations under his power
granted by the Alaska Constitution.486 The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the
superior court, holding plaintiff senior citizens could not claim promissory estoppel or a
Contracts Clause violation when the Governor vetoed appropriations for a longevity
bonus that had been given to senior citizens in order to encourage them to remain in
Alaska.487

City of Skagway v. Robertson
In City of Skagway v. Robertson,488 the supreme court held that a city ordinance
restricting speech was not overbroad, and therefore was constitutional, because it was
properly construed to apply only to commercial speech which did nothing more than
propose a transaction.489 The City of Skagway (“City”), in order to discourage
aggressive sales tactics aimed at pedestrians, passed an ordinance confining person-toperson sales within its historic district to enclosed structures or areas containing at least
200 square feet of retail space.490 Appellant Robertson sold tours by approaching
pedestrians on the street; appellant Lee sold tours from various retail locations.491 The
City appealed the superior court’s finding that the ordinance’s restriction on speech was
not narrowly tailored because it amounted to a non-specific ban on sales in public, no
matter what was being sold.492 Applying the Central Hudson493 test for commercial
speech, the supreme court held that the ordinance did not restrict “business” as a whole
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but merely a subcategory of business, “Off Premises Canvassing.”494 Further, the
language of the ordinance stating that it addressed speech “solely intended” to attract
pedestrians did not impermissibly focus on the intent of the speaker; rather, the word
“solely” was a proper use of limiting language, focusing the application of the ordinance
to commercial speech only.495 The supreme court reversed the superior court, holding
that the Skagway city ordinance restricting speech was not overbroad, and therefore was
constitutional, because it was properly construed to apply only to commercial speech
which did nothing more than propose a transaction.496

Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage,497 the supreme court held that
allowing initiative petitions to force the sale of public utilities would deprive the
assembly of its discretionary authority in violation of the Alaska Constitution.498
Staudenmaier submitted two initiative petitions that the Anchorage municipal clerk
refused to certify.499 The first called for the municipality to sell the Anchorage Municipal
Light and Power Utility at fair market value, and the second called for the sale of the
Anchorage Municipal Refuse Collection Utility to the highest bidder.500 The superior
court affirmed rejection of the petitions, and Staudenmaier appealed.501 The supreme
court held that the petitions were properly rejected because article XI, section 7 of the
Alaska Constitution502 prohibits the making of appropriations by voter initiative.503 The
supreme court reasoned that this prohibition applies to initiatives that designate the use of
state assets, such as Staudenmaier’s.504 The Anchorage Municipal Charter section that
allowed the sale of municipal utilities by voter initiative violated the Alaska Constitution
when it was written, and was therefore void.505 The supreme court affirmed the decision
of the superior court, holding that allowing initiative petitions to force the sale of public
utilities would deprive the assembly of its discretionary authority in violation of the
Alaska Constitution.506
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Alaska Court of Appeals
Bessette v. State
In Bessette v. State,507 the court of appeals held that a police officer had probable
cause to stop a person operating a snowmachine on a sidewalk.508 Trooper Loop
approached Bessette after noticing him trying to start a snowmachine on the sidewalk.509
Bessette showed signs of drunkenness and admitted he had driven the snowmachine.510
Bessette’s breath alcohol content registered above the legal limit, and Trooper Loop
arrested him for driving under the influence.511 Bessette filed a motion to suppress all
evidence from the stop, claiming Trooper Loop did not have probable cause to stop him
for operating the snowmachine on the sidewalk because the sidewalk was covered with
snow.512 The superior court found that Officer Loop did have probable cause to make the
stop and convicted Bessette.513 Bessette appealed the denial of his suppression motion.514
The court of appeals held that probable cause existed because having a snowmachine on
the sidewalk is a traffic infraction regardless of whether the sidewalk is under a snow
berm.515 The court of appeals affirmed Bessette’s conviction, holding that a police
officer had probable cause to stop a person operating a snowmachine on a sidewalk.516

Case v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Case v. Municipality of Anchorage,517 the court of appeals held that the
presumption of constitutionality of the meritorious defense requirement for setting aside a
default judgment was not rebutted.518 Case demanded a trial to contest a speeding ticket
but failed to appear on the specified trial date and received a negative default
judgment.519 The magistrate denied his motion to set aside the default judgment on
grounds that he failed to assert a meritorious defense, which would show that the trial
result could be different if retried.520 Case appealed, arguing that the meritorious defense
requirement violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.521 The court of appeals
held that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
of the meritorious defense requirement, because no case law prohibited the requirement
and Case had failed to cite any authority supporting his argument.522 However, the court
of appeals declined to resolve the constitutional issue completely, holding only that to the
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extent the meritorious defense rule required merely a general defense theory, it did not
violate the Fifth Amendment.523 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the
magistrate, holding that the presumption of constitutionality of the meritorious defense
requirement for setting aside a default judgment was not rebutted.524

State v. Herrmann
In State v. Herrmann,525 the court of appeals held that a superior court ruling that
Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law was unconstitutional amounted to an
impermissible advisory opinion when an individual failed to show that he had been
prejudiced by such a sentencing.526 Herrmann was convicted of vehicle theft, driving
under the influence, and refusing to submit to a breath test.527 The State sought to use
Herrmann’s prior convictions as proof of aggravating factors, but the superior court ruled
that Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law was unconstitutional under Blakely528
and had to be thrown out in its entirety.529 The State petitioned for a review of the
ruling.530 The court of appeals held that the superior court’s ruling was an advisory
opinion on an issue not raised by Herrmann’s case, because Hermann did not dispute the
existence of the prior convictions or show that his Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated.531 In a series of other cases, the court of appeals determined that there is no
Blakely problem when the State limits its proof of aggravators to the defendant’s prior
convictions, and the defendant does not dispute the existence of those convictions.532
The court of appeals vacated the decision of the superior court, holding that in the
absence of a showing that Herrmann had been prejudiced by being sentenced under the
pre-2005 scheme, the ruling that the State’s sentencing law was unconstitutional
amounted to an impermissible advisory opinion.533

Hotrum v. State
In Hotrum v. State,534 the court of appeals held that a warrantless entry was
justified under the emergency aid doctrine and that criminalizing possession of more than
twenty-five marijuana plants did not violate the Alaska Constitution.535 Police went to
Hotrum’s house following a 911 call concerning gun shots and loud noises and entered
the house when no one responded to their presence.536 Hotrum entered a no contest plea
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and was convicted of misconduct involving a controlled substance.537 He appealed,
arguing that police made an unlawful warrantless entry and that criminalizing the
possession of more than twenty-five marijuana plants, regardless of their size, violates the
privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution.538 The court of appeals held that the
warrantless entry met all three requirements under the emergency aid doctrine, which are
that: (1) the police had reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency and an
immediate need for their assistance; (2) the search was not primarily motivated by intent
to arrest or seize evidence; and (3) there was some reasonable basis to associate the
emergency with the place searched.539 The court of appeals also held that criminalization
of possession of more than twenty-five marijuana plants did not violate the privacy
provision of the Alaska Constitution because the legislature has the power to set
reasonable limits on personal marijuana possession.540 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the superior court, holding that the warrantless entry was justified under the
emergency aid doctrine and that criminalizing possession of more than twenty-five
marijuana plants did not violate the Alaska Constitution.541

Morgan v. State
In Morgan v. State,542 the court of appeals held that due process entitles an
individual to a new trial, rather than a mere reassessment of the facts by a new judge,
when the testimony of witnesses is essential to the verdict.543 Morgan was convicted of
second-degree sexual assault.544 He appealed, and the case was remanded to the superior
court, but a new judge was assigned to the case.545 The original trial judge did not allow
evidence that T.F., the alleged victim, had previously made false accusations of rape
against another man.546 On remand, the new judge allowed this evidence, but Morgan
was convicted again.547 Morgan appealed, arguing that he should have been given a new
trial, rather than allowing the new judge to rely on the transcript from the old trial.548 The
court of appeals held that, because the verdict depends in large part on the credibility of
T.F. and because her credibility cannot be determined from a cold read of the record, it
would violate Morgan’s due process rights to allow the new judge to decide the case
without a new trial.549 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court,
holding that due process entitles an individual to a new trial, rather than a reassessment of
the facts by a new judge, when the testimony of witnesses is essential to the verdict.550
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Stevens v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
In Stevens v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,551 the court of appeals held that a local
noise ordinance did not violate the First Amendment, nor was it unconstitutionally
vague.552 Stevens was cited seven times for violating the local noise ordinance by
playing loud music at his restaurant.553 The district court found that Stevens violated the
noise ordinance, and he appealed, arguing that the ordinance was vague, overbroad, and
would have the effect of chilling free speech.554 The court of appeals held that three
factors governed whether the First Amendment is violated: (1) whether the regulation is
justified without reference to the content of the speech; (2) whether the regulation is
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”; and (3) whether the
regulation leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.555 Here, because
Stevens offered no evidence that the ordinance reached substantially more conduct than
was necessary to achieve the Borough’s goals, the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment.556 Furthermore, the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because it
outlined geographic and time restrictions on noise, thus providing adequate notice of
what conduct was prohibited.557 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, holding that the local noise ordinance did not violate the First Amendment, nor was
it unconstitutionally vague.558

Williams v. State
In Williams v. State,559 the court of appeals held that Alaska Statute section
12.30.027(b), which prohibits anyone charged with domestic violence from returning to
the alleged victim’s residence while on pre-trial release, violates the equal protection
clause of the Alaska Constitution.560 Williams was charged with assaulting his wife in
2004 after he was seen with his hand around her neck.561 As a condition of his pre-trial
release, and in accordance with section 12.30.027(b), Williams was prohibited from
returning to his wife’s residence, despite no objection from the alleged victim or the
State.562 Williams argued this statute violated equal protection and infringed on his
fundamental right to maintain his marital relationship.563 The district court held the
statute did not violate equal protection, and Williams appealed.564 The court of appeals
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on an important right
without proof that it advanced a state interest.565 Infringement on Williams’ right to live
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with his wife required careful scrutiny.566 The statute was overinclusive because many
crimes that do not evidence a threat of future violence in the home are included under
domestic violence offenses.567 This allows the statute to create significant hardship
without advancing the State’s interest in reducing domestic violence.568 Thus, the statute
is unconstitutional.569 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court,
holding that the Alaska statute prohibiting anyone charged with domestic violence from
returning to the alleged victim’s residence while on pre-trial release violates the equal
protection clause of the Alaska Constitution.570
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VI. CONTRACT LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Adams v. Adams
In Adams v. Adams,571 the supreme court held that specific performance of an
option-to-purchase provision in a lease was justified by the lessor’s actual knowledge of
the option and that reformation of the lease was supported by clear and convincing
evidence.572 Michael Adams leased property to the lessee, Don Adams, with a signed
extension that gave the lessee an option to purchase.573 The lessee sought to exercise the
option to purchase and Michael refused, claiming he was unaware of the option.574 The
lessee sued for specific performance.575 The supreme court held that actual knowledge
may be inferred from circumstances and that here, there was enough circumstantial
evidence to support the superior court’s finding that Michael had actual knowledge of the
option-to-purchase provision.576 The supreme court also held that there was no clear
error in the superior court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence that reformation of
the lease was justified by a mutual mistake of fact.577 The supreme court also held that
the lessor should have been awarded interest, and that the lessee should have been
awarded attorneys’ fees, under the contract.578 The supreme court thus affirmed the
specific performance order and the reformation of the lease and remanded for adjustment
of interest to the lessor. 579

Cleary v. Smith
In Cleary v. Smith,580 the supreme court held that a settlement agreement between
the Alaska federal prison systems and Alaska prisoners resolving a suit regarding prison
conditions did not create a contract right for a certain class of prisoners to remain in
Alaska prisons.581 A group of prisoners filed a class action lawsuit in 1981 challenging
the conditions of prisons operated by the State of Alaska or the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“FBOP”).582 After being divided into classes, the prisoners confined in the FBOP
prisons came to a settlement agreement that allowed all Alaska prisoners housed in the
FBOP system to be transferred to Alaska state prisons.583 One member of that class,
Donald Stumpf, filed a motion for an injunction when he was informed that he would be
transferred to an Arizona detention center, arguing that the settlement agreement gave
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him a property interest in his Alaska confinement.584 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s denial of the injunction, holding that the settlement agreement did not
create a contract right in allowing all members of the FBOP class from the 1981 suit to
remain in Alaska and avoid transfer to a non-FBOP facility.585
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VII. CRIMINAL LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
C.J. v. State
In C.J. v. State,586 the supreme court held that (1) the State owed a duty of care to
a parolee’s victim; (2) capping non-economic damages did not violate equal protection
under the Alaska Constitution; and (3) each sexual penetration, in one continuous assault,
was a separate incident.587 Luke Carter was released on mandatory parole after serving
ten years of his fifteen-year sentence for violent rape. 588 Shortly thereafter, Carter
violated terms of his parole, and the parole officer issued an arrest warrant but did not
take any further action to locate or arrest Carter.589 Two weeks later, Carter raped C.J.
and was later charged and convicted by a jury for three counts of first-degree sexual
assault.590 C.J. filed an action against the State for negligence, and the State filed a
motion for summary judgment.591 The superior court denied the State’s motion for
summary judgment, treated C.J.’s injuries as a single injury, and limited non-economic
damages to a cap of $400,000.592 The supreme court held that the State had a duty to
exercise due care in supervising parolees.593 The supreme court also held that the cap on
non-economic damages did not violate equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.594
Under the “sliding scale approach” for equal protection claims, the damages cap, which
imposed only economic burdens and was substantially related to the legitimate interest of
reducing insurance premiums, satisfied the minimum scrutiny “means-end fit
requirement” and is therefore constitutional.595 However, the damages were not limited
to a single cap since each sexual penetration, though committed in rapid succession, was
a distinct act and a separate assault under criminal law.596 The supreme court vacated the
denial of summary judgment and remanded for discretionary function immunity, holding
that the cap on non-economic damages for each incident was constitutional.597

State, Department of Corrections v. Cowles
In State, Department of Corrections v. Cowles,598 the supreme court held that a
parole board cannot be held liable for its selection of parole conditions599 and that, under
certain circumstances, the State must exercise due care in supervising parolees.600 A
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parolee murdered his girlfriend and then committed suicide.601 He had been incorrectly
assigned a “medium” supervision level, although his actions warranted a “maximum”
supervision level.602 The personal representative of the girlfriend’s estate sued the
Department of Corrections, alleging that it negligently administered the parole plan.603
The superior court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, and the State
appealed.604 Emphasizing the policy considerations inherent in the parole process as well
as the separation-of-powers doctrine, the supreme court expressly overruled State,
Division of Corrections v. Neakok,605 holding discretionary-function immunity
immunized the State from negligence liability arising from a parole board’s decision of
parole conditions or parole revocation.606 The supreme court also narrowed Neakok,
holding that the State must exercise due care in supervising parolees only when it knows,
or reasonably should know, that they pose a threat to a particular individual or group.607
The supreme court vacated the superior court’s order denying the State’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that a parole board’s selection of parole conditions is entitled
to discretionary function immunity and that the State has a duty to exercise due care to
supervise parolees only in certain circumstances.608

State v. Parker
In State v. Parker,609 the supreme court held that a victim’s age and the intention
to use child pornography pictures only for private use did not mandate inclusion among
the least serious conduct of the offenses charged.610 Parker pled no contest to possession
of child pornography, attempted misconduct involving a controlled substance, and
exploitation of a minor after taking approximately 100 photographs and three videos of a
sixteen-year-old girl whom he had given drugs to on numerous occasions.611 At
sentencing, Parker presented mitigating factors.612 He argued that his conduct was
among the least serious for the offense because the girl was over the age of consent
(sixteen) and the images were intended for private rather than commercial use.613 The
trial court denied Parker’s claim, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the
conduct was the least serious for the offenses charged.614 The supreme court held that
Parker’s intention for only private use, rather than commercial use, made the conduct less
serious, but not necessarily the least serious, especially since production of child
pornography is a separate crime.615 The presumptive sentence is intended to encompass
601
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most of the convictions, with the least serious mitigator only applying to a few;616 that the
child was over the age of consent does not automatically put his conviction in the least
serious category, especially considering that he likely could have been convicted of more
charges than those to which he pled no contest.617 The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals and remanded the case, holding that the victim’s age and the intention to use
child pornography pictures only for private use did not mandate inclusion among the least
serious conduct for the offenses charged.618

Surrells v. State
In Surrells v. State,619 the court of appeals held that revocation of a first felony
offender’s probation and imposition of his remaining suspended sentence does not
constitute an increase in his maximum sentence and therefore does not implicate the
Blakely620 right to trial by jury.621 Surrells was convicted of a class B felony and was
sentenced by a judge to six years imprisonment with four years suspended.622 As a first
felony offender, his unsuspended term of imprisonment could not exceed the four-year
presumptive term for a second felony offender convicted of the same offense in the
absence of aggravating factors or extraordinary circumstances.623 After Surrells served
two years in prison and was released, his probation was revoked and he served two
additional years.624 Subsequently, the State petitioned to revoke his probation and
Surrells moved to correct his sentence, arguing that any additional revocation of his
probation would require a showing of aggravating factors in a trial by jury.625 The court
of appeals held that a sentencing court has authority to revoke a defendant’s probation
and impose previously suspended jail time as a result of the defendant’s post-sentencing
conduct; because the original maximum sentence never changed, the sentence was never
“increased,” and the Blakely right to trial by jury did not apply.626 Furthermore, a first
felony offender’s probation can be revoked, resulting in an unsuspended sentence that
exceeds the presumptive term for a typical second felony offender of the same offense,
when it is justified by the totality of the circumstances, such as poor performance on
probation.627 As a benchmark rule, this sentencing guideline does not implicate the
Blakely right to trial by jury.628 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s
decision, holding that revocation of a first felony offender’s probation and imposition of a
remaining suspended sentence does not constitute an increase in his maximum sentence
and therefore the Blakely right to trial by jury does not apply.629
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Alaska Court of Appeals
Alex v. State
In Alex v. State,630 the court of appeals held that jury instructions defining
“constructive possession” as having “the power to exercise dominion or control” were
problematic, but in the case at hand, the instructions were harmless error.631 The
defendant was convicted of a weapons charge when a gun was found under his seat, the
passenger seat of a car.632 At trial, he argued that he had no knowledge of the gun,
despite his earlier confession to the police.633 The court of appeals held that the jury
instructions, defining constructive possession as “the power to exercise dominion or
control over a thing,” were problematic, as there was no mention of any intent to
possess.634 However, the instructions were harmless since the defense in this case had
not contested any knowledge of the gun, thus intent to possess it was not an issue.635 The
jury instruction would have only made a difference had the defendant conceded
knowledge of the gun under his seat.636 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the
superior court, holding that although jury instructions defining “constructive possession”
as having the power to exercise dominion or control” were problematic, they were
harmless in the case at hand.637

Anderson v. State
In Anderson v. State,638 the court of appeals held that hindering prosecution in the
first degree can be committed by rendering assistance to felony probationers who have
committed misdemeanor or non-criminal violations of their probation and that it is not
necessary to have a separate search warrant when executing an arrest warrant for parts of
the house which do not belong to the person being arrested.639 Lars and Lana Anderson
were convicted of first-degree hindering prosecution when they allowed their twenty
year-old son, Daniel, to hide in their bedroom while police officers looked for him in
response to a parole violation he committed.640 The Andersons argued that because
drinking alcohol during probation did not qualify as a crime “punishable as a felony,”
they could not be held for first degree hindering prosecution641 and that by finding Daniel
hidden in their bedroom, the police violated the Fourth Amendment, because the arrest
warrant was for Daniel, and their bedroom was private.642 The court of appeals held that
the Andersons can be guilty of first degree hindering prosecution despite the fact that
drinking alcohol while on probation is not in and of itself a felony, because it is the
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punishment for the original offense which is altered by violating parole.643 Also, there
was no additional warrant needed to enter the residence, even though it was shared with
Lars and Lana, as long as the officers had probable cause to believe that Daniel was
inside the home.644 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding
that it is not necessary for a probation violator to have committed a felony for someone to
be guilty of first degree hindering prosecution and that a separate search warrant for
different parts of a shared home is not necessary if the arrestee could be hiding there.645

Cooper v. District Court
In Cooper v. District Court,646 the court of appeals held that neither the victim of
a crime nor the State Office of Victims’ Rights (“Office”) has standing to challenge the
sentence imposed upon the perpetrator of a crime.647 Cynthia Cooper and the Office
independently challenged her husband’s sentence which was imposed for his assault
against her.648 Cynthia also moved to have a portion of the proceedings sealed from
public access because it violated psychotherapist-patient privilege.649 Daniel Cooper
arranged a plea bargain with the Municipality of Anchorage to complete a year of
counseling.650 The District Court agreed to allow Daniel to satisfy this condition of his
Cynthia objected,
probation by continuing in a program he had already begun.651
claiming that Daniel must complete a domestic violence intervention program approved
by the Department of Corrections,652 but the District Court judge declared that Daniel’s
current program was sufficient, and Cynthia applied for relief.653 The court of appeals
held that though the victim may provide input before decisions such as sentencing are
made,654 victims do not have the right to appeal those decisions because ultimately
criminal prosecutions are conducted on behalf of the entire community, and victims are
not parties to criminal proceedings.655 Also, the Office only has the authority to advocate
on behalf of clients and to assist crime victims in protecting their legal rights and, thus,
has no authority to file a suit except on behalf of a client who has standing.656 Finally,
the records that Cynthia moved to seal did not contain information protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and, furthermore, that Cynthia waived any privilege she
otherwise would have had by failing to make a timely objection.657 The court of appeals
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denied the application of relief, holding that neither the victim of a crime nor the Office
has standing to challenge the sentence imposed upon the perpetrator of a crime.658

Douglas v. State
In Douglas v. State,659 the court of appeals held that there was no reversible error
in the superior court judge’s evidentiary rulings, that the prosecutor’s final argument
mentioning presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent was not so prejudicial
as to warrant a reversal, but that sentencing was conducted in violation of Blakely v.
Washington660.661 Douglas was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual assault and
two counts of fourth-degree sexual assault.662 Douglas appealed, arguing that (1)
evidence of sexual phone calls between the victim and another man and of noise
complaints should have been admitted, (2) the prosecutor’s final argument incorrectly
described the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent, and (3) the
superior court failed to weigh the probative value in admitting evidence of his prior
assault conviction.663 The court of appeals held that the superior court appropriately
weighed the probative value of evidence regarding sexual phone calls and noise
complaints against the prejudicial value when limiting the admissibility of the
evidence.664 Second, although the prosecutor’s comments regarding the presumption of
innocence were incorrect, the limiting instructions given by the judge meant that the
comments were not prejudicial enough to warrant reversal.665 Furthermore, the
prosecutor’s comments that Douglas argues attacked his decision to remain silent were
fair comments on the evidence.666 Ultimately, however, the court remanded the case to
determine whether the aggravating factors during sentencing were Blakely-compliant.667
The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and remanded the case for further
proceedings regarding the aggravating factors, holding that there was no reversible error
in the superior court judge’s evidentiary rulings, that the prosecutor’s final argument
mentioning presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent was not so prejudicial
as to warrant a reversal, but that sentencing was conducted in violation of Blakely.668

Garhart v. State
In Garhart v. State,669 the court of appeals held that Crocker670 restrictions on
search warrants did not apply retroactively to a pre-Crocker conviction for marijuana
possession, and that appellant’s commercial cultivation of marijuana was not
658
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constitutionally protected.671 Garhart was convicted of controlled substance misconduct
after warranted searches of his house and vehicle revealed evidence of commercial
cultivation of marijuana.672 After Garhart’s conviction but prior to sentencing, Crocker
was decided, holding that a warrant to search a home for marijuana must be based upon
probable cause to believe that the marijuana possession falls outside the scope of
protected personal use.673 Garhart’s motion for a new trial was denied by the superior
court and he appealed, citing Crocker.674 The court of appeals held that, even though
Crocker established a new rule of state constitutional law, here it did not satisfy the threeprong Alaska test for retroactivity because: (1) the policy behind Crocker of protecting
the privacy of the home was not at issue, (2) the law enforcement officers reasonably
relied on the pre-Crocker law in applying for and issuing the search warrants, and (3) full
retroactive application would have a substantial negative impact on the administration of
justice because many cases would be reopened.675 Also, Garhart’s commercial
cultivation of marijuana was not protected by the Alaska Constitution because the
legislature may properly limit the amount of marijuana a person may possess even if for
personal use in his or her home, and Garhart exceeded that amount.676 The court of
appeals affirmed the superior court judgment, holding that Crocker restrictions on search
warrants did not apply retroactively to a pre-Crocker conviction, and that the appellant’s
commercial cultivation of marijuana was not constitutionally protected.677

Hall v. State
In Hall v. State,678 the court of appeals held that a five year composite sentence
with two and a half years suspended was appropriate for a man who pled no contest to
writing bad checks while he was awaiting trial for writing other bad checks.679 While
awaiting trial for writing $8,000 in bad checks, Hall was accused of writing more bad
checks in the amount of nearly $65,000.680 Hall pled no contest to these charges, and the
trial judge sentenced him to four years, two suspended, for a scheme to defraud and one
year, six months suspended, for the misdemeanor of violating conditions of his release.681
Hall appealed the sentences, arguing that because this was his first felony and the crime
was a nonviolent property crime, precedent required the judge to give him probation, not
imprisonment.682 The court of appeals held that imprisonment can be a useful deterrent
and, because Hall had a history of writing bad checks, the trial judge was correct in ruling
that probation would not deter Hall from continuing to write bad checks.683 Additionally,
when a defendant has committed a Class B felony, as Hall did here, a first offender
671
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should receive more than probation unless there are mitigating circumstances.684 The
court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the superior court, holding that a five-year
composite sentence, with two and a half years suspended, was appropriate for a man who
pled no contest for writing bad checks while he was awaiting trial for writing other bad
checks.685

Jackson v. State
In Jackson v. State,686 the court of appeals held that a district court did not violate
the doctrine of separation of powers by requiring a minor to return to court on a biweekly basis to report the progress of her probation.687 Jackson pled no contest to two
counts of underage alcoholic beverage consumption.688 Jackson received a sentence of
probation, a condition of which required her to meet with her sentencing judge on
alternate weeks to discuss her progress.689 Jackson appealed, arguing that the Department
of Corrections had the exclusive authority to monitor probationers.690 The court of
appeals held that the sentencing judge did not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers,691 because the state supreme court had recognized that the probation process was
shared between the judicial and executive branches and that the legislature intended the
judiciary to supervise minors convicted of consuming alcoholic beverages.692 The court
of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the district court did not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers when it required Jackson to report the
progress of her probation to her sentencing judge.693

Lampkin v. State
In Lampkin v. State,694 the court of appeals held that convictions for one act that
violated separate statutes did not constitute double jeopardy when each statue served a
separate societal interest and that one offense was not a lesser included offense of the
other.695 Lampkin was serving a jail sentence when he was convicted of fourth and fifth
degree controlled substance misconduct and promoting contraband in the first degree for
possessing the two controlled substances.696 Lampkin appealed the convictions, arguing
that conviction for both drug possession and promoting contraband violated double
jeopardy. 697 Lampkin argued, alternatively, that drug possession is a lesser included
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offense of the promoting contraband charge.698 The court of appeals held that the
defendant was not in double jeopardy, because the two statutes serve the distinct societal
interests of preventing possession of controlled substances and preventing introduction of
contraband materials into the prison. 699 Additionally, possession of drugs is not a lesser
included offense of the promoting contraband charge, because when the jury found the
defendant guilty of promoting contraband, it did not logically follow that they must also
find him guilty of possession. 700 The court of appeals affirmed Lampkin’s conviction,
holding that his conviction under two separate statutes for one act did not constitute
double jeopardy and that one charge was not a lesser included offense of the other. 701

Miller v. State
In Miller v. State,702 the court of appeals held that an investigative traffic stop of a
driver who had been involved in a verbal domestic dispute was not supported by a
reasonable suspicion that the argument would lead to a crime.703 A 911 caller reported an
argument in a parking lot and gave a general description of the vehicle and individuals
involved.704 The responding officer stopped a vehicle matching the description and
ultimately arrested the driver, Miller, for driving while under the influence and refusing
to submit to a chemical test.705 Miller moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, but
his motion was denied.706 The court of appeals held that a report of a verbal domestic
disturbance alone did not provide the officer with an objective basis for believing that a
crime had been or was about to be committed.707 No violence or threat of violence had
been reported, and there was no reason to believe that the verbal argument, though
heated, would end in domestic violence.708 The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s conviction, holding that an investigative traffic stop of a driver involved in a
verbal domestic dispute was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that the argument
would lead to a crime.709

State v. Moreno
In State v. Moreno,710 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s pre-2005
presumptive sentencing law was valid, provided that there is a jury trial when Blakelycompliant aggravating factors are involved.711 Moreno was convicted of first degree
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sexual abuse of a minor in 2004.712 The State proposed no aggravating factors, and
Moreno faced an eight year presumptive sentence under Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive
sentencing law.713
The superior court found the presumptive sentencing law
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment and announced its intention to apply
indeterminate sentencing to Moreno.714 The court of appeals held that Alaska’s pre-2005
presumptive sentencing law was not unconstitutional because its constitutional flaws
could be remedied by providing a jury trial when certain aggravating factors were
involved.715 The court recognized that the law did violate the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington,716 but determined that the court could sever the
unconstitutional portions of the law from the presumptive sentencing scheme as a
whole.717 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that
Alaska’s pre-2005 presumptive sentencing law was valid, provided that there is a jury
trial when Blakely-compliant aggravating factors are involved.718

Porterfield v. State
In Porterfield v. State,719 the court of appeals held that a co-conspirator’s
statement against penal interest to an unknown police informant was not testimonial in
nature and, therefore, did not implicate the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment720 as described in Crawford v. Washington.721 Porterfield was convicted of
first-degree murder and first-degree arson.722 The government presented the testimony of
Porterfield’s wife admitting each spouse’s involvement to a friend who was covertly
acting as a police informant.723 Previously, the court of appeals held that these statements
were properly admitted under the “statement against penal interest” hearsay exception
and that Porterfield’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.724 Granting this appeal
to reconsider in light of the Crawford decision, the court of appeals followed circuit and
state precedent to hold that Porterfield’s wife’s statements did not implicate the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment because they were not testimonial in
nature.725 These statements were not testimonial because Porterfield’s wife had no
knowledge that her statements could be used against Porterfield,726 and she made the
statements to a friend, not to a government official.727 The court of appeals affirmed the
superior court, holding that Porterfield’s wife’s statement against penal interest to an
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unknown police informant was not testimonial in nature and, therefore, did not implicate
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment as described in Crawford.728

Smart v. State
In Smart v. State,729 the court of appeals held that the Blakely v. Washington730
right to jury trial and requirement of reasonable doubt for aggravating factors should be
applied retroactively to all defendants.731 Two men received enhanced sentences based
on the State’s proof of aggravating factors.732 After their convictions were final, Blakely
was decided, giving criminal defendants the right to a jury trial on any issue of fact that
would potentially increase the defendants’ maximum penalty.733 The court of appeals
held that the correct test for retroactive application of Blakely was the test stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker734 and later adopted by the Alaska
supreme court in State v. Semancik735.736 The court distinguished the retroactivity test
stated in Teague v. Lane,737 which limits the authority of federal courts to overturn state
criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, because Teague did not
address the authority of state courts.738 Under Semancik, the court looks at the purpose of
the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect of retroactive
application on the administration of justice.739 The new rule, Blakely, consisted of the
defendant’s right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to have a jury
decide issues of fact that might raise a defendant’s maximum penalty.740 The purpose of
the Blakely requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to prevent unconstitutional
punishment, was sufficient to merit full retroactivity under Semancik.741 Also, although
reliance on the earlier standard was substantial, the administration of justice would not be
severely impacted by retroactive application of Blakely.742 The purpose of the Blakely
right to jury trial on issues of fact, to guarantee the citizenry’s liberties, also favored
retroactivity.743 The court of appeals reversed and vacated the superior court’s ruling for
one of the convicts and affirmed the ruling for the other convict on grounds of harmless
error, holding that the Blakely right to jury trial and requirement of reasonable doubt for
aggravating factors should be applied retroactively to all defendants.744
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State v. Stafford
In State v. Stafford,745 the court of appeals held that when determining the
mandatory minimum sentences for individuals convicted of driving under the influence
(“DUI”), the date of sentencing was the pertinent date for applying a new, more lenient
law.746 In 2004, the Alaska legislature repealed a lifetime look-back period for prior DUI
convictions and enacted an amendment which required sentencing courts to count only an
offender’s DUI convictions within the previous fifteen years for the purpose of
determining mandatory minimum sentences.747 Stafford and Castrey were arrested for
DUI; both had DUI convictions that were more than fifteen years old.748 The district
court applied the new law because Stafford and Castrey were awaiting sentencing when
the amendment went into effect.749 The State appealed, arguing that the date the offense
was committed should be the pertinent date for applying the new law.750 The court of
appeals held that the date of sentencing was the pertinent date for applying the new law,
because the legislative history of the statute suggested that the legislature wanted the new
law to be applied as soon and broadly as possible, and there was no language suggesting
its application should be limited to those offenses committed on or after the effective
date.751 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that the
date of sentencing was the pertinent date for applying the new law when determining the
mandatory minimum sentences for individuals convicted of DUI.752

Stevens v. State
In Stevens v. State,753 the court of appeals held that Alaska Statute section
28.15.021(5),754 which allows off-highway vehicles to be operated without a license, did
not exempt a driver whose license had been revoked from Alaska Statute section
28.15.291(a),755 which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle on the highway without
a license,756 and that Alaska Statute section 28.15.291(a) did not violate due process or
equal protection.757 Police found Stevens operating a four-wheel vehicle on a highway
with a revoked license and charged him under section 28.15.291(a).758 Stevens pled no
contest and then appealed, arguing that, under section 28.15.021(5), he was not required
to have a license to operate an off-highway vehicle on the highway and, in the alternative,
that section 28.15.291(a) violated due process and equal protection.759 The court of
appeals held that the legislative purpose of section 28.15.021(5) was not to exempt
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unlicensed on-road operation of off-highway vehicles from the prohibition in section
28.15.291(a) but merely to permit unlicensed operation of off-highway vehicles only
when they are operated off the highway.760 Further, Stevens’ due process was not
violated because, when viewed together, section 28.15.291(a) and section 28.15.021(5)
are not incompatible.761 Also, section 28.15.291(a) did not fail for vagueness, because it
was not ambiguous or confused after legal analysis.762 Section 28.15.291(a) also did not
violate equal protection, because the legislature was not irrational in distinguishing onroad and off-road operation of motor vehicles.763 The court of appeals affirmed the guilty
plea,764 holding that section 28.15.021(5) did not exempt a driver whose license had been
revoked from section 28.15.291(a),765 and that section 28.15.291(a) did not violate due
process or equal protection.766

Walsh v. State
In Walsh v. State,767 the court of appeals held that a trial judge did not abuse his
discretion when he did not inquire into or attempt to resolve an apparent breakdown in an
attorney-client relationship in an indigent’s criminal trial.768 Walsh told the judge at his
plea hearing that he and his attorney were having difficulty reaching an agreement on the
pleadings.769 Walsh later stated that there was a conflict of interest with his attorney and
asked for new counsel, but did not specify any particular conflict.770 The judge asked for
particulars of ethical violations, but did not hear anything further about it.771 After the
trial had commenced, Walsh again objected to his attorney and was told by the judge that
such complaints would be addressed elsewhere.772 Walsh appealed his conviction.773
The court of appeals held that judges should be hesitant to inject themselves in the
attorney-client relationship and that here, the breakdown in attorney-client relationship
never appeared so severe as to prevent communication between the attorney and Walsh,
thus the judge acted properly.774 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he did not inquire into or attempt to
resolve an apparent breakdown in an attorney-client relationship in an indigent’s criminal
trial.775

760

Id. at 692.
Id. at 693.
762
Id.
763
Id. at 694.
764
Id. at 695.
765
Id. at 693.
766
Id. at 693–94.
767
134 P.3d 366 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
768
Id. at 368.
769
Id. at 369.
770
Id.
771
Id.
772
Id.
773
Id.
774
Id. at 370–71.
775
Id. at 368.
761

58

Y.J. v. State
In Y.J. v. State,776 the court of appeals held that a minor’s act of concealing a
holster under a bed was evidence tampering.777 Y.J. ran from a police officer who
approached him and suspected him of concealing a weapon.778 Y.J. ran into an apartment
after tossing the gun, but a few minutes later he came out and was taken into custody.779
Upon searching the apartment, police found a holster underneath the bed.780 Y.J. was
convicted of possessing a concealed weapon and evidence tampering.781 After his trial,
Y.J. filed a motion for a partial judgment of acquittal for the evidence tampering
charge.782 The superior court denied this motion, and Y.J. appealed.783 The court of
appeals held that concealing a holster under the bed was evidence tampering, because
substantial evidence existed to show that Y.J.’s intent was to hide the holster from police,
impairing the availability of evidence in a criminal investigation.784 It was irrelevant that
under the law, the holster was not actually “concealed” because it was found quickly by
the police.785 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding
that a minor’s act of concealing a holster under a bed was evidence tampering.786

Zemljich v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Zemljich v. Municipality of Anchorage,787 the court of appeals held that the
government satisfies its duty to offer an independent test of blood alcohol when a driver
understands this right, is given a reasonable opportunity to exercise this right, but is
unwilling to make an affirmative decision to exercise or waive the right.788 Police officer
Daily stopped Zemljich’s car after observing Zemljich stopped beside a young girl crying
in the fetal position in an alley.789 Daily observed that Zemljich appeared drunk and
arrested him for driving under the influence after Zemljich showed a .227 alcohol level
on a breath test.790 Daily offered Zemljich an independent chemical test, but Zemljich
could not decide whether an independent test would help him and left it undecided
whether he would assert his right for that test.791 The court of appeals held, in addition to
finding a reasonable suspicion to authorize the stop,792 that Zemljich impliedly waived
his right to an independent chemical test.793 The trial court correctly found waiver of the
776
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right to the independent test because Zemljich understood his right to an independent
test794 and was given reasonable opportunity to assert that right.795 The court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, holding that the government satisfies its duty to offer an
independent test of blood alcohol when a driver understands this right, is given a
reasonable opportunity to exercise it, but is unwilling to make an affirmative decision to
exercise or waive the right.796
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VIII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Alaska Supreme Court
Crawford v. State
In Crawford v. State,797 the supreme court held that the warrantless search of the
unlocked center console of an automobile was a reasonable search incident to arrest.798
Crawford was arrested for reckless driving, and the arresting officer found crack cocaine
in the vehicle’s center console while conducting a search for weapons.799 After his
suppression motion was denied, Crawford pleaded no contest to fourth degree
misconduct involving a controlled substance.800 The court of appeals upheld the search
because the officer had an articulable reason to believe that the console contained a
weapon, and the supreme court granted a petition for hearing.801 The supreme court held
that the warrantless search was a reasonable search incident to arrest because the
vehicle’s console was within Crawford’s immediate control and was unlocked, making it
immediately associated with Crawford’s person.802 Additionally, the search was
reasonably contemporaneous with Crawford’s arrest because there was only a short delay
between the arrest and the search.803 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals, holding that the warrantless search of a car’s center console was a
reasonable search incident to an arrest for reckless driving.804

Hora v. Cooper
In Hora v. Cooper,805 the supreme court held that a person subject to a domestic
violence protective order does not violate that order simply by being in the same public
place as the person protected by the order,806 and that the fact that two parties both
expressed concerns for their safety was insufficient basis for subjecting both parties to a
mutual restraining order.807 Cooper was placed under a protective order after he pled no
contest to a charge of family violence after allegedly assaulting his then-wife, Hora.808
Hora later petitioned for a long-term restraining order, arguing that Cooper had violated
the terms of the initial order, most notably by making eye contact with her at a local
shopping mall and attending a conference that she also attended.809 In separate
proceedings, the superior court denied the petition for a long-term restraining order and
granted Cooper’s separate motion for a mutual restraining order stemming from the
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couple’s divorce proceedings.810 The supreme court held that Cooper’s conduct did not
amount to “stalking” or “contacting,” the relevant elements of the crime of violating a
protective order.811 The crime of stalking requires the victim to reasonably perceive the
threat of injury, and Hora’s evidence did not support such a finding.812 Furthermore, a
person subject to a domestic violence protective order does not commit the crime of
violating that order simply by being in the same public place as the person protected by
the order.813 However, the superior court abused its discretion in issuing the mutual
restraining order, as there was insufficient factual support for Cooper’s concern that he
would be subject to harassment or contact by Hora.814 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s denial of a long-term restraining order and overturned its imposition of a
mutual restraining order, holding that a person subject to a domestic violence protective
order does not violate that order simply by being in the same public place as the person
protected by the order, and that the fact that both parties expressed concerns for their
safety is insufficient basis for subjecting both parties to a mutual restraining order.815

Vaska v. State
In Vaska v. State,816 the supreme court held that it was error to apply the prior
inconsistent statement provision for the first time on appeal, where defendant’s decision
not to cross examine a young witness was influenced by the State’s reliance on the
catchall exception to the hearsay rule and its failure to lay an adequate foundation to
admit the witness’ statements as prior inconsistent statements.817 Vaska was convicted of
first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, T.E.818 At trial, the court permitted T.E.’s mother to
testify about T.E.’s out of court statements since T.E. could not remember them while on
the stand.819 Vaska appealed, arguing that admission of the mother’s hearsay statements
under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule was unconstitutional.820 On appeal, the
State, for the first time, argued that the statements were admissible as prior inconsistent
statements.821 The court of appeals adopted this new theory, and Vaska appealed.822 The
supreme court held that a party offering a statement under the prior inconsistent statement
rule must satisfy two foundational conditions.823 First, the offering party must show that
the prior statement is, in fact, inconsistent with the witnesses’ testimony.824 Second, the
witness who made the prior statement is to be given an opportunity to explain or deny
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it.825 Both should be met while the witness is still on the stand and before the prior
statement is admitted.826 Here, the State abandoned its examination of T.E. and asked for
her to be excused without complying with either of the foundational conditions.827 The
State’s decision to apply the catchall theory at trial led Vaska to decide not to crossexamine T.E., potentially seriously prejudicing his case.828 The supreme court reversed
the evidentiary ruling of the court of appeals and remanded the case, holding that it was
error to apply the prior inconsistent statement provision for the first time on appeal.829

Alaska Court of Appeals
State v. Avery
In State v. Avery,830 the court of appeals held that, under Blakely v. Washington,831
prior convictions need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when used as
aggravating factors to increase a sentence.832 After three prior felony convictions, Avery
was convicted a fourth time for possessing cocaine.833 The superior court added three
years to Avery’s sentence based on his criminal history.834 Subsequent to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Blakely that all non-prior conviction aggravating factors that increase a
defendant’s prison sentence beyond the established maximum must be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt,835 Avery filed a motion to modify his sentence, arguing that
the aggravating factors should have been proven to a jury.836 The superior court ordered
a new sentencing hearing to decide if the Blakely decision should affect Avery’s
sentence.837 The State appealed, arguing that Blakely did not make Avery’s sentence
illegal and that the superior court did not have the authority to change Avery’s
sentence.838 The court of appeals held that because all of the aggravating factors were
based on Avery’s prior convictions, his sentence was not illegal under Blakely.839
Furthermore, because Avery’s motion for relief was untimely, the superior court did not
have the authority to alter his sentence.840 The court of appeals thus reversed the superior
court’s order of a new sentencing hearing, holding that prior convictions need not be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt when used as aggravating factors to increase a
sentence.841
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Billum v. State
In Billum v. State,842 the court of appeals held that although the sentencing court’s
use of aggravating factors to compound defendant’s sentence was technically
unconstitutional, it was harmless error since the same sentence could have been imposed
without use of any aggravating factors.843 Billum was convicted of three counts of firstdegree assault for causing a car accident and injuring four people.844 Because he was
intoxicated while driving, the judge used this aggravating factor to impose an additional
five years of suspended sentence.845 The court of appeals held that such use of an
aggravating factor without benefit of a jury trial was unconstitutional under Blakely v.
Washington846.847 However, because the judge had the authority to impose the same
sentence by imposing consecutive sentences for each of the charges against the
defendant, it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of the aggravating factor was
harmless error.848 The court of appeals affirmed the sentencing court’s decision, holding
that even though the use of aggravating factors in extending the sentence without a jury
determination was unconstitutional, it was harmless error and the sentence should
stand.849

Blank v. State
In Blank v. State,850 the court of appeals held that a breath test conducted by an
officer prior to arrest was not a preliminary breath test and therefore could be used as
evidence at trial.851 Blank hit and killed a pedestrian, then drove away from the scene.852
A police officer later questioned her at her home, and administered a breath test, which
showed that she was intoxicated.853 Blank challenged the use of this test at trial, arguing
that it was a preliminary breath test because it was given with a portable device and
therefore could only be used in establishing probable cause.854 The court of appeals held
that whether or not a breath test is preliminary is determined by the point in time that the
test is given, not the kind of device used, and therefore the breath test in question was not
proven to be preliminary.855 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision,
holding that the evidence of a breath test was admissible because the test had not been
shown to be preliminary.856
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Brown v. State
In Brown v. State,857 the court of appeals held that a probation officer authorized
to conduct suspicionless searches of the probationer can also temporarily detain the
probationer and enlist the assistance of the police to conduct the stop.858 Probation
Officer Davies mistakenly believed that one of his probationers who may have been
violating parole got into a cab, so he requested that the police stop the cab.859 When the
police stopped the cab, Davies recognized him as Brown, another of his probationers.860
Brown ran and left behind drugs.861 On appeal, Brown argued that Davies did not have
the authority to seize and detain Brown for the purpose of conducting a search and that,
even if the stop was lawful if conducted by Davies alone, the stop became unlawful when
Davies enlisted the help of the police.862 The court of appeals held that a probation
officer’s authority to search a probationer carries the power to temporarily detain the
probationer for the purpose of conducting the search, as long as the search is conducted in
a reasonable time and manner and is not conducted for the purpose of harassment.863 The
court of appeals also held the police assistance did not make the search unlawful, since
probation officers should not choose between endangering themselves by searching alone
or foregoing a search altogether.864 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
superior court, holding that a probation officer has the authority to temporarily seize and
detain a probationer in order to conduct a search subject to the conditions of parole and to
enlist the assistance of the police to conduct the stop.865

Bryant v. State
In Bryant v. State,866 the court of appeals held that a defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to call a witness who may have given favorable testimony and
failing to offer evidence that could have been used to rehabilitate credibility.867 Bryant
was convicted after standing trial for sexual abuse of a minor.868 He moved for a new
trial based on ineffective counsel, arguing that his trial attorney neglected to call a
witness to the stand who would have given testimony in his favor, and that his counsel
failed to offer into evidence a certificate that Bryant hoped to use during his closing
argument to rehabilitate his credibility.869 The court of appeals held that Bryant did not
meet his burden of proof to show that the trial attorney knew, or should have known,
what the witness was going to say and what help that witness could have provided.870
The court of appeals also held that the rehabilitation evidence was unnecessary because
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the prosecution did not address the issue in its closing argument and because the evidence
would not have rehabilitated his credibility.871 The court of appeals affirmed the ruling
of the superior court, holding that a defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to call
a witness who may have given favorable testimony and failing to offer evidence that
could have been used to rehabilitate credibility.872

Carlson v. State
In Carlson v. State,873 the court of appeals held that a judge may deviate from the
judicially declared benchmark range for individuals convicted of second-degree murder
without violating the Sixth Amendment.874 Carlson was convicted of second-degree
murder and was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment with ten years suspended.875 The
judge determined that Carlson’s sentence should exceed the benchmark range because of
his prior history of delinquency and repeated perjury.876 Carlson appealed, claiming that
his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the judge imposed a sentence above the
benchmark range without the aid of a jury.877 The court of appeals held that a judge
could deviate from the judicially declared benchmark range without violating the Sixth
Amendment, because the legislature retained an indeterminate sentencing structure,
allowing a sentencing judge to impose a sentence above the benchmark for any sound
reason.878 Defendants convicted of second-degree murder do not have a Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury decide whether their sentences should exceed the
benchmark range, because a finding of guilt subjects the defendant to the statutory
penalty of ten to ninety-nine years in prison.879 Within the statutory range, sentencing is
indeterminate, and judges are permitted to impose a sentence above the thirty-year
benchmark ceiling as long as they have a sound reason for doing so.880 The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that it is not a violation of
the Sixth Amendment for judges to deviate from the judicially declared benchmark range
for second-degree murder.881

Cleveland v. State
In Cleveland v. State,882 the court of appeals held that a presumptive term of
imprisonment may be properly increased when at least one Blakely883-compliant
aggravating factor has been proven, even if other aggravating factors relied on by the
871
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sentencing judge have not been proven to a jury.884 Cleveland was convicted of three
felonies relating to the forcible sexual penetration of his female cousin and was sentenced
to nineteen years imprisonment.885 On appeal, he argued that the sentencing judge
improperly increased the presumptive maximum term of imprisonment, since the
aggravating factors were not presented to a jury, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.886 The court of appeals held that Cleveland’s sentence did not violate the
Constitution, since five of the seven aggravating factors were in fact proven to the jury,
and any one of the five was sufficient to allow the sentencing judge to increase the
maximum presumptive term of imprisonment.887 The court of appeals affirmed the
superior court’s denial of Cleveland’s motion for a correction of sentence, holding that
the presumptive maximum term was properly exceeded.888

Collier v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Collier v. Municipality of Anchorage,889 the court of appeals held that a police
officer did not violate a driver’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel when the officer
required the driver to produce his driver’s license during a routine traffic stop.890 Collier
was convicted of speeding and appealed, arguing that the officer improperly obtained his
identification after he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right.891 The court of appeals
held that a routine traffic stop was not a custodial interrogation, and as such, the right to
counsel did not arise when the officer requested Collier’s driver’s license.892 The court of
appeals affirmed the conviction for speeding, holding that the driver’s Fifth Amendment
right to counsel was not triggered when a police officer required him to produce his
driver’s license when he was stopped for speeding.893

State v. Dague
In State v. Dague,894 the court of appeals held that where a criminal defendant is
entitled to a trial by jury on an aggravating factor, the defendant is not further guaranteed
a grand jury indictment on that factor.895 Dague was prosecuted for second-degree
murder for the death of a ten-month-old infant in her care; she was ultimately convicted
of manslaughter.896 The State asked the judge to hold a jury trial to consider the presence
of an aggravating factor.897 The trial court discharged the jury and barred the State from
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raising the issue with a subsequent jury.898 The court of appeals held that because
aggravating factors are not “elements” of the crime but rather are factors related to
sentencing, they need not be alleged in the indictment, and the sentencing judge has a
duty to take account of aggravating factors even if not raised by the State.899
Furthermore, the Blakely900 line of cases did not prohibit state courts from using the
element/sentencing factor dichotomy for purposes outside of the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial, such as the grand jury indictment concerned here.901 The court of appeals
reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that, even where a defendant is guaranteed
a jury trial on an aggravating factor, that factor is not an element of the crime for
purposes of the grand jury clause of the Alaska Constitution.902

Davis v. State
In Davis v. State,903 the court of appeals held that the speedy trial calculation
under Alaska Criminal Rule 45904 restarted when the defendant failed to change his plea
at a change-of-plea hearing he requested, that the Rule 45 clock did not begin running
until the trial judge ruled on the defendant’s suppression motion, and that hearsay
testimony was improperly admitted under the present-sense-impression-exception.905 On
July 26, 2000, Davis was charged with criminal offenses related to an automobile
collision; the passenger in the other vehicle involved allegedly told the police officer
statements regarding Davis.906 Davis’ trial began on February 4, 2002 which could have
violated his statutory right to a speedy trial.907 However, since Davis scheduled a
change-of-plea hearing at which he did not change his plea, the superior court ruled that
the speedy trial calculation restarted.908 The jury subsequently found Davis guilty on all
counts.909 The court of appeals held that the speedy trial calculation restarted when the
defendant announced that he would not change his plea at a change-of-plea hearing he
requested and that the Rule 45 clock did not begin running until the trial judge ruled on
defendant’s suppression motion.910 The court of appeals also held that the present-senseimpression hearsay exception is defined by its spontaneity or substantial contemporaneity
and that hearsay testimony was improperly admitted under this exception here,911 since
there was time for the passenger to reflect before the police officer asked him questions
about the event. 912 The court of appeals reversed the conviction and granted a new trial,
holding that the speedy trial calculation under Alaska Criminal Rule 45 restarted when
898
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the defendant failed to change his plea at a change-of-plea hearing he requested, that the
Rule 45 clock did not begin running until the trial judge ruled on defendant’s suppression
motion, and that hearsay testimony was improperly admitted under the present sense
impression exception. 913

Erickson v. State
In Erickson v. State,914 the court of appeals held that a pat-down search of a
passenger in a minor traffic violation stop, who the officer suspected of giving a false
name, was an illegal search.915 Erickson was a passenger in a car pulled over for not
having a front license plate.916 The police officer could not find the name that Erickson
gave him in the Alaska Public Safety Information Network (“APSIN”) and concluded
that the name given was false.917 The officer ordered Erickson out of the car and
conducted a pat-down search, where he found an identification card.918 The officer
arrested Erickson for giving false information and then continued the pat-down search,
finding illegal drugs.919 Erickson was convicted of possession of illegal drugs and
appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the search.920 The court of
appeals held that the search was illegal because the officer did not have probable cause to
arrest Erickson and had no reason to believe Erickson was armed and dangerous.921 The
fact that the officer could not find the name in APSIN is not enough to justify an arrest,
so the pat-down search could not be performed incident to that arrest.922 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the superior court, holding that a pat-down
search of the passenger in a minor traffic violation stop, who the officer suspected of
giving a false name, was an illegal search.923

State v. Garrison
In State v. Garrison,924 the court of appeals held that an individual’s statements to
the police are admissible when made outside the presence of counsel before the start of
adversary proceedings and when any alleged police threats occur after the individual’s
incriminating statements are made.925 Garrison was interviewed at his home without
counsel present as part of an ongoing murder investigation.926 He had refused earlier
attempts at questioning outside his attorney’s presence.927 However, at this time,
913

Id. at 722–23, 730.
141 P.3d 356 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
915
Id. at 357.
916
Id.
917
Id.
918
Id.
919
Id. at 358.
920
Id. at 358–59.
921
Id. at 359–60.
922
Id.
923
Id. at 357, 362.
924
128 P.3d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
925
Id. at 742–43.
926
Id. at 743.
927
Id.
914

69

Garrison answered the police officer’s questions and admitted he had a connection to the
murder weapon.928 The trial court held that this evidence was inadmissible, and the State
appealed.929 The court of appeals held that the evidence was admissible, because there
was no violation of attorney-client privilege when Garrison was not in custody and when
formal proceedings had not yet been brought against him.930 Additionally, the court of
appeals held that the testimony was given voluntarily, as the statements made by the
police were minimally coercive, if at all, and were made after Garrison had already
admitted his connection to the weapon.931 The court of appeals reversed the decision of
the superior court, holding that an individual’s statements to the police are admissible
when made outside the presence of counsel before the start of adversary proceedings and
when alleged police threats occur after the individual’s incriminating statements are
made.932

State v. Gottschalk
In State v. Gottschalk,933 the court of appeals held that giving an individual a copy
of the indictment when he was in court for another proceeding did not constitute service
for purposes of starting the speedy trial period under Alaska Criminal Rule 45.934 While
in a court proceeding on a petition to revoke his probation, Gottschalk was given a copy
of an indictment for felony DUI in a pending case.935 The superior court found that
providing Gottschalk with the copy during the probation proceeding constituted service
for Criminal Rule 45 purposes, even though he was not formally served until three
months later.936 The court of appeals held that the speedy trial period under Rule 45 must
have a clear, exact start date, and that Gottschalk’s proposed start date, when he received
a copy of the indictment, would open the door for confusion as to when the Rule 45 clock
started on each individual case.937 Therefore, the court determined that to start the speedy
trial period, a defendant must be formally served under Rules 4 and 9 or formally
arraigned on the charge under Rule 10.938 The court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s order dismissing the case, holding that the defendant was not “served” for
purposes of Rule 45 when the State gave him a copy of the indictment while he was in
court for another proceeding, but instead was served when he was formally served with
the charge several months later.939
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Joseph v. State
In Joseph v. State,940 the court of appeals held that a police officer’s reasonable
suspicion of public use of marijuana does not justify conducting an investigative stop and
that any evidence obtained as a result of an attempt to conduct an unjustified investigative
stop must be suppressed.941 Joseph was convicted of third-degree controlled substance
misconduct.942 The primary evidence against Joseph was a bag of cocaine that he threw
away while being pursued by an officer who was investigating a report of public use of
marijuana.943 Joseph appealed, arguing that the cocaine evidence should have been
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure.944 The court of appeals held that the
seizure was unlawful because Alaska case law limits investigative stops to situations in
which the suspected criminal activity poses imminent public danger or recently caused
serious harm, and the public use of marijuana did not satisfy this requirement.945 The
court of appeals also held that the cocaine evidence should have been suppressed because
the exclusionary rule applies to situations in which evidence is obtained while police are
attempting to conduct an unlawful investigative stop.946 The court of appeals rejected the
rule in the United States Supreme Court’s decision of California v. Hodari D.947 on state
law grounds, finding that the Hodari D. rule fails to safeguard citizens’ rights to privacy
under the Alaska Constitution.948 The court of appeals reversed the ruling of the superior
court, holding that the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained during an attempt to
conduct an unjustified investigative stop and that reasonable suspicion of public use of
marijuana does not justify conducting an investigative stop.949

Knox v. State
In Knox v. State,950 the court of appeals held that a defense attorney’s failure to
inform a defendant before his guilty plea that he would be subject to mandatory parole
should he be released early because of good-time credit constituted a prima facie case for
ineffective assistance of counsel.951 Knox was charged with selling crack cocaine, a class
B felony, and faced a presumptive six-year sentence as a third-felony offender.952 Knox
argued that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in handling his
suppression motion and in advising him about his plea.953 The court of appeals held that
Knox did not overcome the strong presumption that his attorney represented him
effectively with respect to the suppression hearing, because he did not show that the
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decisions were not tactical.954 However, there was a prima facie case of ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to his plea decision, because the attorney admitted that
she did not know that he would receive mandatory parole after his early release because
of good-time credit, and she claimed that she believed this fact may have swayed Knox’s
decision to plead.955 The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Knox’s application
for post-conviction relief and remanded, holding that the defense attorney’s erroneous
and influential advice to the defendant that he would not be subject to mandatory parole
after his early release constituted a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of
counsel.956

Marunich v. State
In Marunich v. State,957 the court of appeals held that a trial court’s addition of
general conditions of probation after sentencing did not violate a probationer’s double
jeopardy rights but did violate his due process rights.958 Marunich was sentenced to six
years in prison and four years on probation for two separate robberies.959 The superior
court issued its written judgment a week later, which contained twelve conditions of
probation that had not been mentioned by the sentencing judge.960 Marunich appealed,
arguing that the added conditions of probation illegally increased the severity of his
sentence.961 The court of appeals held that the addition of conditions which are inherent
aspects of being on probation did not violate Marunich’s double jeopardy rights, because
probation officers have a certain authority to supervise and control the conduct of
probationers.962 The post-sentencing addition of the general conditions violated
Marunich’s due process rights, however, because he was not given notice or the
opportunity to seek judicial review of the conditions.963 The court of appeals directed the
superior court to give Marunich an opportunity to object to the conditions, holding that
the post-sentencing addition of general conditions of probation violated Marunich’s due
process rights, though not his double jeopardy rights.964

McQuade v. State
In McQuade v. State,965 the court of appeals held that a traffic stop which led to
the arrest of two people in connection with a robbery was based on reasonable suspicion,
and therefore, it was proper that the evidence gained during the traffic stop was not
suppressed. A robbery occurred at an Anchorage gas station.966 After choosing to follow
954
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a suspicious vehicle, occupied by McQuade and Johnston, and observing continued
suspicious behavior including the commission of a traffic violation, a police sergeant
pulled over McQuade and Johnston.967 In searching the car, officers found clothing that
fit the robber’s description and cash that fit the description of the stolen money.968
McQuade and Johnston moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that the sergeant lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop them as robbery suspects.969 The superior court denied the
motion.970 The court of appeals held that in order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard, an officer must not rely on just a hunch, but have an objective justification for
making a stop and be able to point to “specific and articulable facts.”971 Because of the
time at which the officer saw the car, the reactions of the men to the police car, the abrupt
driving maneuvers, and the unusual behavior of the men while the sergeant followed, the
sergeant could point to “specific and articulable facts” and had an objective justification
for stopping the car.972 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court,
holding that a traffic stop which led to the arrest of two people in connection with a
robbery was based on reasonable suspicion, and therefore, it was proper that the evidence
gained during the stop was not suppressed.973

Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage,974 the court of appeals held that two
Anchorage ordinances punishing the sale or possession of drug paraphernalia were
invalid, one because it was unconstitutionally vague, the other because it made possible a
conviction without proof of mens rea.975 Myers, a “head shop” owner,976 challenged the
constitutionality of Sections 08.35.020 and 08.35.025 of the Anchorage Municipal
Code,977 the first prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia or possession of drug
paraphernalia with intent to sell, the second prohibiting the possession of drug
paraphernalia in public.978 Interpretation of the ordinances required examination of the
definition of “drug paraphernalia” found in Section 08.35.010.979 The court of appeals
held that Section 08.35.010, which outlawed all items intended either to help introduce
controlled substances into the human body, or to facilitate violations of Alaska's drug
laws,980 impermissibly encompassed both legal and illegal uses of controlled
substances.981 The court of appeals also held that this Section’s definition of “drug
paraphernalia” as items that circumstances may reasonably indicate a subjective intent to
967
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use or sell for consumption of controlled substances offered the possibility that the
possessor could be convicted of a violation based on a third party’s view of the
circumstances, rather than the possessor's actual intent.982 This would violate Alaska’s
due process requirement of actual awareness of wrongdoing.983 The court of appeals thus
held that Sections 08.35.020 and 08.35.025 of the Anchorage Municipal Code were
invalid; Section 08.35.020 because it was unconstitutionally vague, Section 08.35.025
because it made possible a conviction without proof of mens rea.984

Netling v. State
In Netling v. State,985 the court of appeals held that manufacturing
methamphetamine is a sufficiently serious crime to justify substantial imprisonment even
in the absence of injury, but that the superior court failed to support its determination that
manufacturing methamphetamine on a small scale could not qualify for mitigation as
among the least serious conduct within the definition of the offense.986 Netling pleaded
guilty to second-degree controlled substance misconduct for manufacturing
methamphetamine and was sentenced to the five-year presumptive term after the court
rejected the mitigating factors that he proposed.987 Netling appealed, arguing that his
sentence should be eligible for mitigation because: (1) the harm caused by his conduct
was consistently minor and inconsistent with a substantial term of imprisonment, and (2)
his conduct of manufacturing methamphetamine on a small scale was among the least
serious within the definition of the offense.988 The court of appeals held that
manufacturing methamphetamine was a sufficiently serious crime to justify substantial
imprisonment even in the absence of injury, because the legislature viewed
methamphetamine as a particularly dangerous drug and enacted provisions to severely
punish its manufacture.989 However, the superior court failed to provide support for its
determination that Netling’s small-scale operation could not qualify as among the least
serious conduct within the range of methamphetamine manufacturing.990 The court of
appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling in part, holding that while manufacturing
methamphetamine is a sufficiently serious crime to justify substantial imprisonment, the
superior court failed to support its determination that manufacturing methamphetamine
on a small scale could not qualify for mitigation as among the least serious conduct
within the definition of the offense.991
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Noyakuk v. State
In Noyakuk v. State,992 the court of appeals held that statements made by a suspect
during his first post-arrest interview with state officers were inadmissible because he was
not properly advised of his Miranda rights,993 but that this Miranda violation did not taint
subsequent admissible statements994 and that state officers honored his right to an
attorney.995 While Noyakuk was in custody for other criminal offenses, state troopers
interviewed him regarding the murder of his girlfriend.996 During this interview Noyakuk
was repeatedly told he could have an attorney present and could stop the interview at any
time but was never given a full Miranda warning.997 Noyakuk confessed to the murder of
his girlfriend.998 Each subsequent interview or conversation was preceded with a full
Miranda warning.999 Noyakuk’s motion at trial to suppress these statements was granted
regarding the first interview, but denied regarding all others.1000 The court of appeals
held that, although the first interview was conducted the day after he was arrested,
Noyakuk, who was being held incommunicado in a holding cell, was just as susceptible at
that time to coercion as a new arrestee.1001 The court of appeals also held that there was
sufficient time between the first and second interview to eliminate any threat of
coercion.1002 Furthermore, Noyakuk was appointed an attorney, was properly Mirandized
in subsequent interviews, and understood those warnings.1003 Finally, Noyakuk, who had
enough prior experience with the criminal justice system to understand his rights,
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.1004 The court of appeals affirmed
the decision of the superior court, holding that statements a suspect made during his first
interview were appropriately suppressed because he was not properly advised of his
Miranda rights,1005 but that subsequent statements were not tainted and were
admissible1006 and that state troopers honored his right to an attorney.1007

State v. One
In State v. One,1008 the court of appeals held that where an indigent petitioner files
for post-conviction relief, his or her attorney who submits a "no arguable claims"
certificate on grounds that the post-conviction petition is time-barred must explain why
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there is no arguable exception to the statute of limitations.1009 One entered a plea of no
contest to an assault charge.1010 After sentencing, he filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief.1011 His court-appointed attorney, Zorea, concluded that One’s claim
was time-barred and filed a no arguable claims certificate stating that he believed One
had no arguable claim for post-conviction relief.1012 The superior court accepted the
certificate, and One appealed, arguing that the certificate did not explain in detail why he
had no grounds for relief.1013 The court of appeals held that a no arguable claims
certificate must fully explain all of the claims the attorney considered and why the
attorney concluded these claims were frivolous.1014 Zorea was obligated, but failed to
provide, a full explanation of how he reached the conclusion that the claim was timebarred.1015 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that
where an indigent petitioner files for post-conviction relief, his or her attorney who
submits a "no arguable claims" certificate on grounds that the post-conviction petition is
time-barred must explain why there is no arguable exception to the statute of
limitations.1016

Parrish v. State
In Parrish v. State,1017 the court of appeals held that, without a complete record
that allows for meaningful review, the superior court’s ruling cannot be reversed.1018
Parrish was charged in 2005 with driving under the influence (“DUI”) and felony breathtest refusal and agreed to a plea bargain with the State, whereby he would plead guilty to
a prior 2004 DUI and the 2005 felony breath-test refusal in exchange for the dismissal of
the 2005 DUI.1019 Parrish appealed his sentence, arguing that it should have been
reduced on account of two mitigating factors.1020 The court of appeals rejected the first
mitigating factor, that Parrish’s history of minor violations was inconsistent with the
imposition of substantial imprisonment, because Parrish was not appealing the 2004 DUI
charge, and the court would not review a composite sentence unless all of the underlying
cases were appealed.1021 The second mitigating factor, that his conduct was among the
least serious within the definition of the statute, was also rejected because Parrish had
never before raised this argument in his defense, and thus the court had no record to
establish whether that claim was true.1022 The court of appeals upheld the judgment of
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the superior court, holding that the record was inadequate to allow the court to perform a
meaningful review.1023

Peterson v. State
In Peterson v. State,1024 the court of appeals held that a defendant's Cooksey1025
plea was valid where the issue preserved for appeal was dispositive of all charges and
that an investigative stop did not amount to a seizure where the individual obviously did
not feel compelled to reply to the officer’s questions.1026 Officer Turnage noticed
unusual movement coming from Peterson’s car,1027 stepped out of his car to investigate,
and observed a possible sexual assault.1028 Turnage knocked on the glass, to which
Peterson replied with expletives, asking what the officer wanted.1029 Peterson then gave a
fake name and an obviously fake birth date.1030 Drugs were subsequently discovered and
Peterson was arrested.1031 Peterson entered a Cooksey plea, reserving the right to appeal
the issue of suppression, for three felony charges and a normal no contest plea for four
misdemeanors.1032 He did not appeal the misdemeanor charges.1033 The court of appeals
held that a Cooksey plea is only valid if the issue being appealed is dispositive,1034 and
Peterson’s Cooksey plea was valid because the State failed to prove that the suppression
issue here is not dispositive of the felony charges against Peterson.1035 On the merits of
the suppression motion, Turnage’s actions did not constitute an illegal seizure,1036
because when Turnage approached Peterson, Peterson clearly did not feel compelled to
answer the officer’s questions.1037 Further, Peterson’s fake name and birth date gave
Turnage probable cause for arrest.1038 The supreme court affirmed the denial of
Peterson’s suppression motion,1039 holding that a defendant’s Cooksey plea is valid where
the issue preserved for appeal is dispositive of all the charges and that a police officer’s
questioning of an individual did not amount to a seizure where the individual obviously
did not feel compelled to reply to the officer’s questions.1040
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State v. Rivers
In State v. Rivers,1041 the court of appeals held that a person’s statements made to
an investigator of the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor
(“Division”) at an interview are admissible in court when the person does not
affirmatively exercise his or her right against self-incrimination during the interview.1042
Rivers moved to suppress incriminating statements he had given during an interview with
an investigator of the Division regarding his unemployment insurance.1043 The
investigator encouraged interviewees to participate and informed them that failure to do
so could result in a loss of future benefits.1044 The superior court judge suppressed the
statements because he found that Rivers had been coerced into giving them.1045 The court
of appeals held that the statements were admissible because at the time they were made,
Rivers was not in custody, was not coerced, and most importantly did not exercise his
right to avoid self-incrimination.1046 Alaska Statute section 23.20.070, which governs
immunity from prosecution when making statements before the Division, falls within a
category of statutes requiring individuals to affirmatively assert their right against selfincrimination in order to gain immunity from prosecution.1047 The court of appeals relied
heavily on the reasoning from Minnesota v. Murphy1048 in finding that Rivers’ situation
did not fall under the two possible exceptions to the affirmative assertion requirement,
because he was neither in custody nor compelled to give the incriminating testimony.1049
The court of appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that a person’s
statements made to a Division investigator at an interview are admissible in court when
the person does not affirmatively exercise his or her right against self-incrimination
during the interview.1050

Serradell v. State
In Serradell v. State,1051 the court of appeals held that the superior court could not
deny a criminal offender’s pro se application for post-conviction relief without adequate
notice to the petitioner.1052 Upon his counsel’s advice, Serradell pleaded no contest to
one count of second-degree murder.1053 Serradell then sought to withdraw his plea by
claiming that he was tricked into agreeing to the plea bargain by his attorneys.1054 The
State filed an “Answer and Opposition” asserting that Serradell had failed to rebut the
presumption that his counsel was competent, and the superior court denied Serradell’s
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application.1055 Serradell argued that the superior court erred because he was never given
notice of its intent to dismiss his application, thus preventing him from supplementing his
pleading.1056 The court of appeals held that the State’s “Answer and Opposition” was not
the functional equivalent of a motion for summary disposition, as claimed by the State,
and thus Serradell had no notice of the possible dismissal of his petition, in violation of
current Alaska rules of criminal procedure.1057 The court of appeals reversed the
judgment of the superior court, holding that a petitioner must receive adequate notice that
his application for post-conviction relief will be denied.1058

Slwooko v. State
In Slwooko v. State,1059 the court of appeals held that a reasonable person who
initiated contact with the police herself would not believe she was in custody when she
was interviewed in a polite, non-accusatory manner, even though it occurred in a police
office,1060 and that the interview did not become custodial when she refused to answer
questions because officers assured her that she was not under arrest and remained nonaccusatory.1061 Although another person had already confessed to a murder, police went
to question Slwooko after the confessor made suspicious statements and another person
tipped police that Slwooko admitted involvement in the murder.1062 Upon seeing the
police, Slwooko told them that she needed to talk to them, prompting the police to take
Slwooko to a closed interview room at the police station.1063 There, the police read
Slwooko her Miranda1064 rights, but she said that she did not want to answer
questions.1065 The officers emphasized that Slwooko was not under arrest and continued
to question her in a polite manner, after which she confessed to her involvement in the
murder.1066 The trial court ruled that Slwooko was not in custody when the interview
started, but that the interview became custodial when the officers continued to ask her
questions after she refused.1067 The court of appeals held that Slwooko was not in
custody when the interview began, since a reasonable person would not have believed
that she had no choice to end the questioning.1068 Furthermore, the interview did not
become custodial when officers continued to ask her questions after she initially refused,
because the tone remained polite and non-accusatory and the officers emphasized that she
was not under arrest immediately afterwards.1069 The court of appeals affirmed
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Slwooko’s conviction, holding that her confession was admissible because it was made
during a non-custodial interview with the police.1070

Stickman-Sam v. State
In Stickman-Sam v. State,1071 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant is
entitled to a change of venue if an approved trial-site location is geographically closer to
the site of the alleged crime than the original court.1072 Stickman-Sam was charged with
manslaughter, which allegedly occurred in Galena.1073 Under the Alaska criminal rules, a
criminal defendant may move for a change of venue to an approved trial site if that site is
the closest one to the location of the alleged crime.1074 Stickman-Sam, whose trial was
originally located in Fairbanks, moved to change venue to Nenana.1075 The trial judge
denied his motion because, though Nenana is geographically closer to Galena than
Fairbanks, the expense of travel and logistical convenience makes Fairbanks practically
easier to access than Nenana.1076 The court of appeals held that the underlying purpose of
the criminal rule is to ensure that a defendant has access to a jury pool drawn from the
community in which the crime occurred, particularly when the crime occurs in a rural
community.1077 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial judge, holding that
the criminal rules allow a defendant to change his trial to the venue geographically
closest to the site of the alleged crime.1078

Tritt v. State
In Tritt v. State,1079 the court of appeals held that an appeal of a trial court’s denial
of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy should be decided on the merits of the
double jeopardy claim even if no final judgment has been entered for the underlying
criminal charges, unless the double jeopardy claim is patently without merit.1080 Tritt
was charged with felony driving under the influence, and the trial court declared a
mistrial without his consent.1081 When Tritt was brought to court a second time to face
trial, he filed a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, but the superior
court denied the motion.1082 In an unpublished order, the supreme court had decided a
similar case.1083 The court of appeals, realizing that attorneys and trial court judges may
not be aware of the unpublished order, published this opinion following the order’s
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precedent.1084 The court of appeals granted Tritt’s motion for review, holding that an
appeal of a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy should be
decided on the merits of the double jeopardy claim even if no final judgment has been
entered for the underlying criminal charges, unless the double jeopardy claim is patently
without merit.1085

Tyler v. State
In Tyler v. State,1086 the court of appeals held that when evidence establishing an
aggravating factor is uncontested, and there is no reasonable possibility that a jury would
find in the defendant’s favor with regard to that factor, any potential error in failing to
submit an issue to a jury is harmless and therefore not plain error.1087 David Tyler was
charged with felony driving while intoxicated and driving with a suspended license.1088
Tyler pleaded no contest to the charges.1089 Tyler conceded two aggravating factors, both
of which were based on his prior convictions.1090 He was sentenced to five years’
Tyler appealed the decision, arguing that, under Blakely v.
imprisonment.1091
Washington,1092 the superior court did not have the authority to issue a sentence longer
than the presumptive three years because the aggravating factors were not found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.1093 The court of appeals held that though under Blakely, the
defendant has the right to demand that all aggravating factors of a criminal sentence be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, an exception exists for aggravating factors
based on prior convictions.1094 Because the State relied only upon Tyler’s six prior
convictions for driving under the influence in increasing his sentence,1095 Tyler’s case fell
into the Blakely exception.1096 The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior
court, holding that when evidence establishing an aggravating factor is uncontested, and
there is no reasonable possibility that a jury would find in the defendant’s favor with
regard to the aggravating factor, any potential Blakely error in failing to submit an issue
to a jury is harmless and therefore not plain error.1097
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Williams v. State
In Williams v. State,1098 the court of appeals ruled that reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigative stop can be based on an anonymous tip from an informant when
the informant provides intimate detailed information that can be corroborated by
police.1099 An anonymous informant told the police that Antonio Williams and two other
men had rented a light green Mercury Mountaineer under an alias and were transporting
drugs that day from Anchorage to Fairbanks.1100 After corroborating that such an SUV
had been rented under the same alias, the police set up surveillance and made an
investigative stop when it found the vehicle in question.1101 The court of appeals held
that the reasonable suspicion required for an investigative stop existed because the
informant provided detailed information that was corroborated by police.1102 Thus, the
court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s denial of the suppression motion, holding
that an anonymous tip from an informant can be enough for reasonable suspicion when
information given can be corroborated.1103

Winterrowd v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Winterrowd v. Municipality of Anchorage,1104 the court of appeals held that
traffic stops do not constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes and that motorists have no
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to produce vehicle registration and proof of
insurance.1105 On two occasions when he was stopped for speeding, Winterrowd failed to
produce his vehicle registration or proof of insurance, invoking his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel.1106 He was later convicted of
failing to carry motor vehicle insurance and failing to produce proof of insurance.1107
Winterrowd appealed, arguing that because he was “seized” under the Fourth
Amendment and had invoked his Fifth Amendment privileges, he could not be punished
for failing to produce registration and proof of insurance.1108 The court of appeals held
that although a traffic stop is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, traffic stops do
not constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes because some seizures of short duration,
such as traffic stops, do not trigger the Fifth Amendment rights recognized in
Miranda.1109 Moreover, motorists have no Fifth Amendment rights to refuse to produce
vehicle registration or proof of insurance.1110 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
of the district court, holding that during traffic stops, motorists are not in “custody” for
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Miranda purposes and have no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to produce vehicle
registration or proof of insurance.1111

1111

Id.

83

IX. ELECTION LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of
Anchorage,1112 the supreme court held that a ballot proposition that was confusing and
misleading was legally insufficient to be certified and placed on the ballot.1113 Citizens
for Implementing Medical Marijuana (“Citizens”) submitted to the Anchorage municipal
clerk a petition advocating the legalization of marijuana paraphernalia when used in a
private and/or medicinal context.1114 The Municipality refused to certify the petition for
the ballot, and Citizens sued.1115 The superior court dismissed the suit on summary
judgment, and Citizens appealed.1116 The supreme court held that a ballot proposition
petition must be truthful and comprehensible,1117 and Citizens’ petition failed to meet this
requirement because its title was confusing, it was misleading as to the conduct it sought
to protect, and it failed to explain whether it abolished or created rights.1118 The supreme
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that the ballot proposition was
confusing and misleading and thus legally insufficient to be certified and placed on the
ballot.1119

North West Cruise Ship Ass’n of Alaska v. State, Office of Lieutenant Governor
In North West Cruise Ship Ass’n of Alaska v. State, Office of Lieutenant
Governor,1120 the supreme court held that, despite technical deficiencies in the process of
obtaining signatures for an initiative petition, the Division of Elections (“Division”)
construed its own regulations in a manner consistent with both the rule of liberal
construction with regard to statutory initiative procedures and the regulations ensuring
voters are well-informed when signing such a petition.1121 A ballot initiative, which
would have led to increased regulation of the cruise ship industry, was opposed by that
industry on the grounds that the procedures followed in collecting signatures violated
Alaska law.1122 North West Cruise Ship Ass’n of Alaska argued that the signatures on
the initiative petitions were invalid for four reasons.1123 The supreme court held that,
despite these technical deficiencies, the signatures on the initiative were valid because the
deficiencies did not impede the purpose of the statutory initiative process.1124 The
supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Division, holding that,
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despite technical deficiencies in the process of obtaining signatures for an initiative
petition, the Division of Elections construed its own regulations in a manner consistent
with both the rule of liberal construction with regard to statutory initiative procedures and
the regulations ensuring voters are well-informed when signing petitions.1125
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X. EMPLOYMENT LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Board of Trustees v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Board of Trustees v. Municipality of Anchorage,1126 the supreme court held that
it was not unconstitutional for a retirement system to absorb the costs of a grievance
settlement with a municipality, and the municipality is not required to absorb the impact
of the settlement.1127 Anchorage maintains a retirement program for former city police
officers and firemen called the Anchorage Police and Fire Retirement System
(“System”).1128 After a grievance action victory by a former police officer against the
city resulted in increased liability for the System, a superior court judge ruled that the
increased liability was inherent to the System, and Anchorage did not have to compensate
the System for the increased liability.1129 In a separate action, another grievance against
Anchorage led to more increases in liability for the system, but this time a different judge
ruled that forcing the System to absorb the costs without help from the city was an
unconstitutional violation of the State’s accrued benefits clause.1130 The supreme court
held that forcing the System to bear the increased costs was not unconstitutional and the
municipality did not have to pay.1131 Increased liability was inherent to the System and a
settlement by the municipality was not an unconstitutional change to the plan.1132 The
supreme court affirmed the ruling of one superior court and reversed the ruling of another
superior court, holding that it was not unconstitutional for a retirement system to absorb
the costs of a grievance settlement with a municipality, and the municipality is not
required to absorb the impact of the settlement.1133

Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey
In Circle De Lumber Co. v. Humphrey,1134 the supreme court held that disability
payments to an injured employee were properly calculated by the Workers’
Compensation Board using the employee’s overall wage earnings rather than his wage
earnings from the two years prior to the injury.1135 Otto Humphrey was seriously injured
in 1993 while employed by Circle De Lumber Company and, as a result of his injury, was
first awarded Temporary Total Disability (“TTD”) benefits and then, after it was
determined in 1999 that his injuries were permanent, awarded Permanent Total Disability
(“PTD”) benefits.1136 The Compensation Board (“Board”) calculated Humphrey’s TTD
benefits based on the salary he was earning at the time of the accident, but calculated his
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PTD benefits based on the salary for the position that Humphrey estimated he would have
been holding in 1998.1137 Circle De argued that the Compensation Board took too broad
a view of Humphrey’s employment history when determining the PTD compensation and
should have only considered his salary from the two years before the accident when
determining his average wage, as required by statute.1138 The supreme court held that
Humphrey’s earnings in the two years prior to the accident were not an accurate predictor
of wage losses, and thus the Board’s alternative method of calculation was
appropriate.1139 Because Humphrey’s salary from the two previous years was lower than
the average of his entire career, and because substantial evidence showed his earning
patterns were stabilizing and improving, it was reasonable to use his overall earnings
history in the calculation.1140 The supreme court upheld the Board’s decision to calculate
permanent disability payments for a permanently injured employee based on the
employee’s overall earning patterns rather than his earnings from the two years prior to
his accident.1141

Leigh v. Seekins Ford
In Leigh v. Seekins Ford,1142 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board (“Board”) failed to make sufficient findings addressing an
employee’s evidence that he was incapacitated by pain and pain medication and that his
employer failed to provide substantial evidence that work within his capabilities was
regularly and continuously available.1143 Leigh injured his back while working for
Seekins Ford.1144 Leigh applied to the Board for permanent total disability (“PTD”)
benefits, but the Board found that Seekins Ford rebutted Leigh’s presumption of
compensability and that Leigh failed to prove his PTD status, therefore denying his
claim.1145 The superior court upheld the Board’s conclusions, and Leigh appealed,
arguing that Seekins Ford did not rebut the presumption of compensability.1146 The
supreme court held that the Board failed to make adequate findings to support its
conclusion that Leigh was not totally and permanently disabled, and failed to sufficiently
address Leigh’s contentions about the effect of his pain and pain medication on his
employment.1147 Also, Seekins Ford did not present substantial evidence that work that
Leigh could undertake was regularly, continuously available.1148 The supreme court
vacated the superior court’s decision and remanded to the Board for further proceedings,
holding that the Board’s findings were insufficient regarding an employee’s evidence that
he was incapacitated by pain and pain medications and that his employer failed to provide
1137
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substantial evidence that work within his capabilities was regularly and continuously
available.1149

Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc.
In Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc.,1150 the supreme court held that an employee
alleging wrongful termination did not present sufficiently strong circumstantial evidence
that she was fired for retaliatory reasons.1151 Bonita Mahan worked for Arctic Catering
Inc. on two separate occasions and alleged that (1) during her first period of employment
she was subject to sexual harassment and (2) her second period of employment was
wrongfully terminated for retaliation associated with the sexual harassment that had
occurred previously.1152 The supreme court affirmed dismissal of her first claim on
statute-of-limitations grounds.1153 The supreme court held that with regard to the
wrongful termination claim, Mahan did not offer enough circumstantial evidence that she
was fired for retaliatory rather than legitimate reasons, thus failing to meet her burden
under either the pretextual discharge framework test or the mixed-motives discharge
framework test of wrongful termination, because she offered no evidence beyond her
own personal feelings that she had been treated unfairly.1154 The supreme court affirmed
the superior court’s order, holding that an employee alleging wrongful termination failed
to present sufficiently strong circumstantial evidence that she was fired for retaliatory
reasons.1155

McMullen v. Bell
In McMullen v. Bell,1156 the supreme court held that a state employee had no legal
or practical right to include substantial cashed-in leave in the calculation of his retirement
benefits.1157 Upon retiring from state service, McMullen sought to include substantial
cashed-in leave in the calculation of his retirement benefits.1158 The Public Employee’s
Retirement Board (“Board”) excluded the cashed-in leave from the calculation of
McMullen’s benefits, and the superior court affirmed the Board’s decision.1159
McMullen appealed, arguing that the law in effect when he was hired entitled him to
include leave in the calculation of benefits.1160 The supreme court held that neither the
law nor practice entitled McMullen to include his cashed-in leave when calculating his
retirement benefits, because even though the statute in effect when he was hired did not
expressly exclude cashed-in leave from the definition of compensation, McMullen failed
1149
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to show that he was actually entitled to retirement benefits including the cashed-in leave
under the original law.1161 Also, McMullen was not a party to collective bargaining
agreements that permitted the inclusion of cashed-in leave in retirement benefits, and he
acknowledged that he did not actually expect that he would be able to include the leave in
his retirement benefits.1162 The supreme court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that
the state employee was not entitled by law or practice to include his cashed-in leave to
calculate his retirement benefits.1163

Olson v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc.
In Olson v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc.,1164 the supreme court held that an
employee’s claim of wrongful termination was properly dismissed because the employee
could not allege any facts to support that claim.1165 Olson had a history of absences from
work, was put on probation by his employer, Teck Cominco, and warned that continued
absences beyond his allotment could result in termination.1166 Olson claimed lead
poisoning and filed a workers’ compensation suit, missing days beyond his permitted
“unplanned absence” time, and after the workers’ compensation claim was found to be
invalid, was terminated from Teck Cominco for excessive absences.1167 Olson filed a
wrongful termination suit, claiming that he was fired, not because of the absences, but in
retaliation for the workers’ compensation claim he filed against the company.1168 The
supreme court found that there was no factual support alleged for this claim, and so there
was no genuine issue of material fact to be tried.1169 The supreme court upheld the trial
court’s granting of summary judgment against Olson, holding that he could allege no
facts to support his claim of wrongful termination.1170

Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District
In Schmitz v. Yukon-Koyukuk School District,1171 the supreme court held that a
teacher, whose tenure contract incorporated the grievance provisions of the school
district’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the teachers’ union, was required
to exhaust all remedies under the grievance provisions before instigating litigation against
the district.1172 Schmitz, a teacher, signed a tenure contract with the Yukon-Koyukuk
School District that incorporated the teachers’ union’s CBA terms regarding grievance
procedures.1173 When the district eliminated Schmitz’s position and transferred him to a
distant school, Schmitz complied with the first two steps of the grievance process and
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then sued the district for breach of contract.1174 Schmitz argued that he was not required
to fulfill the grievance process steps because the school allegedly had breached his
contract and not the CBA itself.1175 Rejecting this argument, the superior court granted
the school district’s motion for summary judgment.1176 The supreme court held that the
contract fully incorporated the terms of the CBA and that Schmitz was required to
exhaust all remedies under the CBA before pursuing litigation.1177 The supreme court
affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that a teacher whose tenure contract
incorporated the grievance provisions of the school district’s CBA with the teacher’s
union was required to exhaust all remedies under those provisions before suing the
district.1178

Alaska Court of Appeals
Ornelas v. State
In Ornelas v. State,1179 the court of appeals held that The Alaska Employment
Security Act (“AESA”)1180 does not preclude prosecuting individuals for theft who
fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits.1181 In order to receive unemployment
benefits, Ornelas falsely reported that he had not worked and had not received
earnings.1182 Ornelas confessed and was convicted of twenty-three counts of making false
statements in order to obtain unemployment benefits pursuant to AESA, as well as
second degree theft.1183 Ornelas appealed his conviction for theft, arguing that AESA
provided exclusive remedies for those who fraudulently obtain unemployment
benefits.1184 The court of appeals held that, although AESA includes a remedy for
general AESA violations, the legislature did not intend this to be the sole remedy for theft
under AESA; it is merely the remedy for violations not covered elsewhere in AESA or by
“another applicable statute,” which in this case would be the statute criminalizing
theft.1185 The court further reasoned that it is unlikely that the legislature did not intend
to criminalize the fraudulent receipt of benefits.1186 The court of appeals affirmed the
conviction for theft, holding that AESA does not preclude the prosecution of individuals
for theft who fraudulently obtain unemployment benefits.1187
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XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Kempthorne
In Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Kempthorne,1188 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) issued by the government
when land in the Northwest Planning Area (“NWPA”) is leased does not have to include
site-specific analysis for particular locations, until actual leasing and exploration has
occurred.1189 The Northern Alaska Environmental Center (“NAEC”) alleged that the
government violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when it failed to
analyze the environmental impact of oil drilling on specific parcels for lease, and that the
government’s analysis, which looked at the entire region, was insufficient.1190 The
government argued that once the parcels were leased and explored, the lessees would still
have to apply for permits for drilling at those sites, and then site-specific analysis of the
environmental effects would be possible.1191 The Ninth Circuit held that a site-specific
FEIS is not necessary during initial leasing authorization, before actual leasing and
exploration, because uncertainty is inherent in multi-stage projects, and oil exploration in
the WNPA is a multi-stage project.1192 Thus, it is not unreasonable for a general analysis
of the region at that early point in the project.1193 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision
of the district court, holding that a site-specific FEIS was not necessary during initial
leasing authorization under the NEPA.1194
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XII. ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Alaska Supreme Court
In re Ford
In In re Ford,1195 the supreme court issued a ninety-day suspension to an attorney
who knowingly violated a superior court order.1196 Attorney Ford refused to follow a
superior court’s order to transfer a damage payment to opposing counsel.1197 The Alaska
Bar Association’s hearing committee ruled on summary judgment that Ford knowingly
disobeyed an order of the court in violation of Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct
3.4(c).1198 The committee issued a thirty-day suspension, which was raised by the
disciplinary board to ninety days, and Ford appealed.1199 The supreme court held that
Ford knowingly violated Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(c) and independently
issued a ninety-day suspension to deter further misconduct.1200 The supreme court
further found that a summary judgment ruling did not violate Ford’s due process rights,
given that there was no genuine issue of material fact.1201 As for sanctions, the supreme
court found that Ford’s misconduct warranted a ninety-day suspension because there was
no question that there was a knowledgeable breach of duty that harmed the reputation of
lawyers and impeded efficiency.1202 Although the recommended sanction was sixmonths,1203 the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances,
and a ninety-day suspension was the typical length assessed in earlier cases.1204 The
supreme court thus suspended an attorney who knowingly violated a court’s order for
ninety days.1205
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XIII. FAMILY LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
In re Adoption of Missy H. and Cameron H.
In In re Adoption of Missy H. and Cameron H.,1206 the supreme court held that a
two-part test governs whether the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) reasonably
withheld its consent to an adoption, consisting of (1) whether the statutorily required
consents had been obtained or excused and (2) whether adoption is in the best interests of
the child.1207 The Donnes had been foster parents for about thirty children.1208 Due to
child abuse allegations, their foster care license was revoked until a mental-health
evaluation was completed on the mother and until the Donnes completed a plan of
correction.1209 The Donnes then tried to adopt two of their former foster children, Missy
and Cameron.1210 OCS withheld its consent, but the superior court found that OCS did so
unreasonably because adoption was in the best interest of the children.1211 The supreme
court held that the correct test for determining the reasonableness of OCS’s decision to
withhold consent to adoption is a two-part inquiry, consisting of (1) whether the
statutorily required consents had been obtained or excused and (2) whether adoption is in
the best interests of the child, and that the superior court had improperly focused only on
the best interest prong.1212 The supreme court also held that OCS’s withholding of
consent was reasonable because it was properly following its rules for ensuring safety of
the children in its custody.1213 The supreme court remanded the case, holding that the
correct test for whether OCS reasonably withheld its consent to an adoption is (1)
whether the statutorily required consents had been obtained or excused and (2) whether
adoption is in the best interests of the child.1214

Brotherton v. Brotherton
In Brotherton v. Brotherton,1215 the supreme court held that allowing a writ of
execution on a judgment five years after the order in a divorce was proper because the
wife chose not to execute until the appeals process was complete.1216 In 1995, Douglas
and Tahni Brotherton divorced.1217 There were several court orders and appeals,1218 at
the end of which Tahni was awarded half of the equity in a property, and Douglas also
was ordered to pay her accrued interest at 10.5 percent.1219 Douglas appealed the order,
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arguing that Tahni had relinquished her right to execution since more than five years had
passed since the judgment.1220 The supreme court held that a court has the discretion in
allowing executions on orders more than five years old if there are “just and sufficient
reasons” for the delay.1221 Here, Tahni did have “just and sufficient reasons” for delay
because (1) there was a great deal of animosity in the case, and, more importantly, (2)
Tahni was waiting for the appeals process to end before seeking an execution.1222 The
supreme court affirmed the ruling of the superior court, holding that allowing a writ of
execution on a judgment five years after the order in a divorce was proper because the
wife chose not to execute until the appeals process was complete.1223

Byers v. Ovitt
In Byers v. Ovitt,1224 the supreme court held that, in altering a child support order,
the trial court correctly permitted discovery of a father’s tax returns, declined to call for a
third hearing sua sponte, and imputed income to the father based on his expenses,1225 but
that the trial court incorrectly calculated the father’s adjusted gross income by not
deducting federal income tax payments and voluntary retirement contributions.1226 In
2002, a court ordered Byers to pay Ovitt child support.1227 Subsequently, Ovitt
discovered evidence indicating that Byers’ income was higher than initially reported and
brought a suit to modify the child support order.1228 The superior court master ordered
discovery of Byers’ tax returns to verify the claim.1229 Byers was uncooperative.1230 The
superior court master thus imputed Byers’ adjusted gross income based on his
expenditures and ordered an increase in child support payments.1231 Byers failed to
request a third hearing, and the superior court affirmed.1232 Byers appealed, arguing that
the superior court impermissibly (1) ordered discovery of his tax returns; (2) failed to call
a third hearing sua sponte; (3) imputed adjusted gross income; and (4) calculated adjusted
gross income.1233 The supreme court held that (1) it was within the superior court’s
broad discretion in discovery decisions to order Byers to turn over his tax returns; (2) the
superior court was not obligated to initiate a third hearing sua sponte because it gave
Byers clear notice that it was his obligation to request a hearing; (3) the superior court has
the discretion to impute adjusted gross income where, as here, the defendant is
uncooperative and the record is incomplete;1234 but that (4) the superior court should have
deducted Byers’ retirement contributions and federal income tax in calculating adjusted
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gross income.1235
The supreme court thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded the case, holding that the trial court correctly permitted discovery of a father’s
tax returns, declined to call for a third hearing sua sponte, and imputed income to the
father based on his expenses in altering a child support order;1236 but that it incorrectly
calculated the father’s adjusted gross income by not deducting federal income tax
payments and voluntary retirement contributions.1237

Debbie G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Debbie G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1238 the supreme
court held that designating a relative to raise a minor child did not remedy the risk of
harm posed in the home and that termination of parental rights was therefore
appropriate.1239 Debbie G. and Charles F., the birth parents of John G., both had a history
of substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal activity, and acknowledged that they
were either unwilling or unable to take care of John G.1240 The Office of Children’s
Services began proceedings to terminate parental rights and determined that John should
be placed with the same family that had adopted John’s half-brother.1241 The superior
court ruled to terminate parental rights, and both parents appealed, arguing that they had
remedied their conduct by designating a relative to care for John.1242 The supreme court
held that parents who place a child at risk of harm do not remedy the situation by
designating a relative to step into their parental role, because the designation would not
ensure permanent placement for the child, nor would it prevent the parents from trying to
regain physical custody.1243 The supreme court affirmed the holding of the superior court
terminating Debbie G. and Charles F.’s parental rights, holding that the designation of a
relative to raise a minor did not remedy the conduct that placed the child at risk.1244

Dunlap v. Dunlap
In Dunlap v. Dunlap,1245 the supreme court held that a divorced father’s appeal
ten years after an initial ruling did not meet the “exceptional circumstances” and “clear
error constituting manifest injustice” standard for timeliness,1246 and that a contract
between divorced parents requiring one party to contribute to an educational fund was
enforceable despite failing to identify the exact procedure for administering such a
fund.1247 According to James and Ann Dunlap’s divorce settlement, James was to put a
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percentage of his retirement buyout into educational accounts for their children.1248
James created such accounts, but subsequently closed them.1249 The supreme court held
James’ claim that a prior judgment requiring him to contribute a portion of his retirement
payout to both the educational fund and to child support was improper was barred,
because James waited ten years to appeal the order and failed to show the requisite
“exceptional circumstances” and “manifest injustice.”1250 The supreme court also held
that the clause of the divorce settlement requiring James to establish an educational fund
for the children was enforceable, even though the clause did not specify the exact
procedure for administering the educational fund, because the essential terms of the
provision were clear, and thus fairness and justice required it to be upheld.1251 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, holding that a divorced father’s
appeal ten years after an initial ruling did not meet the “exceptional circumstances” and
“clear error constituting manifest injustice” standard for timeliness, and that a divorce
agreement requiring contribution to an educational fund was enforceable despite its
failure to identify the exact procedure for administering the fund.1252

Elliott v. Elliott
In Elliott v. Elliott,1253 the supreme court held that the superior court erred in not
holding an evidentiary hearing or making factual findings before modifying a child
custody arrangement.1254 After their divorce, Darlis and Nathan Elliot amicably agreed to
set a visitation schedule for their two children.1255 However, Darlis Elliott eventually
moved for a modification of child custody and support, which Nathan Elliott opposed.1256
The superior court denied the motion and ordered the visitation schedule proposed by
Nathan Elliott without holding a hearing or making any factual findings.1257 The supreme
court held that, while not specifically required in the state child custody statute,
procedural due process and the court’s ability to make an “informed and principled
determination” required a hearing.1258 A hearing is not required only when the
modifications are sufficiently minor.1259 Furthermore, this case required that factual
findings regarding the best interests of the child and the changed circumstances
accompany modifications in the arrangements.1260 The supreme court vacated and
remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the superior court’s modification
of a child custody arrangement without holding a hearing and without making any factual
findings was reversible error.1261
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Fortson v. Fortson
In Fortson v. Fortson,1262 the supreme court held that a 60-40 division of marital
assets in a divorce proceeding was not an abuse of discretion because the court had
properly considered outside factors, such as the health of the parties, in making its
decision.1263 Blanton Fortson challenged the court’s allocation of property in divorce
proceedings between himself and his wife Jayne, a dermatologist and paraplegic with
significant ongoing medical expenses.1264 Blanton argued that there was a discrepancy
between his and Jayne’s earning power, because Jayne’s earning capacity was ten times
that of Blanton.1265 The supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion in dividing the Fortsons’ marital assets unequally, giving sixty percent to Jayne
and forty percent to Blanton, despite the initial presumption that an equal division of
property is most equitable.1266 Stating that the statutory factors under consideration
include the age and health of the parties, the supreme court noted that Blanton had a
reasonable earning capacity, whereas Jayne’s health care costs were already substantial
and likely to increase if her health declined further, which would also substantially reduce
her high earning capacity.1267 The supreme court also reviewed several other questions
pertaining to the division of assets, addressing issues such as capital gains taxes,
repayment of loans, and property valuations.1268 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s judgment in all of its holdings save one, holding that an unequal division of assets
in favor of the higher-earning party is not an abuse of discretion when other factors
reasonably prompt the court to divide it in this manner.1269

Gilbert M. v. State
In Gilbert M. v. State,1270 the supreme court held that a grandfather did not have
standing to appeal the revocation of his daughter’s parental rights.1271 After his daughter
Jan’s parental rights over his granddaughter, Belinda, were terminated and Belinda was
adopted, Gilbert attempted to appeal the termination of his daughter’s parental rights.1272
Jan chose not to appeal the termination herself.1273 The supreme court held that Gilbert
could not appeal the termination of parental rights because he and Jan did not have a
“special relationship,” such as that between a parent and their minor child, thus Gilbert
did not have the third party standing required to appeal the termination of parental rights
on Jan’s behalf.1274 The supreme court also held that Gilbert had no right to appeal as
Belinda’s Indian custodian, because he was never found do be her Indian custodian by a
court and because he would “almost certainly” be in prison for the remainder of Belinda’s
1262

131 P.3d 451 (Alaska 2006).
Id. at 458.
1264
Id. at 453–54.
1265
Id. at 456–57.
1266
Id.
1267
Id. at 457.
1268
Id. at 459–64.
1269
Id. at 464.
1270
139 P.3d 581 (Alaska 2006).
1271
Id. at 583.
1272
Id. at 583–86.
1273
Id. at 585–86.
1274
Id. at 587.
1263

97

minority.1275 The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that
a grandparent who did not have a “special relationship” with his daughter and who was
not an Indian custodian of his granddaughter lacked standing to appeal his daughter’s loss
of parental rights.1276

Ginn-Williams v. Williams
In Ginn-Williams v. Williams,1277 the supreme court held that a divorce settlement
agreement need not be modified because no evidence was presented that affected the
children’s best interests, that a non-custodial father could claim his son as a dependent,
and that a second mortgage and a car debt were marital property.1278 Melanie GinnWilliams and Channing Williams divorced after five years of marriage and executed a
voluntary agreement for joint legal custody of their children.1279 Five days after the
agreement, Ginn-Williams filed a motion to amend the agreement,1280 claiming for the
first time that Williams had a history of domestic abuse.1281 The superior court denied
Ginn-Williams’ motion, concluding that the agreement was entered into voluntarily in the
best interests of the children.1282 Additionally, the court denied Ginn-Williams’ motions
to bar Williams from claiming their son as a dependent and held that a second mortgage
and car debt were marital property.1283 The supreme court held that there were no
changed circumstances justifying the modification of the divorce settlement agreement,
that Williams could claim his son as a dependent, and that the second mortgage and car
debt were marital property.1284 Ginn-Williams’ proposed revision of the settlement
agreement was motivated by previously expressed concerns that Williams was unreliable
rather than any fear for the safety of the children.1285 As for the dependency claim, since
their son was a “qualifying child” under the federal tax laws, Williams could claim him
as a dependent.1286 Finally, the car debt was marital property because it was acquired
during the marriage;1287 the mortgage was marital property because even though
Williams’ acquired it before the marriage, Ginn-Williams evidenced the intent to accept
the property upon marriage.1288 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior
court, holding that a divorce settlement need not be modified because no evidence was
presented that affected the children’s best interests, that a non-custodial father could
claim his son as a dependent, and that a second mortgage and a car debt were marital
property.1289
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King v. Carey
In King v. Carey,1290 the supreme court held that a non-custodial parent failed to
demonstrate a change in circumstances and thus was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing for modification of custody.1291 King moved for modification of custody of her
son because of changed circumstances,1292 but her only evidence of changed
circumstances was an affidavit signed by her son stating that he now preferred to live
with both parents.1293 Carey, the boy’s father, opposed the motion, alleging that King
manipulated the son into signing the affidavit.1294 King replied, alleging for the first time
that the boy had begun using alcohol and drugs and felt threatened by his step-brother
while living with his father.1295 The supreme court held that the only evidence King
properly raised was the affidavit, which was not enough to meet her burden of
demonstrating a significant change in circumstances, and thus did not warrant an
evidentiary hearing for custody change.1296 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court, holding that the non-custodial parent failed to produce sufficient evidence to
indicate a change of circumstances and was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or
modification of her son’s custody.1297

Krize v. Krize
In Krize v. Krize,1298 the supreme court held that, where a husband regularly
deposited lease income into a joint bank account, the transmutation doctrine did not apply
to future lease income.1299 In dividing Robert and Judy Krize’s property during their
divorce proceeding, the superior court ruled that although the real property was Robert’s
separate property, future lease income from a long-term lease on the property was marital
property.1300 Robert appealed, claiming that the deposits of lease income into the joint
account constituted individual gifts, not a transmutation of the income into marital
property.1301 The supreme court held that the depositing of funds into the joint account
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the lease proceeds were marital
property, because transmutation requires intent to change separate property into marital
property, and there was no evidence that Robert intended for the future lease income to
be marital property.1302 The title to the property was in Robert’s name only, and Judy did
not help manage the property or the lease, nor did she use her credit to help improve the
property.1303 Additionally, Robert had retained the right to stop depositing the lease
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income into the account.1304 On a separate question, the supreme court held that it was
proper to take the likelihood of future inheritance into account in property divisions, even
if speculative, since property divisions are not subject to later revision.1305 The supreme
court reversed the ruling of the superior court, holding that placing funds earned from
separate property into a joint account was insufficient evidence to justify the application
of the transmutation doctrine to future lease income.1306

Mattfield v. Mattfield
In Mattfield v. Mattfield,1307 the supreme court held that a husband’s appeal of a
superior court decision to disburse to the IRS funds from a dissolved family business was
premature and that his appeal of a decision to reconsider a child support order was not
supported by a showing of reversible error.1308 Six years after Rodney and Tamara
Mattfield’s divorce, the IRS filed a levy against, and after trial recovered, funds from the
Mattfield’s dissolved marital business.1309 At roughly the same time, the superior court
referred the issue of child support to the Child Support Enforcement Division, which
calculated Rodney’s support obligation based on estimated instead of actual earnings.1310
Though this order was contrary to the superior court’s mandate, the court signed it,
apparently by oversight.1311 Tamara moved to reconsider and vacate the IRS and child
support orders, the superior court agreed, and Rodney appealed.1312 The supreme court
held that Rodney’s appeal of the disbursement of IRS funds was premature because the
order was not a final judgment subject to appeal, and that the appeal of the decision to
reconsider the child support order was unsupported by the record, because
reconsideration of the order was consistent with the court’s previous orders to calculate
child support using actual income.1313 Rodney was given opportunity but failed to
respond to Tamara’s motion to reconsider, and the lower court sufficiently explained its
child support order.1314 The supreme court dismissed appeal regarding disbursement and
affirmed the superior court’s reconsideration of the child support order, holding that a
husband’s appeal of the superior court’s decision to disburse to the IRS funds from a
dissolved family business was premature, and his appeal of the decision to reconsider a
child support order was not supported by a showing of reversible error.1315
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Melendrez v. Melendrez
In Melendrez v. Melendrez,1316 the supreme court held that the superior court did
not give undue weight to the value of keeping siblings together in granting a father
primary custody of four children.1317 During their divorce proceedings, Valerie and
Michael Melendrez, Sr., established a custody agreement whereby their four children
would reside with Valerie in California during the school year.1318 A year later, the two
oldest children requested to relocate to Alaska to be with their father, Michael, which
Valerie did not oppose.1319 Michael then proposed a modification of custody for the two
youngest children as well, which would grant him primary custody of all four
children.1320 The superior court granted Michael custody, and Valerie appealed, claiming
that the court gave undue weight to the benefit of keeping all four children together, and
undervalued the importance of maintaining stability and continuity in the lives of the
youngest children, by keeping them with her.1321 The supreme court held that Valerie did
not present clear evidence that the relationship between the older and younger children
was overvalued, and thus did not demonstrate that the superior court’s factual findings
were clearly erroneous.1322 In addition, sibling relationships can be heavily weighed in
considering custody placements, and so the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
their custody assignment.1323 The supreme court affirmed the custody modification,
holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in its decision to
grant primary custody to the father for all four children in question.1324

Odom v. Odom
In Odom v. Odom,1325 the supreme court held that the superior court’s award of
primary physical custody of the children and award of the family home to the wife in a
divorce proceeding was not an abuse of discretion, and that the husband’s interests in his
family business were separate property that could be invaded only if an equitable division
could not be achieved through an unequal division of marital property.1326 In Bill and
Carey Odom’s divorce proceeding, the superior court awarded Carey the family home
and primary physical custody of both children.1327 The superior court found that Bill’s
interests in Odom Enterprises were separate property but demanded that it be invaded in
order to achieve an equitable distribution.1328 Bill appealed the award of custody and the
family home and the invasion of his separate property.1329 Carey appealed the ruling that
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Bill’s interests were separate property and the amount of invasion.1330 The supreme court
held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical
custody of the children to Carey, because the superior court properly considered that
Carey had been the primary caregiver on a full-time basis and was an excellent
mother.1331 Similarly, the award of the family home was not an abuse of discretion
because the superior court properly linked the award of the home to the award of primary
physical custody of the children.1332 Moreover, Bill’s interests in Odom Enterprises were
separate property because Bill had made active efforts to keep the property separate
(thereby eliminating the possibility of transmutation), no marital contributions had been
made to the property, and Carey failed to prove that the property had appreciated as a
result of the marriage.1333 Separate property should not be invaded unless equitable
division of the marital property is impossible,1334 and Bill’s separate property should only
have been invaded if all of the marital assets would not be enough to meet Carey’s
reasonable needs.1335 The supreme court affirmed the awards of primary physical
custody and the home to Carey and affirmed the finding that Bill’s interests in Odom
Enterprises were separate property but vacated and remanded the invasion of the separate
property to determine if unequal division of marital property would properly balance the
equities.1336

Peter A. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services
In Peter A. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1337 the supreme
court held that a father could not appeal an adjudication order finding his children to be in
need of aid, because the issue was moot.1338 Peter A.’s two children were found, in an
adjudication order by the superior court, to be in need of aid because of their mother’s
alcohol abuse problem.1339 Though the case was dismissed and the children remained
with their father, Peter A. appealed the entry of the order, arguing that the superior court
could not adjudicate children to be in need of aid based only on one parent’s actions
where there is a second, fit parent willing and able to care for the child.1340 The supreme
court held that the issue on appeal was moot, because the adjudication order was a dead
letter and there was no actual controversy.1341 However, equity required vacatur of the
adjudication order.1342 The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not
apply because the primary legal issue in the case was not likely to be “repeatedly
circumvented” in future litigation.1343 The supreme court vacated the superior court’s
1330
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adjudication order, but dismissed Peter A.’s appeal as moot, holding that he could not
appeal an adjudication order finding his children to be in need of aid because the issue
was moot.1344

Rodvik v. Rodvik
In Rodvik v. Rodvik,1345 the supreme court held that unsupervised visits by a father
were appropriate, that adequate supporting evidence must be shown to award marital
property unequally, that federal income taxes should be subtracted from income for child
support purposes, that bad faith and vexatious conduct warrant attorneys’ fees award, and
that a judge does not need to recuse himself solely because a party has criticized one of
his previous decisions.1346 Karsten and Maureen Rodvik obtained a divorce in superior
court, where Maureen was awarded sole custody of the children and Karsten was allowed
supervised visits.1347 Four protective orders were issued against Karsten, and he did not
cooperate with many of the superior court’s instructions.1348 Maureen was awarded over
half the marital property and legal fees.1349 The superior court judge declined to recuse
himself after Karsten noted that the judge had cited Karsten for his opposing viewpoint in
a previous controversial case.1350 Karsten appealed.1351 The supreme court held that the
unsupervised visits were appropriate pending a psychological evaluation because of
evidence that Karsten’s behavior had an adverse effect on the children.1352 The court
remanded the marital property issue because further supporting evidence was needed to
show why Maureen needed over half the marital property, in addition to child support, to
meet the children’s needs.1353 The court also held that Karsten’s income should be
recalculated because federal income taxes were not subtracted before child support
payments were calculated.1354 The court held that the legal fees award was appropriate,
despite the spouses’ roughly equal economic positions, because Karsten’s behavior made
litigation significantly more expensive for Maureen.1355 The court also held that the
judge did not need to recuse himself when a party had publicly disagreed with his
previous decision because judicial decisions often spark public comment and such
comments do not prevent a judge from rendering an unbiased verdict.1356 The supreme
court affirmed in part, and remanded in part, the decision of the superior court, holding
that unsupervised visits were appropriate, that adequate support is needed to award
marital property unequally, that federal income taxes should be deducted from child
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support income, that the legal fees award was appropriate, and that the judge did not need
to recuse himself.1357

Rowland v. Monsen
In Rowland v. Monsen,1358 the supreme court held that a father in a custody
dispute was entitled to attorneys’ fees against the mother because the mother did not
prove that the order of fees was void or that extraordinary circumstances warranted relief,
and her own motion for relief and appeal of the underlying order for attorneys’ fees were
untimely.1359 Several years after separating, Rowland petitioned for a protective order on
behalf of her children against their father, Monsen, who had custody.1360 Rowland failed
to prove her allegations, and Monsen retained custody and moved for attorneys’ fees.1361
Rowland served her opposition but did not file the pleading with the court, which
subsequently ordered Rowland to pay the full amount.1362 Rowland filed for relief,
arguing that the court’s order was void and that extraordinary circumstances warranted
relief, but her motion was denied as untimely.1363 The supreme court held that Monsen
was entitled to attorneys’ fees against Rowland.1364 Rowland’s argument that the order
was void was without merit because neither the untimeliness nor the inadequacy of
findings of Monsen’s motion for attorneys’ fees were fundamental flaws.1365 Also,
Rowland’s motion for relief based on extraordinary circumstances and appeal of the
underlying order for attorneys’ fees were not brought within a reasonable time since she
did not explain the nearly four-year delay.1366 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s judgment that a father in a custody dispute was entitled to attorneys’ fees against
the mother because the mother did not prove that the order of fees was void or that
extraordinary circumstances warranted relief, and her own motion for relief and appeal of
the underlying order for attorneys’ fees were untimely.1367

Van Sickle v. McGraw
In Van Sickle v. McGraw,1368 the supreme court held that amendments to the child
custody statute, Alaska Statute section 25.24.150,1369 do not apply to a case in which the
evidence closed after the amendments’ effective date and that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding custody to the father in a custody dispute.1370 Joshua
McGraw and Jennifer Van Sickle parented a child out of wedlock, separated within
1357
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months of the child’s birth, and now live in separate states.1371 Van Sickle appealed the
superior court’s decision to grant primary custody to McGraw, claiming that the court
erred by not applying the amended version of the child custody statute and that the court
abused its discretion by misapplying various sections of the previous statute.1372 The
supreme court held that the amended statute did not apply here because the evidence
closed before the effective date of the amendments.1373 Also, trial courts are vested with
broad discretion when determining child custody,1374 and the superior court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that McGraw was better at achieving an open and loving
relationship between the child and the other parent,1375 in finding that Sitka is a better
home for the child,1376 or by failing to make specific findings regarding the geographic
distance between the two parents.1377 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the
superior court, holding that the amendments to the child custody statute do not apply to
this case because the evidence closed before the amendments’ effective date and that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody to McGraw.1378

Watega v. Watega
In Watega v. Watega,1379 the supreme court held that the superior court abused its
discretion in granting a man's motion to compel the sale of the family house during
divorce proceedings over his wife's objections, because no exceptional circumstances
existed.1380 Craig Watega filed for divorce from his wife, Lesley, in 2002.1381 A court
gave Craig custody of the couple's house for the duration of the divorce proceedings, but
he failed to make payments on the deed of trust.1382 Fearful of foreclosure, Craig
petitioned the court to allow the property to be sold.1383 Without granting a hearing, the
court agreed to the sale.1384 Lesley fought the sale, but the superior court found the
buyers had a valid and enforceable interest in the house.1385 Lesley appealed.1386 The
supreme court held that the superior court abused its discretion in granting Craig's motion
to compel the sale of the house, because though the relevant statute did authorize the
superior court to permit the sale of property pending a divorce in exceptional
circumstances,1387 the Wategas’ case did not qualify as exceptional circumstances, since
the house was not in imminent danger of foreclosure and the sale did nothing to increase
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or preserve the value of the marital estate, and because protecting Lesley's credit was not
a valid reason for the sale given her own objections to the sale.1388 Because Lesley’s
opposition to the sale was stated in the file, the buyers had at least constructive
knowledge that she might challenge an ownership claim and, therefore, could not have
been bona fide purchasers for value.1389 The supreme court reversed and remanded the
superior court’s decision to grant motion for compelled sale of a couple’s home, holding
that no exceptional circumstances existed.1390

Winston v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Winston v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,1391 the supreme
court held that the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) made reasonable efforts at
parental re-unification before terminating a father’s parental rights and had good reason
for believing the children were in need of aid because of the father’s abuse of their
mother.1392 OCS took Winston’s children away at birth, while he was incarcerated for
abusing their mother.1393 Winston delayed establishing contact with his children until
after he had been out of prison for some time.1394 When he did contact OCS about
establishing contact, OCS referred him to several programs.1395 He did not complete
these programs, and OCS terminated his parental rights.1396 The trial court upheld the
termination order, and Winston appealed.1397 The supreme court held that, given the
father’s varying level of interest in his children, the State did make reasonable efforts to
unite the family by paying his travel expenses and referring him to programs.1398 Also,
there was good cause for believing the children were in need of aid, because of Winston’s
prior abuses of women.1399 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the State made reasonable efforts at parental re-unification before
terminating the father’s parental rights and had good reason to believe the children were
in need of aid due to the father’s prior abuse of the mother.1400
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XIV. HEALTH LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital
In Smallwood v. Central Peninsula General Hospital,1401 the supreme court held
that a Medicaid patient had standing to sue a hospital for balance billing in violation of
the hospital’s contract with Medicaid.1402 Smallwood sued Central Peninsula General
Hospital after he was billed for amounts exceeding Medicaid reimbursement, in violation
of the hospital’s contract with Medicaid not to bill recipients.1403 The superior court
entered judgment against Smallwood, stating it was doubtful that he had a private right of
action to enforce the balance-billing prohibition.1404 The supreme court held that
Smallwood had standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract, because he was the
intended beneficiary of the clause.1405 The supreme court remanded the case to the
superior court, holding that Smallwood had standing to sue to enforce the balance-billing
prohibition.1406
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XV. INSURANCE LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Cole v. State Farm Insurance Co.
In Cole v. State Farm Insurance Co.,1407 the supreme court held that a live-in
companion was not covered under a car insurance policy that unambiguously defined
“spouse” as a currently, legally married husband or wife.1408 Cole was divorced from,
but living with, the insured when a motorist hit and injured him.1409 Cole sued State
Farm Insurance Co. (“State Farm”) after being denied his claims for medical and
underinsured motorist payments as a “spouse” under the policy.1410 The superior court
granted partial summary judgment to State Farm, ruling that Cole was not covered
because he was not legally married to the policy holder.1411 Cole appealed, arguing that
the spousal coverage provision of the policy should be broadly construed because its
terms were ambiguous and for public policy reasons.1412 The supreme court held that a
reasonable purchaser of the policy would not have expected spousal coverage to extend
to a cohabitating companion to whom he or she was not legally married, having
considered the policy language, relevant extrinsic evidence, and precedent interpreting
similar provisions.1413 The supreme court also rejected Cole’s public policy argument,
finding that he produced no evidence of marital status discrimination.1414 The supreme
court affirmed the order of the superior court, holding that Cole was not covered under
his live-in companion’s car insurance policy that unambiguously defined “spouse” as a
currently, legally married husband or wife.1415

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lestenkof
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lestenkof,1416 the supreme
court held that, where a policyholder is not underinsured with regard to attorneys’ fees,
the insurer does not have to pay additional attorneys’ fees.1417 Following a fatal accident
in which an automobile driven by Odden collided with a motor home, resulting in the
death of Lestenkof, Lestenkof’s widow pursued a wrongful death claim against
Odden.1418 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (“State Farm”), Odden’s
insurer, paid Lestenkof an advance payment of over $62,000 pursuant to Odden’s
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage.1419 After the parties agreed to
assume that a hypothetical jury trial would result in a verdict for Lestenkof of
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$1,000,000, State Farm offered to settle the claim with Lestenkof for approximately
$172,000, which included attorneys’ fees of $115,600 calculated from the hypothetical
jury award.1420 Lestenkof accepted this offer, but demanded an additional $110,000 so
that the UIM coverage offered the same protection as the liability coverage.1421 The
superior court agreed with Lestenkof, holding that State Farm was required to pay
additional attorneys’ fees under its UIM coverage, and State Farm appealed.1422 The
supreme court held that Odden was fully insured with respect to attorneys’ fees and that
State Farm was therefore not obligated to pay the additional amount.1423 Odden’s policy
did not contain a valid limitation on attorneys’ fees, so Odden was not underinsured with
regard to the $115,600 attorneys’ fees.1424 The supreme court reversed the decision of the
superior court and held that the insurer was not required to pay additional attorneys’ fees
pursuant to the policyholder’s UIM coverage.1425
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XVI. NATIVE LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp.
In Jimerson v. Tetlin Native Corp.,1426 the supreme court held that a settlement
agreement between a Native corporation and its directors and shareholders was invalid
because the agreement violated the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(“ANCSA”).1427 Tetlin Native Corporation (“TNC”) transferred a large portion of its
land to the Tetlin Tribal Council.1428 In protest, shareholders Jimerson and David led a
successful campaign to recall TNC’s board of directors and subsequently filed a
complaint on behalf of TNC against the shareholders and directors who had been
involved in the land transfer.1429 A resulting settlement agreement provided dissenting
TNC shareholders with the opportunity to exchange their TNC ANCSA stock for shares
in a new corporation formed by TNC.1430 The supreme court held that the settlement
agreement was unenforceable because it violated ANCSA section 7(h)(1)(B),1431 which
prohibits the alienation of ANCSA stock.1432 The supreme court further held that the
settlement agreement did not fit into any of the statutory exceptions to section
7(h)(1)(B).1433 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Jimerson’s
motion for enforcement, holding that the agreement was invalid because it violated
ANCSA.1434

State, Department of Health and Social Services v. Native Village of Curyung
In State, Department of Health and Social Services v. Native Village of
Curyung,1435 the supreme court held that Alaska Native villages can bring suit as parens
patriae to enforce rights created by the Adoption Assistance Act and the Indian Child
Welfare Act, but that the villages cannot bring suit on their own behalf or sue the State
directly.1436 Several Alaska Native villages brought suit against the State and the
Director of the Division of Family and Youth Services (“Director”), alleging violations of
the Adoption Assistance Act and the Indian Child Welfare Act.1437 After the superior
court refused to dismiss several of the villages’ claims, the State filed a petition for
interlocutory review, arguing that the villages were not proper plaintiffs and that the State
was not a proper defendant.1438 The supreme court held that the villages could bring a
claim as parens patriae under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because violations of the Adoption
1426
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Assistance Act and Indian Child Welfare Act were quasi-sovereign interests that affected
the well-being of the villages’ families, which was intertwined with the villages’
integrity.1439 The Adoption Assistance Act created a right to a state plan and case review
system that the villages could enforce through a § 1983 action.1440 Similarly, the Indian
Child Welfare Act created enforceable rights that supplement § 1983.1441 However, the
villages could not bring a claim on their own behalf because villages cannot use § 1983 to
enforce sovereign rights.1442 The supreme court also held that while the villages could
sue the Director in his official capacity, they could not sue the State directly because §
1983 does not authorize suits against states.1443 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s decision in part, holding that Alaska Native villages can bring suit as parens
patriae claims under § 1983 and reversed in part, holding that villages cannot bring suit
on their own behalf or sue the State directly.1444
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XVII. PROPERTY LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. v. Star Trucking, Inc.
In Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. v. Star Trucking, Inc.,1445 the supreme
court held that a lessor may obtain loss-of-use damages for leased property that is
completely destroyed.1446 Alaska Construction Equipment, Inc. (“ACE”) leased a rock
dump truck to Star Trucking, Inc. (“Star”), which Star totaled shortly after the start of the
lease.1447 ACE agreed to settle its claim against Star, but the parties disagreed about the
scope of the settlement.1448 Believing the settlement covered only property damage, ACE
refused to release Star of all liability.1449 Star withheld the settlement check from ACE,
prompting ACE to sue Star for both the check and loss of use damages.1450 After the trial
court granted Star’s motion for summary judgment, ACE appealed.1451 The supreme
court held that loss-of-use damages are available where leased property is totally
destroyed, finding that this enables damage awards to most accurately reflect the
expectation interest of a lessor seeking damages.1452 The supreme court reversed the
superior court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded, holding that a lessor may
obtain loss-of-use damages for leased property that is completely destroyed.1453

Alaska Railroad Corp. v. Native Village of Eklutna
In Alaska Railroad Corp. v. Native Village of Eklutna,1454 the supreme court held
that the Alaska Railroad Corp. (“Railroad”) was subject to a local zoning ordinance and
thus had to apply for a conditional use permit before drilling on culturally sensitive land
in the Native Village of Eklutna.1455 In a 2004 decision, the supreme court held that the
Alaska Railroad Corporation Act did not clearly exempt the Railroad from a municipal
zoning ordinance that restricted drilling on culturally sensitive land, and required the
Railroad to obtain a conditional use permit before drilling.1456 The Railroad Commission
responded to the ruling by enacting an emergency regulation permitting the Railroad to
drill absent the conditional use permit1457 and asked the legislature to clarify that it was
exempt from municipal zoning laws.1458 The legislature declined to exempt the Railroad,
setting up a task force to explore the issue further.1459 The Native Village of Eklutna
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filed suit, alleging that the emergency regulation impermissibly authorized the Railroad
to drill without a conditional use permit.1460 The superior court entered summary
judgment for the Native Village of Eklutna.1461 The supreme court held that the Railroad
did not have statutory power to exempt itself from zoning ordinances because it merely
has statutory power to regulate third party conduct on its own lands, not the power to
override local ordinances.1462 Moreover, the court was precluded from reconsidering the
issue of whether the statute immunized the railroad from municipal zoning ordinances by
the “law of the case” doctrine.1463 The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment, holding that the Railroad was subject to a local zoning ordinance and thus had
to apply for a conditional use permit before drilling on culturally sensitive land in the
Native Village of Eklutna.1464

Forshee v. Forshee
In Forshee v. Forshee,1465 the supreme court held that a pro se litigant’s property
division appeal is reviewed, similarly to a represented litigant, for: abuse of discretion in
the characterization of property and denial of motions, application of the correct legal
standard, clear error of the factual findings, and clearly unjust distribution of assets.1466
After Shan and Jack Forshee’s divorce trial, in which Jack represented himself,1467 Jack
appealed the superior court’s judgments on the value of various marital assets and its
decision not to consider additional debts. 1468 The supreme court held that, although less
stringent standards are applied to pro se litigants, the standard of review remains abuse of
discretion.1469 The supreme court found that Jack voluntarily proceeded without counsel
and did not establish that he was unable to represent himself. 1470 The superior court’s
judgments regarding the value of marital assets and the lack of evidence of fraud and
duress in the divorce settlement were not clearly erroneous. 1471 Finally, Jack was given
repeated opportunities to introduce debts and did not. 1472 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s judgments, holding that in considering a pro se litigant’s property
division, it did not abuse its discretion, it correctly applied the legal standard, it made no
clear errors in factual findings, and it made no clearly unjust distribution of assets. 1473
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St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the
United Methodist Church, Inc.
In St. Paul Church, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference
of the United Methodist Church, Inc.,1474 the supreme court held that property disputes
from a schism of two religious groups should be resolved using a neutral principles
approach and that the new religious group should be entitled to its former name.1475 The
Board of Trustees of the Alaska Missionary Conference of the United Methodist Church,
Inc. (“AMC”) is the regional conference of the United Methodist Church (“UMC”).1476
St. Paul Church, Inc. (“St. Paul Church”) had signed agreements subjecting their property
to UMC.1477 AMC filed a complaint against St. Paul Church for breach of contract,
trespass, and other offenses.1478 The supreme court held that the disputed properties
belonged to AMC under a neutral principles approach,1479 which examines “the deeds to
the church property, the charter of the local church, the book of order or discipline of the
general church organization, and the state statutes governing the holding of the church
property . . . .”1480 Under this approach, the disputed property belonged to AMC despite
St. Paul Church’s claims that there had not been unequivocal intent or property when the
trust was formed. 1481 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling, holding
that a trust was created by St. Paul that granted UMC ownership of the disputed property.
1482

Young v. Embley
In Young v. Embley,1483 the supreme court held that a junior lienholder has the
right to cure a senior interest holder’s default on a deed of trust, and a foreclosure cannot
occur unless the junior lienholder has had an opportunity to cure the default.1484 Young
and Dang operated a bed-and-breakfast together, but Dang held sole title to the property
and executed a deed of trust on it, which eventually came to be held by Embley, without
the knowledge of Young.1485 Dang defaulted on the deed of trust and, with a foreclosure
sale pending, granted a lien on the property to Young.1486 Young attempted to stop the
foreclosure sale, arguing that she had the right to cure the default but was not told the
amount owed until the morning of the foreclosure sale and thus did not have time to cure
the default before the property was sold.1487 The supreme court held that deeds of trust,
like mortgages, also carry the equity of redemption, and this right to equitable redemption
also extends to junior interest holders, since their interest would be completely cut off at
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foreclosure.1488 The supreme court then interpreted Alaska Statute section 34.20.070(b)
to extend the right of cure beyond the obligor.1489 Because Young did not learn the
amount owed within a reasonable time before foreclosure, the foreclosure sale was
invalid.1490 The supreme court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Embley,
holding that the junior lienholder has a right to cure the default on a deed of trust and that
the junior lienholder must be given a reasonable amount of time to do so before a
foreclosure sale can be held.1491
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XVIII. TAX LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers Ass’n v. Fairbanks North Star
Borough
In Interior Cabaret, Hotel & Retailers Ass’n v. Fairbanks North Star
Borough,1492 the supreme court held that a proposed borough tax on alcohol was legal,
because it was area-wide and because the non-discrimination statute that requires the
imposition of other sales taxes is fulfilled by a single hotel tax.1493 The Interior Cabaret,
Hotel & Retailers Association (“Association”) sued the Fairbanks North Star Borough
(“Borough”) to challenge a proposed sales tax on alcohol on grounds that it was not
“areawide” as required by statute and that it violated a non-discrimination law that
required another sales tax to be imposed in the area.1494 The superior court granted
summary judgment for the Borough, and the Association appealed.1495 The supreme
court held that, though the ordinance exempted alcoholic beverage sales to the extent that
they were already taxed by cities, the tax was still “areawide” because the exemptions
were defined by the application of another tax rather than by geography.1496
Furthermore, the supreme court held that the statute prohibiting municipalities from
imposing an alcohol tax without taxing at least one other commodity can be fulfilled by
the imposition of a sales tax on just one single source other than alcohol1497 and was
fulfilled by the Borough’s room tax on hotels.1498 The supreme court affirmed the
decision of the superior court, holding that the proposed tax on alcohol was legal because
it was area-wide and because it was non-discriminatory, since hotel rooms were also
taxed.1499

Northwest Medical Imaging, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue
In Northwest Medical Imaging, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue,1500 the
supreme court held that Alaska may tax a corporation if it continues to do business in
Alaska after it has been administratively dissolved in its state of incorporation.1501 Dr.
James Pister incorporated Northwest Medical Imaging, Inc. (“Northwest”) under the laws
of the State of Washington in 1988.1502 Effective 1990, Northwest was administratively
dissolved by Washington State.1503 However, Northwest continued to act as a
corporation in Alaska, providing radiology services and signing contracts as a corporation
1492
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until 1998.1504 The Alaska Department of Revenue sued to collect taxes on corporate
activity between 1991 and 1995.1505 The Office of Tax Appeals determined that
Northwest did not have to pay taxes because it had been dissolved, but the superior court
reversed.1506 The supreme court held that the Office of Tax Appeals had original subject
matter jurisdiction because it was legislatively created to hear tax disputes, such as the
question of whether a corporation exists for tax purposes.1507 The Department of
Revenue, in turn, has the right to hold hearings to decide tax disputes.1508 Federal law
adopted by Alaska, rather than Washington law, decides when a corporation ceases to
exist for tax purposes.1509 Under federal law, a corporation ceases to exist when it has
been dissolved, has stopped business activity, and has relinquished all assets.1510 Here,
the corporation did not stop business activity.1511 Therefore, it remained a taxable
corporation despite being administratively dissolved.1512 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court, holding that Alaska may tax a corporation if it continues to do business in
Alaska after it has been administratively dissolved in its state of incorporation.1513
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XIX. TORT LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
In re Exxon Valdez
In In re Exxon Valdez,1514 the Ninth Circuit held that the ratio of punitive damages
to harm suffered in the Exxon Valdez oil spill was excessive and ordered a $2 billion
remittitur of damages, reducing the punitive-damages award to $2.5 billion.1515 The
original $5 billion punitive-damages award in the Exxon Valdez suit following the 1989
oil spill had been reduced to $4.5 billion by the district court after two remands,
representing an 8.93-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to harm suffered.1516 Both parties
appealed.1517 The Ninth Circuit held that, under BMW v. Gore1518 and State Farm,1519
punitive damages are reviewed under three guideposts: (1) reprehensibility of
misconduct, (2) ratio of punitive damages to harm suffered, and (3) comparable statutory
penalties.1520 Here, (1) under the State Farm sub-factors, Exxon’s conduct was at a high
level of reprehensibility, but its mitigation efforts reduced this level to mid-range;1521 (2)
Exxon’s pre-judgment compensatory payments were properly included in harm when
calculating the appropriate punitive damages-to-harm ratio,1522 but a ratio above 5-to-1
would violate due process because the conduct was not intentional and because Exxon
took mitigating action, including cleanup efforts and monetary compensation;1523 and (3)
legislatures have taken oil spills seriously.1524 In sum, Exxon’s reckless conduct justified
severe, but not the most severe, punitive damages, and a ratio of 5-to-1 was
appropriate.1525 The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case, holding that the ratio between punitive damages to harm suffered
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill exceeded the appropriate ratio by a material factor and
ordering that the punitive-damage award be reduced to $2.5 billion.1526

Alaska Supreme Court
Anderson v. PPCT Management Systems, Inc.
In Anderson v. PPCT Management Systems, Inc.,1527 the supreme court held that
damages could not be awarded based on retained control or vicarious liability theories
because there was no agency or master-servant relationship, but that summary judgment
1514
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was improperly awarded on the negligence claim because the creator of the training
programs had a duty of care that could create legal liability.1528 Anderson alleged that
she was injured during a training program given by an instructor certified by PPCT
Management Systems, Inc. (“PPCT”).1529 PPCT designs use-of-force training programs
for use by criminal justice agencies.1530 Rather then send out their own trainers, PPCT
creates a training manual and trains agency employees on how to teach the course.1531
Anderson appealed the superior court’s summary judgment rulings with respect to the
existence of a master-servant relationship, agency, control retained by PPCT, and a
breach of duty of PPCT towards Anderson.1532 The supreme court held that there was no
agency or master-servant relationship, primarily because PPCT did not maintain
sufficient control over the instructors in their work.1533 Specifically, PPCT did not have
the right to perform safety inspections, order a training stopped or resumed, and, although
it could make suggestions, the agencies were not required to abide by them.1534
However, the superior court had framed Anderson’s negligence claim too narrowly, that
PPCT had a duty of care, and it was a jury question as to whether PPCT had provided
sufficient warnings and safety precautions for instructor trainers and instructors.1535 The
supreme court affirmed part and reversed part of the superior court’s summary judgment
rulings, holding that damages could not be awarded on retained control or vicarious
liability theories because there was no agency or master-servant relationship, but that
summary judgment was improperly awarded on the negligence claim because the creator
of the training programs had a duty of care that could create legal liability.1536

B.R. v. State, Department of Corrections
In B.R. v. State, Department of Corrections,1537 the supreme court held that a
complaint against the state should not be dismissed if at least one claim falls outside of
intentional-tort immunity, thus leaving a triable issue.1538 B.R. was a federal prisoner
who alleged that during a visit to the jail’s medical center, a physician’s assistant (“PA”)
assaulted her sexually.1539 During a subsequent visit to the medical center, B.R. alleged
that she was assaulted again and it is unclear whether she was provided a protective
escort as she had requested.1540 In her suit, B.R. alleged that the Alaska Department of
Corrections ( “ADC”) was liable for the PA’s assault and was negligent in hiring the
assistant and in failing to adequately train employees to handle occurrences of such
misconduct.1541 The ADC invoked intentional-tort immunity, and the superior court
1528
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granted summary judgment in its favor.1542 The supreme court held that while the state is
not liable for the actual assault by their employee, it can still be liable for breaching the
independent duty to protect B.R. from assault.1543 In order for that claim to succeed, it
must be grounded in a governmental duty that is distinct from the intentional tort duty
and that exists even if the assailant were not a government employee.1544 The supreme
court held that B.R.’s complaint had at least one theory of liability based on the ADC’s
failure to supervise other employees in protecting B.R. from assault, and as such,
summary judgment was inappropriate.1545 The supreme court reversed the grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for trial, holding that the prisoner’s complaint
presented triable issues as to whether the ADC had violated its duty to protect her from
assault.1546

DeNardo v. Bax
In DeNardo v. Bax,1547 the supreme court held that there exists a conditional
privilege for communications among co-workers about personal safety and that a
showing of ill will on the part of the communicator is not per se evidence that the
privilege has been abused.1548 DeNardo and Bax were co-workers.1549 Bax made
statements to her co-workers that she believed DeNardo was stalking her, and as a result
DeNardo filed a lawsuit claiming that Bax’s statements were maliciously made and
libelous.1550 The supreme court first held that, because it had previously recognized
privilege for statements made to protect business interests and also for public safety, there
should be a conditional privilege when a co-worker makes a statement to another coworker concerning the safety of the workplace.1551 Regarding DeNardo’s claim that Bax
had made the statements maliciously and had thus abused the privilege,1552 it is possible
for malice to be a violation of the privilege, but even where there is malice, if the proper
motives are predominant, the publisher’s personal ill will toward the alleged victim does
not control.1553 The supreme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Bax,
holding that there is a conditional privilege for communications among co-workers about
personal safety and that a showing of malice is not per se evidence that the privilege has
been abused.1554
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Hagen Insurance, Inc. v. Roller
In Hagen Insurance, Inc. v. Roller,1555 the supreme court held that an injured
worker was eligible for non-economic damages for emotional distress when an insurer’s
negligence caused physical injury, that allowing expert testimony was not an abuse of
discretion given the complexity of calculating workers’ compensation benefits, and that it
was not an error to grant a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages when there
was no evidence of malice or reckless indifference.1556 Roller applied for workers’
compensation insurance through Hagen Insurance, Inc. (“Hagen”), but when Roller was
injured on the job, the policy had not yet taken effect.1557 A jury found that Hagen was
negligent in securing the coverage and awarded damages to Roller; Hagen and Roller
both appealed.1558 Hagen argued that there was insufficient evidence to support an award
of emotional distress damages and that the testimony of Roller’s expert should have been
excluded.1559 Roller argued that it was an error for the court to grant a directed verdict
motion on the issue of punitive damages.1560 The supreme court held that Roller was
eligible for non-economic damages for emotional distress because the jury could have
found that Hagen’s negligence prolonged Roller’s physical injury by preventing him
from receiving treatment or forcing him to return to work prematurely.1561 Also,
allowing the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, because the calculation of
workers’ compensation benefits was complex.1562 Finally, to recover punitive damages,
the plaintiff must show malice or reckless indifference, and Roller failed to do so.1563
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that an injured
worker was eligible for emotional distress damages when an insurer’s negligence
prolonged physical injury, that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow expert testimony
on the complex calculation of workers’ compensation benefits, and that it was not error to
grant a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages when there was no evidence of
malice or reckless indifference.1564

Harrold v. Artwohl
In Harrold v. Artwohl,1565 the supreme court held that a patient who was not told
by the surgeon that a CT scan could rule out the need for an immediate appendectomy
raised a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial.1566 After a preliminary CT scan,
Harrold was diagnosed with appendicitis.1567 Artwohl, the surgeon, confirmed the
diagnosis and recommended immediate surgery without an additional CT scan; Harrold
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consented, and the appendix was removed but was found to be healthy.1568 The superior
court, finding that Harrold had enough information and had given informed consent,
granted Artwohl’s motion for summary judgment.1569 The supreme court held that a
patient who was not told by his surgeon that a second CT scan could rule out the need for
an immediate appendectomy raised a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial,
because a reasonable patient could deem that information crucial to his treatment
decision.1570 Harrold asserted in an affidavit that no one told him that the second CT scan
could confirm the diagnosis with ninety-eight percent accuracy, which would have
changed his treatment decision.1571 Because a reasonable patient could view this
additional knowledge as important in deciding whether to give consent, the issue must be
decided at trial.1572 The supreme court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment, holding that a patient who was not told by the surgeon that a second CT scan
could rule out the need for an immediate appendectomy raised a genuine issue of material
fact requiring a trial.1573

Haynes v. McComb
In Haynes v. McComb,1574 the supreme court held that an attorney was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law in a legal malpractice action because the attorney’s
client’s criminal conviction had been vacated.1575 A former criminal defendant sued his
attorney and her employer, the Alaska Public Defender Agency (collectively “attorney”),
for legal malpractice.1576 The superior court granted the attorney’s motion for summary
judgment based on the affirmative defense of actual guilt, and the client appealed.1577
Because the attorney relied solely on an appellate court opinion which was subsequently
vacated, the supreme court held that the appellate opinion could be used neither as a
collateral estoppel bar nor for evidentiary purposes.1578 As such, the attorney had not
made a prima facie case of actual guilt, and was thus not entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.1579 The supreme court reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded
the case, holding that the attorney was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in a
legal malpractice action where the client’s conviction, the sole basis of the attorney’s
defense, had been vacated.1580
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Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections
In Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections,1581 the supreme court held that a
plaintiff’s claim of negligent record keeping was not materially distinct from a false
imprisonment claim that was blocked by state immunity.1582 Due to an oversight by the
Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Kinegak was falsely incarcerated for seven days
past the completion of his sentences.1583 Kinegak filed a civil suit against the DOC
alleging negligent computation of release date leading to negligent, unjustified continued
incarceration.1584 The DOC responded by claiming sovereign immunity under a state
statute authorizing immunity against claims arising out of false imprisonment.1585 The
superior court granted the DOC summary judgment and Kinegak appealed. 1586 The
supreme court overruled its own prior case, Zebre v. State,1587 and held that, in order to
prevail, a plaintiff must claim harm that is materially distinct from claims for which the
state is entitled to immunity.1588 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s
dismissal of the complaint, holding that a plaintiff’s claim of negligent record keeping
was not materially distinct from a false imprisonment claim that was blocked by state
immunity.1589

Kirk v. Demientieff
In Kirk v. Demientieff,1590 the supreme court held that an attorney’s attempt to
intervene in a former client’s appeal was untimely.1591 Demientieff retained Kirk to
represent her in a tort action against United Companies.1592 Kirk mailed the complaint to
the court the day before the statute of limitations ran, but the court did not receive
delivery on time and dismissed the case.1593 Kirk wanted to petition for reconsideration
because he believed that the complaint was late due to a mishap with the mail; however,
Demientieff hired other counsel and filed a malpractice suit.1594 Nearly a year after the
original action, Demientieff agreed to allow Kirk to petition for reconsideration in her
name.1595 Reconsideration was denied.1596 Demientieff withdrew the suit against United
Companies, and Kirk tried to intervene by claim of right.1597 The trial court denied the
intervention because it was untimely.1598 The supreme court held that the intervention
1581
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was not timely because Kirk had knowledge that his interests had diverged from
Demientieff’s eighteen months prior to the intervention1599 and because reopening the
case would be prejudicial to United Companies but not significantly prejudicial to
Kirk.1600 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that an
attorney’s attempt to intervene in a former client’s appeal was untimely.1601

Lamb v. Anderson
In Lamb v. Anderson,1602 the supreme court held that a conviction for a crime
collaterally estops a defendant in a civil trial from re-litigating the essential elements of
the crime of which he was convicted.1603 Anderson drove drunk and crashed into Lamb’s
motorcycle, severely injuring Lamb.1604 Anderson pled no contest to three separate
criminal charges.1605 Lamb filed a civil suit against Anderson for negligence and sought
punitive damages for “outrageous or reckless conduct.”1606 Lamb moved for summary
judgment as to the liability for punitive damages because Anderson had already pled
guilty to the assault, but the superior court denied the motion.1607 The supreme court held
that current law already collaterally estopped a civil plaintiff from re-litigating essential
elements of the crime to which they had pled no contest, and the court extended this to
apply to civil defendants as well.1608 Under the Scott1609 test, there are three elements to
collaterally estop a defendant from denying an essential element of the offense: (1) the
conviction was for a serious criminal offense, (2) the defendant had a full and fair
hearing, and (3) it was clear to the jury which facts have been determined and which have
not.1610 All three elements were satisfied in this situation, so Anderson was collaterally
estopped from denying recklessness, but because punitive damages are available, yet not
required, the inquiry as to the punitive damages remained open.1611 The supreme court
held that a plea of no contest in the criminal case prevented defendant from denying the
elements of that offense in the civil trial but did not necessarily require punitive
damages.1612
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Lightle v. State
In Lightle v. State,1613 the supreme court held that fraudulent misrepresentation
does not require an intent to deceive, but only knowledge of some falsity of the
misrepresentation by the maker and intent that the recipient act in reliance.1614 Lightle, a
real estate agent, listed a house as an “active listing” with a note indicating a previous
pending offer.1615 When Seeley asked about the house, Lightle stated that the previous
offer was “dead.” 1616 Seeley made an offer on the house and Lightle eventually assured
her that the house was hers. 1617 Seeley cancelled her lease and incurred moving
expenses. 1618 Upon learning that a “Back-up Addendum” had been added, stating that
Seeley’s offer was only a back-up offer in case the original one fell through, Seeley
refused to accept the agreement.1619 She filed a claim with the Alaska Real Estate
Commission’s (“Commission”) real estate surety fund. 1620 The Commission’s hearing
officer concluded that Lightle had committed fraudulent misrepresentation, and the
superior court confirmed the conclusion. 1621 The supreme court held that fraudulent
misrepresentation does not require an intent to deceive, but only knowledge of the
fraudulence of the statement and that the recipient will act in reliance of that statement.
1622
Even though Lightle asserted that his statements were literally true at the time, the
supreme court found that they constituted half-truths, and as such still qualified as
Since Lightle intended that Seely rely on his statements,
misrepresentations. 1623
Lightle’s actions did constitute fraudulent misrepresentation. 1624 The supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s ruling, holding that fraudulent misrepresentation does not
require an intent to deceive, but only knowledge of some falsity of the misrepresentation
by the maker and intent that the recipient act in reliance.1625

Marsingill v. O’Malley
In Marsingill v. O’Malley,1626 the supreme court held that the superior court
properly instructed the jury on the reasonable patient standard with respect to physician
informed consent, did not allow inadmissible expert testimony, but awarded excessive
and improper attorneys’ fees.1627 Marsingill, suffering of stomach pains, called Dr.
O’Malley.1628 O’Malley advised her to go to the emergency room, but did not speculate
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as to the seriousness of her condition.1629 Marsingill did not go to the hospital and
subsequently suffered brain damage and partial paralysis.1630 O’Malley won a jury
verdict and attorneys’ fees, and Marsingill appealed.1631 The supreme court held that the
jury instructions properly stated the reasonable patient standard,1632 and that the expert
evidence of other doctors was relevant because the doctors had expertise due to
experience in knowing what advice patients desire and respond to.1633 The supreme court
further found that the attorneys’ fees were excessive, because they included noncompensable work involving lobbying appellate efforts.1634 The supreme court affirmed
the decision of the superior court, holding that the superior court properly instructed the
jury on the reasonable patient standard with respect to physician informed consent and
did not allow inadmissible expert testimony, but vacated and remanded the improper
award of attorneys’ fees.1635

Pederson v. Barnes
In Pederson v. Barnes,1636 the supreme court held that a guardian’s lawyer is
liable to the ward for the guardian’s wrongdoing only where the lawyer knew or had
reason to know of the wrongdoing and that pure several liability applies to duty-toprotect cases.1637 After becoming guardian for his orphaned niece, Aiken was convicted
of stealing and spending her estate assets.1638 Pederson, Aiken’s attorney, had failed to
confirm the validity of Aiken’s suspicious financial statements and had refuted claims of
wrongdoing on Aiken’s behalf.1639 A jury found Pederson forty percent at fault and
Aiken sixty percent at fault for compensatory damages arising from Aiken’s fraud.1640
The supreme court held that the proper liability standard for a guardian’s lawyer with
respect to a ward was the lawyer knowing or having “reason to know” (as opposed to
“should know”) of wrongdoing.1641 Also, pure several liability applies to duty-to-protect
cases, and thus damages should have been apportioned between Aiken and Pederson
according to the jury’s determination of fault.1642 The supreme court vacated the award
of compensatory damages and remanded the case, holding that a guardian’s lawyer is
liable to the ward for the guardian’s wrongdoing only where the lawyer knew or had
reason to know of the wrongdoing and that pure several liability applies to duty-toprotect cases.1643
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XX. TRUSTS AND ESTATES LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Blodgett v. Blodgett
In Blodgett v. Blodgett,1644 the supreme court held that no manifest injustice
resulted from applying Alaska’s “slayer statute” to a son who negligently killed his
father.1645 Richard Blodgett pled no contest to the negligent homicide of his father in
2003, and then attempted to participate in the probate proceedings for his father’s will.1646
The other beneficiaries of the will contended that, pursuant to the “slayer statute,”1647—
which prevents an heir from inheriting from a decedent he has killed—Blodgett was
precluded from benefiting.1648 The superior court agreed, explaining that under the
statute forfeiture is mandatory for negligent homicides unless there is a showing of
manifest injustice, which Blodgett failed to prove.1649 The supreme court held that, under
the “slayer statute,” Blodgett failed to demonstrate manifest injustice sufficient to warrant
participating in the probate proceedings, because Blodgett failed to show that his conduct
differed from that of others convicted of negligent homicide.1650 Additionally, the court
rejected: (1) Blodgett’s claim of being deprived due process because he was given
sufficient notice and a hearing;1651 (2) his allegation that forfeiture under the “slayer
statute” violated the Forfeiture of Estate Clause of the Alaska Constitution because the
clause is not implicated by the “slayer statute”;1652 and (3) his claim that the ex post facto
clause of the Alaska Constitution applied to a life insurance policy he procured for his
father before the “slayer statute” was passed because it concerned a non-probate asset.1653
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that applying
Alaska’s “slayer statute” to Richard Blodgett would not result in manifest injustice.1654
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